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Abstract 
Energy service contracting consists in the outsourcing of energy-related services to a 
contractor, an Energy Service Company (ESCO), through a long-term contract. This 
business model has been deemed, in the literature, a promising market-based 
instrument to foster the deployment of renewable energy and energy conservation 
projects. This thesis examines empirically the determinants of adoption of energy 
service contracting and their underlying economic mechanisms. After a general 
introduction including a critical literature review, the first chapter focuses on adoption 
of energy supply contracting (ESC), while the second chapter examines the 
willingness to opt for energy performance contracting (EPC). The last chapter 
assesses how new energy policies could expand the supply-side of ESC and EPC. 
The analyses are based on three original datasets, including real contractual choices 
and two stated choice experiments targeted at the potential demand and supply of the 
energy service contracting market. The empirical evidence suggests that risk sharing 
is an important determinant of the client’s adoption. Economies of scale and trust 
have also an impact, while the financing from the ESCO has a positive effect only for 
a minority of energy consumers. The transaction costs involved in these contracts are 
exacerbated by the number of decision-makers involved. On the supply side, only 
important changes in the energy market, such as the implementation of White 
Certificates or an increase in the demand of energy contracting from both public and 
private clients, have a significant impact on the willingness to enter the ESCO market. 
Using original empirical methods, this PhD thesis provides new insights in the 
mechanisms that could foster the diffusion of these contracts and exploit their 
potential in the energy transition and in business opportunities.  
Keywords: energy service contracting, energy efficiency, renewable energy, risk 
sharing, transaction cost economics, energy service company (ESCO) 
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Résumé 
Les contrats de services énergétiques consistent à externaliser au travers d’un 
contrat de longue durée la provision et l’optimisation de services d’énergie à un 
contracteur, nommé ESCO (Energy Service Company). Ce modèle d’affaire est perçu 
dans la littérature comme un instrument de marché prometteur pour déployer des 
projets liant énergie renouvelable et économies d’énergie. Cette thèse étudie 
empiriquement les déterminants d’adoption des contrats de service énergétique et les 
mécanismes économiques sous-jacents. Faisant suite à une introduction générale 
contenant une revue critique de la littérature, le premier chapitre se concentre sur 
l’adoption des contrats de fourniture énergétique, alors que le second chapitre 
examine la volonté d’opter pour des contrats de performance énergétique. Le dernier 
chapitre explore comment de nouvelles politiques énergétiques pourraient étendre 
l’offre de ces contrats. Les analyses reposent sur trois bases de données inédites, 
découlant de choix contractuels réels et de deux expériences à choix (préférences 
exprimées) ciblant la demande et l’offre potentielles sur le marché des contrats de 
services énergétiques. L’analyse empirique montre que le partage du risque est un 
déterminant important dans le choix du client d’adopter de tels contrats. Les 
économies d’échelle et la confiance ont aussi un impact, alors que le financement par 
l’ESCO a un effet positif seulement pour une minorité. Les coûts de transactions de 
ces contrats sont exacerbés par le nombre de décisionnaires impliqués. Du côté de 
l’offre, seuls d’importants changements sur le marché de l’énergie, par exemple 
l’introduction de certificats blancs ou une augmentation de la demande de contracting 
de la part des clients privés et publics, ont un impact significatif sur l’offre. En se 
basant sur des méthodes empiriques inédites dans le domaine, cette thèse de 
doctorat offre de nouvelles perspectives sur les mécanismes susceptibles d’étendre 
la diffusion de ces contrats et ainsi exploiter leur potentiel dans la transition 
énergétique et les opportunités commerciales. 
Mots-clés: Contrats de service énergétiques, efficacité énergétique, énergies 
renouvelables, partage du risque, économie des coûts de transaction, ESCO 
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Introduction 
1 Motivation 
The Swiss authorities are considering to progressively abandon nuclear power while 
ensuring security of energy supply via a smooth transition to a sustainable and low 
carbon economy. In this context, it is crucial to attract sufficient investments in both 
renewable technologies and energy efficiency. The success of the energy policy 
programs will depend on the extent to which they can identify and overcome market 
barriers to investment. Thus, the potential of instruments such as energy contracting 
in Switzerland should be explored. 
Energy service contracting is considered as a market-based instrument that can 
facilitate investments in renewable and efficient energy services and combines 
business opportunities with social benefits. These contracts have resulted in 
important energy savings (Soroye and Nilsson, 2010; Goldman et al., 2012) and 
investment in innovative renewable energy systems (Bleyl, 2011). In 2011, the 
aggregate revenues for the contractors were estimated to reach $5 billion in the US 
(Gilligan, 2011), and 3.5 to 5 billion Euros in Germany in 2013 (Bertoldi et al., 2014). 
Yet, the potential of energy service contracting does not seem to be fully exploited 
(Backlund and Thollander, 2011). In most countries indeed, these contracts have 
been applied only to large energy consuming buildings in specific market segments 
(Backlund and Thollander, 2011; Pätäri et al., 2016). In Switzerland, despite strong 
financial institutions and credit-worthy private and public institutions, the Energy 
Supply Contracting market has experienced a slow growth while Energy Performance 
Contracting has only recently started to emerge.  
This PhD thesis intends to answer the following question: What are the determinants, 
and the underlying economic mechanisms, for adoption of energy service 
contracting? While the literature on energy contracting is wide and has benefitted 
from the contribution of experts coming from many fields such as engineering, 
business management, public policy, physics, law or finance, this thesis focuses on 
the economic perspective and uses econometric tools to answer this question. More 
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specifically, the determinants of energy service contracting are explored using 
economic theories on vertical integration, transaction cost economics, risk sharing, 
access to capital and economies of scale. This thesis uses empirical evidence from 
both the demand side and the supply side of the Swiss market of energy service 
contracting. The main contribution of this thesis relies on the original datasets and on 
the econometric methods used to explore energy service contracting adoption, 
namely discrete choice experiments. 
This introductory chapter provides a critical review of the existing literature and 
exposes the contribution of the thesis.1 The chapter is structured as follows: the next 
section reviews the definition and concepts of energy service contracting, as well as 
the technologies and contractual schemes involved. The interest of energy service 
contracting is exposed in section 3 and a presentation of the general tendencies on 
the markets is provided in section 4. A literature review of the determinants of 
adoption of energy service contracting is provided in section 5 for theoretical 
contributions and 6 for empirical evidence. The role of the government is discussed in 
section 7. The contribution of the PhD thesis is then exposed in section 8, and is 
followed by some concluding remarks. 
2 Energy Service Contracting 
2.1 Definition and concept 
Energy service contracting involves the provision of energy services. Although many 
definitions of energy services exist in the literature, the relevant definition in the 
context of energy service contracting is provided by a directive of the European 
Parliament (Fell, 2017): “Energy service: the physical benefit, utility or good derived 
from a combination of energy with energy efficient technology and/or with action, 
which may include the operations, maintenance and control necessary to deliver the 
service, which is delivered on the basis of a contract and in normal circumstances has 
proven to lead to verifiable and measurable or estimable energy efficiency 
improvement and/or primary energy savings.“ 
 
                                            
1 Substantial parts of this chapter are based on Klinke et al. (2017). 
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In this thesis, the conditions under which an activity is considered as energy service 
contracting, and under which a contractor is considered as an ESCO (Energy Service 
Company) follow Sorrell (2005): “A necessary feature of an energy service contract 
appears to be the transfer of decision rights over key items of energy equipment 
under the terms and conditions of a long-term contract, including incentives to 
maintain and improve equipment performance over time.” 
Firms, public communities and house-owners usually outsource some of the activities 
related to the provision of energy services. However, these activities are considered 
as energy contracting only if the contractor has decision rights over the installations 
and/or the operation and an incentive to optimize equipment performance once the 
equipment is installed. As a result, conventional projects of construction or retrofit 
where the contractor or the engineer is paid at project delivery are not considered as 
energy service contracting, since the contractor is not involved in operating the 
installation and there is no long-term contract. 
Energy service contracts involve at least two parties. The clients are typically the 
owners of the building. The contractors are called Energy Service Companies 
(ESCOs), which are typically energy utilities, energy equipment and appliances 
providers, facility managers or general companies. 
The literature often refers to two different types of energy contracting: Energy Supply 
Contracting (ESC) and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) that are defined in the 
following sections.  
2.2 Energy Supply Contracting (ESC) 
ESC, also called Delivery Contracting (DC) (Marino et al., 2011), covers usually one 
or more streams of useful energy (e.g. steam/hot water, coolant, electricity), but the 
contractor exerts no or little control over the demand of energy services (e.g. room 
heating, ventilation, lighting). In these contracts, the ESCO typically has no incentive 
to reduce energy service demand because it is usually paid by an indexed unit price 
for delivered energy plus a fix amount for the equipment. Helle (1997) presents the 
main characteristics of ESC: “The characteristics feature of that type of contracting is 
to be found in its shifting the interface between energy suppliers and energy 
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consumers by one (conversion) stage along the energy chain (primary energy - final 
energy -useful energy -energy services). While with the traditional energy market 
structure the interface between energy supplier and energy consumer is placed at the 
stage of supplying final energy, contracting from the energy supplier’s point of view 
constitutes a forward integration.” 
The characteristics given by Helle (1997) imply that the adoption of ESC by the client 
consists in some way in outsourcing useful energy provision to an ESCO. This remark 
has been used by Sorrell (2007) to relate the decision to opt for ESC to the literature 
of vertical integration and transaction costs economics. This framework applied to the 
ESC choice will be reviewed in a following section. 
Another general characteristic of ESC relies on the fact that the ESCO keeps the 
ownership of the installation during the contract’s duration. 
Energy supply contracting in Europe mostly promotes energy efficiency, renewable 
energy provision or innovative technologies for the delivery of heat (Bleyl, 2011). 
These types of contracts often involves technologies for the production of heating, hot 
water or cooling, such as heat pumps, biomass heating (pellets or woodchips), or 
solar (thermal).  
2.3 Energy performance contracting (EPC) 
Energy performance contracting delivers energy savings to the building owner. The 
basic principle of EPC is that a contractor assesses, develops and finances energy 
efficiency measures. By monitoring the technical installations, the contractor provides 
its client with a reduction in energy costs in exchange for a fixed fee or part of the 
savings achieved. The contractor finances the equipment or guarantees energy 
savings to the building owner. EPC differs from ESC in the fact that the contractor 
does have an influence on the demand of energy services and delivers energy 
savings to the client. Typical measures proposed within EPC are efficient lighting, 
heating control systems, energy automation systems, and occasionally improved 
insulation of the building envelope and combined heat and power (CHP) systems 
(IEA-RETD, 2013). The two dominant EPC models are shared savings and 
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guaranteed savings (Hansen, 2006), which are mainly differentiated by the financing 
characteristic: 
 Shared savings: the ESCO typically finances or receives financing by a third party in 
order to design and implement the project. Energy cost savings are then shared 
between the two parties.  
 Guaranteed savings: In this model, the client carries the financing or gets financing by 
a third party. The ESCO guarantees that the energy saved will meet a certain 
threshold. Otherwise, the ESCO reimburse the difference. In these types of contracts, 
the ESCO is typically paid a fixed fee. 
The fact that the ESCO is paid or provides guarantees according to the savings 
achieved obliges the two parties to agree on the measurement and verification 
methods of the outcome.  
Other EPC schemes exist and can mix the characteristics of shared savings and 
guaranteed savings. The methods of financing are flexible and can involve a share of 
the actions financed by the ESCO while the rest is invested by the client. An 
additional actor such as an investor can also be part of the contract, as in the 
forfaiting scheme (swissesco, 2016). In this scheme, the investor finances partly or 
completely the installation and gets in return a corresponding predefined fixed share 
of the savings (from the client or the ESCO). As in the guaranteed-savings scheme, 
the client also pays a fixed fee to the ESCO which provides in return a guarantee on 
the energy savings achieved. In practice, it is also possible to see more 
comprehensive contracts that combine characteristics of both ESC and EPC. For 
instance, EPC can involve the financing of renewable energy technologies, such as 
solar photovoltaic systems, thermal collectors or heat pumps. ESC can also include 
quality insurance for energy efficiency measures as in the so-called Integrated Energy 
Contracting model (Bleyl, 2011).  
2.4 ESC versus EPC 
ESC provides energy delivery while EPC provides energy savings. This results in the 
fact that ESC often includes renewable energy technologies while EPC rather focuses 
on equipment increasing energy efficiency. While the contractor is required to 
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decrease energy costs in EPC, there is no mean or incentive to reduce the energy 
consumption in ESC. 
Despite this main divergence, the two types of contracts are closely related. First, 
both ESC and EPC provide risk sharing mechanisms. This is the case even if 
different risks prevail in each type: risk related to energy provision and renewable 
energy for ESC and risk related to energy savings for EPC. 
Second, as both types of contracts can involve financing from the ESCO, they can 
both be seen as financing mechanisms.  
Thus, the economic theory underlying the client’s choice to opt for ESC or EPC is 
comparable (Sorrell, 2007). EPC and ESC are operating on the same supply chain of 
energy services, although EPC can be seen as a variant of ESC which goes deeper 
in terms of the ESCO’s control on the energy distribution process.2  
These similarities justify the interest of discussing the results in the contexts of both 
ESC and EPC in this PhD thesis. For instance, while chapter 1 focuses on ESC, EPC 
literature will still be discussed throughout the chapter. In this case, it is also relevant 
because the empirical literature on ESC adoption is inexistent while already wide on 
EPC, thus bringing insights into my empirical investigation. 
A brief literature review on the interest of energy service contracting in the context of 
renewable and energy efficiency is further discussed in the next section. 
3 The interest of energy service contracting 
3.1 Renewable energy and the role of ESC 
Investment in the development and production of small scale renewable technologies 
has been seen earlier in the literature as sub-optimal, due to barriers such as lack of 
access to capital, missing information and awareness, and restricted access to 
technology at a reasonable price (Painuly, 2001). 
In particular, many small-scale renewable technologies for heating and cooling are 
produced by SMEs that cannot reach the critical level to benefit from economies of 
                                            
2 See Sorrell, 2007 for a diagram explaining the energy distribution process. 
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scale (IEA-RETD, 2013). Moreover, the uncertainty concerning new technologies may 
bias consumers’ decision towards status quo or may imply that it is rational for 
consumers to delay investments. In this case, the literature calls this phenomenon 
irreversibility (Pindyck, 1991; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).  
Finally, any reasonable diffusions of renewable energy, let alone a mass-market 
development, depend also on the success of energy utilities to identify and exploit the 
potential market niches with a relatively high willingness to invest. However, the 
interested companies might be unable to identify and target the relevant potential 
customers. Indeed, although existing research shows positive willingness to pay for 
green energy (Borchers et al., 2007 among others), empirical evidence suggests that 
the estimates are highly heterogeneous across individuals and technologies 
(Borchers et al., 2007; Scarpa and Willis, 2010). As a result, while renewable 
technologies are significantly valued by consumers, for the vast majority of them this 
value is not sufficiently large to cover the capital costs of micro-generation energy 
technologies without any kind of financial or regulatory support. 
ESC is typically used by customers to install new equipment that often involves 
renewable and/or innovative technologies such as co-generation systems (Bleyl, 
2011). However, there has been no attempt in the literature to empirically prove that 
ESC promotes investments in renewable technologies. The impact of EPC, on the 
other hand, has been explored by Okay and Akman (2010) and Fang and Miller 
(2013), who analyse its influence on CO2 emissions3. First, Okay and Akman (2010) 
use the ESCO markets’ study of Vine (2005) on 38 countries to analyze pairwise 
correlations between ESCO indicators, such as the age of EPC market, the number 
of ESCOs and the total value of ESCO projects, and country indicators, such as GDP 
per capita, CO2 emissions and energy consumption. They find positive correlations 
between ESCO indicators and CO2 emissions and conclude that this suggests that 
ESCO projects are either not necessarily targeted to emission-reduction or that the 
market is unsaturated in most countries observed. Fang and Miller (2013) reach an 
opposite conclusion using a panel of 129 countries from 1980 to 2007. Using a GMM 
                                            
3 Vine (2005), Okay and Akman (2010), Fang and Miller (2013) use the general term of ESCOs to refer to companies that are 
engaged in performance-based projects. Even if they also account for projects involving renewable energy, it is plausible to 
consider that they refer to EPC rather than ESC in their research.  
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estimation method, they find a negative impact of the existence of ESCO activities on 
CO2 emissions that increase over time. Nevertheless, the results from both studies 
may still suffer from endogeneity problems and unobserved heterogeneity across 
countries.  
As a result, there is no reliable empirical proof in the existing literature that energy 
contracting has a causal negative impact on CO2 emissions and more precisely, that 
energy contracting promotes investment in renewable energy. This is the case even if 
many authors have argued that investments in renewable technologies are promoted 
because energy contracting, and especially ESC, can reduce some of the barriers 
aforementioned. For instance, Sorrell (2005) argues that ESC allows the client to 
transfer some risk onto the ESCO, thus reducing uncertainty linked for instance to the 
technical aspects of new technologies. Also, the customer can concentrate on core 
activities while finding a way to reduce his lack of technical knowledge or access to 
capital (Sorrell, 2005; Painuly, 2001; IEA-RETD, 2013). Moreover, the long-term 
contract and the incentive it creates for the ESCO to maintain equipment performance 
during the contract implies that ESC is an “instrument to minimize life-or project cycle 
cost, including the operation phase of the building” (Bleyl, 2011, p. 185). As a result, 
limited access to innovative and renewable technology at a reasonable price, as 
stated by Painuly (2001), may actually be overcome by ESC. This opinion is 
supported by Eikmeier et al. (2009) who explore the advantage of ESC over in-house 
energy provision, once an old heating system is replaced. Using query of contracting 
companies and telephone interviews with selected market participants, they find that 
“contracting enables to counter successive declines of the annual use efficiency over 
the heater lifetime roughly 4% better on average than in-house solutions”. Sorrell 
(2007) argues also that ESC can reduce significantly technologies’ prices since 
competitive bidding induces the ESCO to minimize production and operation costs. 
Conversely, when the energy supply is managed in-house, incentives of market 
competition are not present, unless such incentives are provided by an internal 
management mechanism (Irrek et al., 2005; Capelo, 2011). Then, Sorrell (2007) 
asserts that access to expensive, promising or new technologies can be achieved at 
reasonable price thanks to the economies of scale that ESCOs experience. Indeed, 
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while he observes that organizations usually lack the scale to implement large energy 
projects, the ESCOs, through specialization and contracting with multiple clients, can 
reach significant economies of scale. 
While citing all these apparent advantages provided by ESC, it is to be kept in mind 
that a contract also incurs transaction costs. Indeed, while contracting is expected to 
reduce overall productions costs as compared to in-house procurement, the overall 
transaction costs are also expected to increase (Capelo, 2011). Even if this argument 
has been used by Capelo (2011) about EPC, this also applies to ESC where the 
client must gather information about the ESCO and the implications of the contract, 
which comes at a cost (Sorrell, 2007).  
Finally, no author has argued that ESCOs are more effective than conventional 
energy providers to target and reach customers with high willingness to pay for 
renewable energy. 
To summarize, although the existing literature suggests that there may be several 
channels through which energy contracting may support and induce investment in 
innovative and renewable technologies, there is hardly any empirical attempt to 
support these conjectures. Nevertheless, the apparent success of the ESC markets in 
Europe to supply cost-effective projects with innovative and renewable technologies 
(see for instance Bleyl, 2011) suggests that the ESCOs attracted a significant part of 
the consumers interested in investing in these technologies. 
In this context, exploring the relative importance of the mechanisms of ESC adoption 
would permit to propose contracting options that focus primarily on these important 
features, in order to develop further the ESC market and attract more customers who 
invest in promising renewable technologies. This represents the motivation of my first 
chapter of my PhD thesis, which assesses the mechanisms of ESC adoption. 
3.2 Energy efficiency 
In order to understand how energy service contracting may have a role to play in 
energy efficiency, it is important to review the literature and the concepts underlying 
the energy efficiency gap. The literature in this domain is important because it gives 
insights on how the barriers to energy efficiency could be mitigated. These barriers 
   
10 
 
could also exist in the context of renewable energy. The objective is then to review 
the literature on the role of energy service contracting in this domain. Nevertheless, 
because this PhD thesis does not aim to explore in detail the concept of the energy 
efficiency gap, the present chapter proposes a summary of the literature, which does 
not pretend to be exhaustive. 
Experts’ interest in energy efficiency investments started with Hausman (1979). By 
comparing the capital costs with the expected operating costs, Hausman (1979) 
estimated an implied discount rate of approximately 20% - well above the rates at 
which most individuals borrowed or invested money. Hausman’s observation that 
individuals do not seem to invest optimally in energy efficiency, or as stated by Jaffe 
and Stavins (1994), the existence of an energy efficiency gap, has given rise to an 
important literature (See Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). The potential reasons of this 
gap, among which market failures, have been analyzed in the literature, although its 
size remains unclear and the relative importance of its causes unknown. 
The gap may take different definitions across studies. Engineering studies typically 
compare the amount of energy efficiency investments presenting positive net present 
values with the current level of investments (See for instance EPRI, 2009; McKinsey 
Company, 2009). On the other hand, economists define the gap as the difference 
between what is optimal from the consumer’s perspective and what is actually 
invested (Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). A larger definition of the gap covers the 
difference between the socially optimal investment level in efficiency and the current 
level of investment. This chapter considers this wider definition, in order to analyze 
the role of energy service contracting in energy efficiency in general. 
Several market failures can explain the energy efficiency gap as defined by the 
economists. While it has been argued in the literature that all these causes are 
playing a significant role in the energy efficiency gap, there has been hardly any 
attempt to compare the sizes of their impact on the sub-optimal investment. 
 Split incentives may arise because the up-front costs are not paid by the individual who 
benefits from lower energy costs (IEA-RETD, 2013). Both theoretical models and 
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empirical evidence show that this results in under-investment in energy efficiency.4 Split 
incentives can occur between landlords and tenants, as well as within a firm.5 The 
landlord-tenants split incentives is of particular importance in the Swiss context where 
only 37% of the dwellings were inhabited by their owners in 2010 (OFS, 2013). 
 Imperfect information may prevent the investor from appropriately assessing ex ante the 
potential of an investment (Tietenberg, 2009; Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). Gathering 
the necessary information about the differences in quality of these investments may also 
be too costly (Allcott and Greenstone, 2012; Sorrell et al., 2004). 
 Limited access to capital or credit constraints has been cited as a market failure 
characterizing investments in energy efficiency, in cases where the lender cannot 
distinguish between good or bad credit risk borrowers (Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). 
This phenomenon is exacerbated if borrowers with a high energy savings potential have 
poor credit risk profiles (Palmer, Walls and Gerarden, 2012). Other constraints may 
prevent entities from investing in energy efficiency, such as debt ceilings (particularly 
affecting the public sector) or limited budget for non-core activities (in the case of private 
firms). In the latter case, firms may be reluctant to find external financing for investments 
that are not directly linked to the core-business (Hansen, 2006) and even if internal capital 
is available, the energy efficiency project may be considered less strategic than other 
investments (Cooremans, 2011). Finally, investors may be insufficiently informed about 
the financing options or subsidies available when making their decisions (IEA-RETD, 
2013). 
 Regulatory failures correspond to divergences between electricity prices and marginal 
costs, resulting from economic regulation of electricity markets, which may distort 
incentives to invest in energy efficiency and increase the gap when the price falls below 
marginal cost (Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). However, this effect may be only temporary 
since prices can also rise above the marginal cost, creating positive incentives to invest. 
Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argue that these potential distortions do not relate to the energy 
efficiency gap, since regulatory failures do not help in explaining non-adoption at current 
prices. 
                                            
4 See Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) and Davis (2010) for empirical evidence and the appendix of Gillingham et al. (2012) for a 
formal explanation. 
5 Within firms, split incentives may arise when the department which is in charge of investing in building technologies and the 
department who has to pay for the energy costs are separated and also have separated financial accounting.  
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 Finally, the energy efficiency gap has also been explained by the fact that consumers do 
not necessarily act according to the standard assumptions underlying the neoclassical 
economic theory. Gillingham and Palmer (2013) describe in detail the related behaviors 
that they call behavioral anomalies, such as loss aversion (Greene et al., 2009) or a 
systematic undervaluation of discounted future energy costs (Allcott and Wozny, 2012). 
Limited attention or non-standard decision-making processes lead individuals to simplify 
the decision by focusing only on certain attributes when making a choice or to stick to 
familiar or salient options.6 
 Other insights may be brought into the energy efficiency gap literature by exploring how 
other non-financial considerations affect the decision to invest in energy efficiency 
(Cooremans, 2011; Cooremans, 2012), such as power relationships within the firms or the 
firm’s strategy. The investment category in terms of analytical characteristics and scope is 
also likely to play a major role in the firm’s decisions. The analytical characteristics of an 
investment include the impact, the level of risk, the financial return, the solutions 
available, the number of actors and the incentive to invest. The scope on the other hand 
defines whether the investment is related to the core-business or not. Therefore, not only 
the profitability matters in the investment decisions, but also its strategic component in 
terms of increasing the competitiveness of the core-business (Cooremans, 2011; 
Cooremans, 2012). One should also consider the fact that the firms are likely to have 
different criteria of decision depending on the type of investment. Investments related to 
the core-business may be typically evaluated using profitability criteria such as net 
present value. But, the decision-making process may be different in the case of 
investments that are not directly related to the core-business, such as investments in 
energy efficiency. In these cases, other requirements (rate of return) or other criteria 
(payback time) may apply. 
Several other elements may explain why seemingly cost effective investments in 
efficiency are not undertaken. These elements represent the difference between 
engineering measures and the gap considered by the economists: 
 First, the heterogeneity across energy consumers may imply that the net present 
value of an investment may be positive for the average consumer, but negative for a 
majority of individuals (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). 
                                            
6 This has been studied in other contexts, such as consumption practices on eBay (Hossain and Morgan, 2006). Sensitivity to 
the framing of choices, whereby the presentation of choices can affect significantly the decision (Duﬂo et al., 2005), are also 
cited as having an impact on the energy efficiency gap (Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). 
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 Second, engineering studies fail to account for hidden costs, such as the discomfort 
linked to some technologies or the opportunity costs, which represent the return of any 
alternative investment that the consumer forgo when investing in energy efficiency. 
These opportunity costs may be particularly important for firms where the part of energy 
in production costs often represents a small share of 2-5%, implying that investments 
on the production process are well more interesting than energy efficiency (Hansen, 
2006). Uncertainty about future energy prices and risk due to the irreversibility of the 
investment may also imply that it is rational for consumers to delay their investments in 
energy efficiency (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994) and thus lead to an overestimation of the 
energy efficiency gap in engineering studies.  
 The risk inherent to energy efficiency investments reduces the number and amount of 
investments undertaken in energy efficiency (Anderson and Newell, 2004) and may 
explain the high implicit rates observed by Hausman (1979). Risk stems from financial 
or technical uncertainties. In the former case, it relates to unexpected realization costs 
or future energy price variations. The technical risk in energy efficiency investment 
relates to unexpected technical failures of the equipment, under-performance or 
uncertain energy savings. Based on 50 retrofitted residential multifamily buildings in 
Switzerland, Khoury and Hollmuller (2017) find that realized energy savings do not 
meet the expected savings, but are instead considerably lower due to a variety of 
reasons (mismatch between actual use and standards, uncertainty in facility managers 
and clients behaviour or poor input data quality).7 
 Then, the estimations do not account for possible interactions between technologies 
if implemented together and often “assume perfect installation and maintenance” 
(Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). Moreover, the coordination of the different actors 
involved in energy efficiency projects is very important to guarantee an optimization of 
the system as a whole (Levine et al., 2007) and may imply significant transaction costs 
that are not included in these estimates.  
 Finally, engineering studies may not account for the fact that expected energy savings 
can be reduced because of rebound effects, in which wealth effects following the 
implementation of energy-efficient installations lead the individuals to consume more8. 
                                            
7 According to their model, 500MJ/m2/year expected savings translate in 310MJ/m2/year realized. 
8 See for instance Sorrell and Dimitropoulos (2008) for more details on the rebound effect. 
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Finally, the optimal level of investment from the consumer’s perspective will still be 
lower than the socially optimal outcome because of externalities. Increasing the 
actual level of investment in energy efficiency will bring social benefits by decreasing 
negative externalities. 
3.3 The role of energy service contracting 
3.3.1 Split incentives 
There has been no attempt in the literature to determine whether and how energy 
service contracting reduces split incentives. One could argue that the ESCO, or the 
facilitator, can help tenants to coordinate in order to invest in energy efficiency. The 
ESCO may also assist potentially interested owners to redirect the costs of energy 
efficiency investments to the tenants. Nevertheless, I show in the first chapter of this 
thesis that having tenants is an important barrier to ESC adoption and suggest that 
the Swiss legal framework regarding the transfer of costs to the tenants should be 
clarified. In the UK (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016) as well as in the mature US and 
Canadian ESCO markets (Panev et al., 2014), commercial centers and office 
buildings represent untapped potential because of the involvement of tenants. While 
energy service contracting, in its standard form, does not seem to solve split 
incentives issues, it is possible that energy service contracts with alternative payment 
schemes are more effective in that sense. Nolden and Sorrell (2016) provide a list of 
these schemes, such as on-bill financing, in which repayments are typically tied to the 
property and not the owner or the tenant. However, because these schemes always 
involve a remuneration of the capital via the energy bill or an increased rent, they are 
not suitable for the current Swiss legal framework. Indeed, transferring to the tenants 
100% of the retrofits capital costs via an increased rent is not possible, since only the 
value added can be transferred. The Swiss law explicitly mentions that retrofits capital 
costs cannot be transferred to the tenants in the ancillary costs either.9 Hence, having 
                                            
9 See art. 6 OBLF, concerning the ancillary costs (“charges  accessories”). One exception exists: district heating capital costs can 
be totally transferred to the tenant via ancillary costs. One should also note that the prohibition to transfer the capital c osts via 
ancillary costs concerns by definition only capital costs of what is considered as an investment. It the EPC involves no 
investment on new equipment, but just energy equipment optimization (such as improved energy systems regulation), the costs 
for such optimization can be transferred to the tenants via the ancillary costs. Thus, on-bill financing has already been applied in 
some EPC contracts in Switzerland. But these contracts do not involve any capital investment. They just focus on energy 
systems optimization. 
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tenants is expected to decrease the likelihood of energy efficiency investment, with or 
without energy service contracting. 
3.3.2 Imperfect information and risk 
In both ESC and EPC, the operation and maintenance is covered by the contractor 
during the whole contractual period. Thus, the client benefits from the technical 
knowledge of the ESCO in the long run, which may reduce imperfect information. 
EPC is designed to give both the ESCO and the customer the incentive to reduce 
energy costs. ESC guarantees energy delivery at the same cost during the whole 
contractual period. These contracts therefore represent important risk sharing 
mechanisms. Even if the risk is not considered as a cause of the energy efficiency 
gap as perceived by the economists, it may still explain the low level of investment in 
energy efficiency as observed by engineers. Sharing the risk with the contractor, 
which is specialized in these types of equipment, may permit to reach a level of 
investment, which is closer to the socially optimal level. 
Nevertheless, a guarantee comes at the cost of a risk premium paid to the ESCO. 
Respondents are likely to have heterogeneous preferences and perceptions towards 
the technological risk. Recent research from Polzin et al. (2016b) show that German 
municipalities underestimate the risks associated with street lighting LEDs retrofits 
and therefore do not value the risk-sharing advantage of EPC. But this result may be 
specific to the LED technology perceived as safe. 
3.3.3 Limited access to capital 
ESCOs can facilitate access to financing, either by paying for the installation 
themselves, or by guaranteeing a third-party investment via the EPC “forfaiting” 
scheme (Swissesco, 2016). Li et al. (2014) find empirical evidence that ESCOs can 
partly relieve the clients of their financing need, using a sample of 140 EPC projects 
implemented in China. 
However, these results may be challenged by the fact that the ESCO’s guarantee in 
the “forfaiting” scheme will provide added value only if the third party investor 
evaluates the ESCO with a better risk profile than the client. In ESC and in the 
shared-savings scheme, ESCOs may also have difficulties to find the necessary 
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capital (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016; Panev et al., 2014). Whether the facilitated access 
to capital provided by ESCOs is indeed valued by building managers depends on 
their actual credit constraints with respect to energy efficiency investments. These 
constraints might be relatively small in Switzerland especially in periods of low 
interest rate. 
3.3.4 Non standard behaviors and non-financial considerations 
To my knowledge no research has yet explored the impact of energy service 
contracting in this area. Because these contracts involve annual payments that are 
agreed upon at the signature of the contract, the underestimation of future financial 
flows as opposed to the initial investment may be reduced. Also, because the 
technical and financial risk is shared with the ESCO, the latter has an incentive to 
propose the investment which is the most relevant to the client. This may reduce the 
complexity of the choices the building owner has to make and thus may mitigate 
inattention or imperfect optimization. 
Despite the lack of literature in this domain, the ESCO market actors seem aware of 
the importance of non standard behaviors: “We want to acknowledge the fact and 
raise awareness among Facilitators and other stakeholders [on the ESCO markets], 
that the identified needs for change require approaches beyond economic rationale 
based on a homo oeconomicus concept or environmental awareness. Instead 
psychological and organizational change processes need to be put on the agenda, 
even though this may be new territory for most energy efficiency professionals.” (Bleyl 
et al., 2012).  
3.3.5 Other empirical evidence on the role of EPC 
The extent to which EPC promotes energy efficiency has first been studied by Soroye 
and Nilsson (2010). Using data on EPC projects implemented in the public sector in 
Sweden between 2000 and 2010, they find that these projects led to an average of 
22% energy savings for heating and hot water. They also observe that ESCOs helped 
to increase the awareness of firms about the usefulness of energy efficiency, 
although this could not be precisely measured. A few other studies attempted to 
measure the impact of EPC. Okay and Akman (2010) estimate pairwise correlations 
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between ESCO and country indicators in a sample of 38 countries and find that the 
volume and maturity of the EPC market is positively related to energy consumption. 
They conclude that this result stems either from the ineffectiveness or the non-
saturation of the EPC market. However, this result could be due to reverse causality. 
Indeed, countries with higher energy use have a greater need for EPC solutions. 
Fang et al. (2012) reach an opposite conclusion using a panel of 94 countries over 
the period 1981 to 2007. They find that the existence of the EPC market has a 
negative impact on energy use and that the effect becomes stronger over time. 
However, these results may still suffer from endogeneity and/or unobserved 
heterogeneity across countries. Goldman et al. (2012) provide insights into the 
estimated amount of energy saved in the US thanks to EPC. Based on a sample of 
2,484 projects implemented in the US over the period 1990-2008, they evaluate that 
EPC generated a net direct economic benefit of $23 billion to their clients. While 
these studies provide illustrations of the potential size of energy savings induced by 
EPC, they do not provide empirical evidence that EPC induces investment in energy 
efficiency and thus reduces the energy efficiency gap. Indeed, it is possible that EPC 
simply facilitated the tasks of customers who would have invested anyway and as 
such, cannot be considered as a complete solution for the energy efficiency gap. 
Also, EPC projects may only involve optimization of the energy equipment and as 
such, do not directly imply an investment in energy efficiency, since they have no 
impact on the balance sheet. They will just affect the expenses, by providing energy 
savings, without any capital investment. 
While the potential role of energy service contracting has been reviewed in this 
section, the next section explores whether these potentials are exploited in the 
current ESCO markets. 
4 Diffusion of energy service contracting 
4.1 Foreign ESCO markets 
An important part of the relevant literature consists in assessing the evolution and the 
size of the ESCO markets around the world (see for instance Vine, 2005; Goldman et 
al., 2005; Painuly et al., 2003; Lee et al., 2003; Bertoldi et al., 2014; Bertoldi et al., 
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2017; Marino et al., 2010; Marino et al., 2011; Xu et al., 2011; Goldman et al., 2012; 
Panev et al., 2014;  Stuart et al., 2016; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016).  
In 2014, the US was considered as the most mature ESCO market (Fang et al., 2012; 
Panev et al., 2014).10 The US private industry has been developing since the 1970s 
as a response to the oil shocks and was mostly based on the shared-savings model 
(Langlois and Hansen, 2012). While the US was becoming a more mature market, the 
guaranteed-savings model has become predominant (Goldman et al., 2005). In a 
more recent report, Stuart et al. (2016) show that the US ESCO industry revenues 
have been stagnating between 2011 and 2014 and that ESCOs have tried to 
diversify. For instance, they are now proposing non-energy benefits within EPC, such 
as water conservation, emission credits or avoided operation and maintenance. 
The initial Energy Contracting concept started in Western Europe more than 100 
years ago (Hansen, 2006; Bertoldi et al., 2006; Adnot et al., 2002). However, it only 
re-emerged significantly in the European Union in the 1980s. In 2000, the estimation 
of the EPC market size in Western Europe was around 150 million Euros per annum 
(Bertoldi et al., 2003). Bertoldi et al. (2006) present the results of a survey conducted 
in the EU-25 countries and Romania and Bulgaria in the period 2003 to 2004 and 
show that there were important differences among the situation and evolution of the 
markets across countries. With 500 ESCOs and an estimated annual revenue of 3.5 
to 5 billion Euros in 2013 (Bertoldi et al., 2014), Germany is the leading market in 
Europe (Eikmeier et al., 2009). It is followed by Italy and France (Marino et al., 2010; 
Bertoldi et al., 2014). The general trend in European countries shows stagnation or a 
slow growth for the 2010-2013 period (Bertoldi et al., 2014). Exceptions are France, 
Spain, Denmark and Ireland which experienced a strong growth in the same period. 
In 2013, the ESCO markets are still emerging or inexistent in a majority of countries11 
(Bertoldi et al., 2014), suggesting that the situation may significantly evolve in the EU 
in the next years (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). 
The following tendencies have been noted on the foreign ESCO markets: 
                                            
10 The US market may be now supplanted by the Chinese market, which was estimated to account for 55% of worldwide ESCO 
revenues in 2015 (IEA, 2016). 
11 Exceptions are Germany, France, Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, Italy and UK, which show either moderate or 
good development of the ESCO market. 
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 ESC projects dominate significantly the markets, as compared to EPC in both 
European and US markets (Eikmeier et al., 2009; Bleyl, 2011; Bertoldi et al., 2006; IEA-
RETD, 2013). 
 The advantages of energy contracting are most relevant beyond a certain scale, 
mainly due to the transaction costs involved in the contracting process. For ESC, a 
Swiss ESCO uses typically bottom threshold of 50kW12, i.e. more than ten household 
units, while in Germany, Eikmeier et al. (2009) cites a thermal load of 100kW, i.e. 
around 20 000 € annual energy costs (Bleyl, 2011), as a minimum project size to cover 
all the transaction costs, based on empirical results from a market study. For EPC, 
which is expected to incur even higher transaction costs, the critical size for a viable 
project is even larger than under ESC. This has been showed by Goldman et al. (2005) 
who observed a median project cost of US$1 million for EPC compared to US$0.5 
million for non-performance-based contracting projects. In Germany, the minimum 
energy cost for an EPC project is estimated at 100’000 euros per year (Bleyl, 2011). 
 Project financing varies across countries and seems to depend on the maturity of 
the ESCO market. While the US ESCOs used to finance sometimes with their own 
funds the projects in the premises of contracting activities, this has drastically changed 
and projects are now financed with long-term debt or leases. Nowadays, US ESCOs 
prefer to serve as vehicle or facilitator to provide financing rather than directly finance 
themselves, in order to balance the risks (ICF, 2007; IEA-RETD, 2013). Conversely, 
shared savings is the dominant model used in Europe, while 90% of the contracts in the 
US are rather using guaranteed savings schemes. Since the European ESCO is a 
younger market, clients are likely to be less confident and aware about this new 
business model, and usually let the ESCO finance the investment and bear the financial 
risk as it is the case in the shared savings model (Hansen, 2006; Marino et al., 2011). In 
the US, on the other hand, confidence of the consumer leads them to invest in EPC 
projects, through guaranteed savings schemes (Goldman et al., 2005). 
 Finally, while in practice ESC is used in various market segments, such as housing, 
commerce industry or public buildings (IEA-RETD, 2013), EPC is practically 
limited to the public sector, such as hospitals, swimming facilities or schools (Bleyl, 
2011; Marino et al., 2011). The actors call it the “MUSH” market (municipal and state 
government, universities and colleges, schools and hospitals) (Satchwell et al., 2010). 
                                            
12 For projects typically involving heat supply and hot water, sometimes coupled with passive cooling, cooling, ventilation, etc . 
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The abundance of public EPC projects in spite of private investments may be explained 
by several causes. First, public institutions often need third party financing and the 
ESCOs are not reluctant to provide the financing in such cases because public clients 
are credit worthy (Bleyl, 2011). Then, the size, the use and the age of public 
infrastructures typically represent high savings potentials that are attractive for the 
ESCOs (Bleyl, 2011). Moreover, regulations have forced public entities to implement 
energy policy goals in their own buildings (Langlois and Hansen, 2012). Finally, the 
public sector seems to accept longer payback period. Indeed, based on a sample of 
approximately 1 500 EPC projects, Goldman et al. (2005) find a median payback time 
of 10 years for public infrastructure as compared to 3 years for private projects. 
4.2 The Swiss energy contracting market 
In Switzerland, detailed statistics on the energy contracting market are not available. 
The available data suggest a slow growth, due to lacking in-house expertise, limited 
ﬂexibility for the industry, and financing barriers for small contractors (Marino et al., 
2010; Bertoldi et al., 2014). In 1999, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy (SFOE) 
estimated the ESC market at 170 million Euros/year (Bundesamt für Energie, 1999). 
This number has reached 350 million Euros in 2009, according to Swiss 
Contracting13. 
The EPC market, on the other hand, is still small and undeveloped with only a few 
ESCOs active and consequently only a few contracts per year signed. These projects 
encompass improvement of heating ventilation and air-conditioning (HVAC), lighting, 
pumps, automation, motors and inverters, with a relative dominance for industrial and 
non-residential buildings (Bertoldi et al., 2014). As opposed to other markets, a major 
part of EPC projects in Switzerland has been implemented with private clients. 
Although interest from the supply-side for EPC exists, the concept is rather unknown 
among consumers14. The first call for tender applied to EPC has been published in 
2016. The apparent delay of the Swiss EPC market as compared to other European 
ESCO market is not explained in the literature. Some experts argue that the main 
difference between the Swiss market and foreign ESCO markets lies in the fact that 
                                            
13Association that listed 76 energy contractors in 2010 which include local energy producers and distributors with some of them 
providing ESC. An estimation is that around 7-10 companies (mainly local energy utilities) have carried out energy contracting 
projects (Bertoldi et al., 2014). 
14 According to Jean-Marc Zgraggen, EPC-expert of SIG, one of the few ESCOs offering EPC in Switzerland. 
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the Swiss potential clients do not need external financing, which has often been a 
trigger of adoption in foreign ESCO markets. 
4.3 Diffusion of energy service contracting and the energy service gap 
Despite the success of energy contracting in some countries, some authors have 
argued that the potential of this business model was not fully exploited in terms of 
both energy savings and business opportunities (Marino et al., 2010; Bleyl, 2011; 
Langlois and Hansen, 2012), which lead Backlund and Thollander (2011) to refer to 
this problem as the energy service gap. The main reason for the existence of the 
energy service gap, evoked by Backlund and Thollander (2011), relies on transaction 
costs that prevent the market to further develop. As a result, theses contracts are 
mostly relevant beyond a certain scale and targeted at specific market segments, 
leaving out small energy consumers (Backlund and Thollander, 2011) and SMEs 
(Pätäri et al., 2016). Second, stagnation has been observed on some mature markets 
such as in the US (Stuart et al., 2016). Other authors observed that there is also an 
untapped potential of energy efficiency improvements in the public sector (Satchwell 
et al., 2010) as well as in the existing residential buildings (IEA-RETD, 2013). 
Some authors claim that this is explained by the fact that low hanging fruits have 
already been harvested in most countries (Marino et al., 2010; Goldman et al., 2005). 
These attractive projects are typically represented by public buildings and simple 
technologies that reduce easily energy consumption, such as LED, HVAC, voltage 
optimization and building controls and rarely apply more comprehensive retrofits such 
as envelope enhancement (Bleyl, 2011; Nolden et al., 2016; Nolden and Sorrell, 
2016). This observation could mean that the ESCOs have already exploited all their 
potentials and that other instruments than contracting must be found to cover other 
market segments or technologies. 
One could also study the energy service gap under another perspective, i.e. indirect 
benefits. For instance, Goldman et al. (2005) state that customers in the US are no 
longer interested in cost/benefit ratios only, but are also increasingly valuing other 
indirect benefits, such as mitigating facility security or electric reliability of on-site 
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generation projects that are usually not taken into account in cost-benefit analyses. In 
this case, there may still be a potential untapped by the ESCOs.  
Whether the energy service gap exists or not calls for a further investigation on the 
potential developments that remain for energy contracting. If these possibilities to 
grow further and target new market segments exist but are not exploited, then one 
should review the barriers that are hampering such an expansion. If these barriers 
happen to be non-existing or unbinding, then this could mean that ESCOs have 
already exploited the existing market niches. In this context, exploring the 
determinants of adoption of energy service contracting allows to assess whether and 
how its potential could be further exploited. 
5 Theoretical review of the determinants of adoption of 
energy service contracting 
Only a few studies attempted to develop a theoretical framework applied to energy 
contracting. Yik and Lee (2004) and Li et al. (2014) provide a model for energy 
performance contracting viability and design based on net present values of future 
savings. Sorrell (2007) relies on economic theory, and more specifically on 
transaction cost economics (TCE), to assess contracts’ viability, applicable for both 
energy performance and energy supply contracting.  
Sorrell (2007) argues that energy contracting represents a shift from a hierarchical 
form of organization (vertical integration) to a more market-based form and thus can 
reasonably be related to the economic theory of the firm, i.e. the so-called “make-or-
buy” decision.  
Sorrell’s model on the choice to invest in energy contracting rather than self-invest is 
summarized by Figure 1. The decision to opt for contracting draws upon the 
comparison of anticipated production costs (i.e. financing, distribution, control, 
maintenance, etc.) and transaction costs (i.e. consulting and legal costs, negotiations, 
costs associated with opportunistic behavior, etc.). Potential savings in production 
costs and aggregate production costs are key determinants in Sorrell’s model to 
explain contracts’ viability. Two other factors inspired from the TCE are added, 
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namely asset specificity and task complexity. Finally, he also incorporates two 
external variables specific to the context, i.e. competitiveness of the energy service 
market and institutional context (e.g. information, procurement, accreditation, 
consultancy, etc.). 
 
Figure 1 Sorrell’s model of contracting decision (Sorrell, 2007; p. 519).15 
 
The main determinants of adoption of energy service contracting considered in this 
thesis are transaction costs, risk sharing, economies of scale and financing. They are 
briefly developed in the next sections and further detailed in chapters I and II of this 
thesis. 
5.1 Transaction costs 
This PhD follows Sorrell's (2007) conjecture by identifying transaction costs as an 
important determinant of adoption of energy service contracting. 
All investments in energy efficiency or renewable energy incur transaction costs. 
These may include consulting and legal costs, the cost of negotiations with the 
potential suppliers, as well as the burden of gathering information related to the 
available technologies, financing or subsidies opportunities. Energy service 
                                            
15 (o) refers to factors determining the contracting decision, (s) to determinants explaining why particular services are in or out of 
the contract, (c) for elements that clarify why contract’s viability varies between comparable organizat ions in different contexts. 
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contracting may reduce part of these costs, since the ESCO benefits from its 
experience in the domain and accompanies the client in these processes. 
On the other hand, because energy service contracting involves long term contracts, 
it incurs transaction costs in writing and negotiating the contractual clauses. The 
expected transaction costs that will occur after the contract’s signature are also 
expected to have an impact on the client’s decision to adopt energy service 
contracting. These costs include renegotiation and litigation costs, potential legal 
expenses and all the costs related to a modification of the technology or a transfer to 
another client or supplier.  The transaction costs incurred in energy service contracts 
will depend on the technology specificity, the building and the client’s type. The 
elements impacting energy service contracting adoption through transaction costs are 
developed in the first chapter of the thesis. 
5.2 Risk 
When investing in renewable energy or energy efficiency, the client faces 
technological risks, such as unpredictable costs that arise in the construction phase of 
the project or any technological default that occurs in the equipment lifetime. A 
financial risk is also incurred in energy efficiency measures, due to the uncertainty 
surrounding energy savings. The ESCO can diversify the risk via a large portfolio of 
projects and other activities and benefit from higher technical knowledge than the 
client. It has also a better expertise in assessing a project’s risk. As a result, it is 
optimal for clients with risky projects to share the risk with the ESCO in order to gain 
from a better control and mitigation of the risks. Thus, risk sharing is expected to be 
an important determinant of adoption of energy service contracting. 
5.3 Economies of scale 
Many building owners cannot reach the critical level to invest in renewable energy or 
energy efficiency at reasonable costs. ESCOs may help the building owners to reach 
the critical size by pooling them together. This is typically the case in energy supply 
contracting involving district heating. Because the ESCO has a financial incentive to 
regroup the energy consumers, it will bear the costs of negotiating with the different 
potential clients to reach a viable size. This may also apply in the context of EPC, in 
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which the ESCO may help the clients to pool their buildings together in a single 
contract in order to benefit from economies of scale. 
 
Transaction costs, risk and economies of scale are determinants that are likely to be 
interdependent in the client’s decision to adopt energy service contracting. For 
instance, the client’s size in terms of energy costs combines the effects of transaction 
costs and economies of scale. Sorrell (2007) argues that transaction costs for small 
consumers are likely to outweigh all ESC benefits, including economies of scale 
advantages. At the other extreme, very large consumers may benefit less from the 
ESCO’s advantages such as economies of scale or risk sharing since they may 
benefit from in-house energy management. As a result, ESC contracts are likely to be 
the most viable for mid-size energy consumers. 
Using different factors related to these concepts, the chapter I of this thesis intends to 
disentangle their effect in the willingness to adopt these contracts. 
5.4 Financing from the ESCO 
A building owner willing to implement energy efficiency measures or renewable 
technologies may have limited access to capital. This has been cited as a market 
failure characterizing investments in energy efficiency, in cases where the lender 
cannot distinguish between good or bad credit risk borrowers (Gillingham and Palmer, 
2013). This phenomenon is exacerbated if borrowers with a high energy savings 
potential have poor credit risk profiles (Palmer, Walls and Gerarden, 2012). Taken 
together, these elements result in higher interest rates that can hamper consumers to 
invest. Building owners or managers may also be insufficiently informed about the 
financing options or subsidies available when making their decisions (IEA-RETD, 
2013). Other constraints may prevent entities from investing in energy efficiency or 
renewable energy, such as debt ceilings (particularly affecting the public sector) or 
limited budget for non-core activities (in the case of private firms). 
Both ESC and EPC can relieve the clients from their financing needs, since these 
contracts can include financing from the ESCO. Whether the facilitated access to 
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capital provided by ESCOs is indeed valued by building managers depends on their 
actual credit constraints with respect to energy efficiency investments. 
6 Determinants of adoption from the client’s point of 
view: empirical review 
While Sorrell’s conjectures are available for empirical tests, there has been almost no 
attempt to determine econometrically whether these determinants are relevant.16 This 
lack of empirical research is due to the problem of limited availability of data on 
contracts (Mathew et al., 2005). The existing empirical literature of the factors 
affecting the clients’ decisions mostly consists of qualitative studies using a 
descriptive approach based on interviews and perception of various impacts. Here is 
a summary of the trends observed across the markets.  
One of the most important barrier described in the literature is low awareness, lack 
of information and skepticism of the clients towards contracting options (Soroye 
and Nilsson, 2010; Vine, 2005; Xu et al., 2011; Marino et al., 2011; Hansen, 2006; 
Jensen et al., 2010; Capelo, 2011; Nguene, 2008; Pätäri et al., 2016).  
A second important barrier relies on the lack of commitment from firms’ top 
management (Thollander et al., 2013; Vine, 2005). Indeed, Hansen (2006) observes 
that EPC is hard to be implemented in business, especially industries, because “the 
horrible truth is that top management is not interested in energy”. This is explained by 
the fact that the part of energy costs in the overall costs represents usually only up to 
2-5% in industries. While these numbers can increase significantly for energy-
intensive industries, up to 30% in chemical production (Hansen, 2006), clients may 
still be reluctant to outsource energy management to an ESCO, especially if in-
house technical expertise exists (Marino et al., 2011). This reticence may be 
particularly important against EPC, if the production involves trade secrets, because 
the implementation of energy efficiency measures as well as the measures and 
verification of the savings, asks for a certain knowledge and control of the processes. 
Moreover, from the firms’ point of view, transaction costs and financial risks incurred 
                                            
16 An exception is Polzin et al. (2016). 
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by projects that are not related to their core business activities are regarded with 
caution. These projects need to bring high profitability in a limited period of time to be 
considered by the managers (Hell, 1997). As a result, Thollander et al. (2013) 
observe that only firms where the top managers have real ambitions for a long-term 
energy strategy tend to be interested in energy contracting. 50% of the firms surveyed 
in their study claim to have these ambitions. They also observe, together with Capelo 
(2011), that competition can increase the need to improve cash ﬂows and 
subsequently increases the interest for EPC. 
Finally, private clients (including firms) usually ask for small payback time periods 
(Goldman et al., 2005), which is sometimes hard or impossible to reach for the 
ESCOs. This is due to the fact that these clients want to limit the duration of the 
contract as much as possible (Hansen, 2006; Soroye and Nilsson, 2010; Lee et al., 
2015). Iimi (2016) shows that competition between experienced ESCOs make EPC 
more attractive through shorter payment periods. This suggests that a potential 
solution is to foster the supply side of the ESCO markets. Iimi (2016) also 
demonstrates that the information disclosed in public calls for tenders affect the 
quality of the bids: by pre-announcing energy savings target, the collectivity is more 
likely to get bids with shorter contract duration. 
Other barriers related to the contracts, such as administrative hurdles (Jensen et al., 
2010), project complexity, repayment inability due to ESCOs default (Lee et al., 
2015), complex procurement procedures (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016) or complex 
measure and verification processes (Xu et al., 2011) have been observed. Based on 
the transaction costs economics and on interviews with representatives of the UK 
ESCO market, Nolden et al. (2016) show how intermediaries, also called facilitators, 
can lower transaction costs and work as drivers for the clients. More specifically, they 
note that these intermediaries provide the client with specialization economies, scale 
economies and learning economies that reduce search costs, bargaining and 
opportunism costs. They can also pool small projects to reach a viable size and open 
EPC to smaller-size energy consumers. 
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It is finally worth noting that barriers hindering investments in energy efficiency may 
also apply in the decision to opt for EPC. This is the case for instance for split 
incentives, non-standard behaviors or non-financial considerations (cf. sections 3.2 
and 3.3). Here again, there is no literature on how barriers to EPC and energy 
efficiency are cumulative or may substitute one another. 
7  Is policy intervention needed? 
The rationale for government support has been emphasized in the literature by the 
observation, as explained earlier, that there exist an energy service gap. However, 
while the terminology has been used to bring a parallel with the energy-efficiency gap, 
one should note that it is not the same causes that are underlying these concepts. 
Indeed, as stated previously, the energy-efficiency gap eventually exists because of 
market failures that prevent energy customers to invest as it would be optimal. The 
energy service gap, on the other hand, is claimed to be due to high transaction costs, 
which represent a market barrier, but not necessarily a failure. And as stated by Jaffe 
and Stavins (1994) “unlike market failures, if market barriers are not market failures, 
they don’t call for policy responses”. In fact, one could argue that ESCOs are 
considered as market-based instruments to facilitate investments in renewable 
technologies and energy efficiency. And as such, they do not directly depend on, or 
should not rely on governmental support.  
In the energy contracting literature, no study claims directly that there is no need for 
government support, to my knowledge. Yet, there is no evidence that an ESCO 
market cannot emerge and grow without any help from the authorities. Some authors 
argue in fact that energy contracting is likely to gain in importance in the future 
because of factors that are not linked to any policy instruments. For instance, 
Goldman et al. (2005) state that several trends, such as the increase in environmental 
concern, the need for technical system supply security, high fuel prices, and trend 
towards outsourcing energy procurement will induce growth on the ESCOs markets. 
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Switzerland provides an example where the government has stepped in only recently, 
but where contracting, yet only ESC, has been developed significantly.17  
There is no proof either that without government support the main problem of ESCOs 
market will be overcome. Indeed, evidence seems to suggest that it is not possible for 
the ESCOs to target smaller customers if they do not get any policy support 
(Tietenberg, 2009). The appropriate question is to determine whether it is more 
efficient for the authorities to help the ESCOs to supply these smaller consumers with 
contracting options or to implement other policy instruments that are directly targeted 
to this market segment.  
The instruments that directly target the energy efficiency gap and investment in 
renewable technologies include, for instance, the implementation of obligations and 
strengthening of building codes, the change of legal frameworks to allow to redeem 
the costs of investments onto the tenants and various incentive programs, such as 
subsidies or taxes. However, experience has shown that voluntary measures, 
enhanced by incentive programs, were not sufficient to foster significantly the 
development of renewable energy and efficiency measures (IEA-RETD, 2013). As a 
result, it seems that obligations will be needed to reach EUs 2020 energy savings 
goals, if the government choose to directly target energy consumers. However, IEA-
RETD (2013) argue that energy contracting could be well more ﬂexible, since it is a 
market-based instrument and can adapt to the customer’s needs. Moreover, while 
obligations force the consumer and thus may overcome some behavioral issues, they 
do not solve limited access to capital or a lack of technical information. Hence, energy 
contracting could be seen as a promising complementary instrument to obligations in 
order to induce private investments in these market segments. One can then 
conclude that, not only energy contracting may need the support of the government, 
but the reverse could also be true. The extent to which energy contracting or 
obligations, together or alone, represent an appropriate policy tool, would need further 
research on what is really binding the potential private investors. Sorrell et al. (2004) 
argue that several limiting barriers are usually involved together in a single energy 
                                            
17 See Klinke et al., 2017 (chap. II) for a comprehensive review of the energy policy instruments implemented in Switzerland and 
their direct or indirect link to energy service contracting. 
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efficient investment. This implies that using one single instrument may appear to be 
insufficient, “since it could simply cause another barrier to become the binding 
constraint” (Tietenberg, 2009).  
8 Structure of the thesis 
Despite the abundant literature on energy service contracting, the lack of empirical 
evidence on the decision to adopt energy service contracting is striking. This PhD 
thesis intends to reduce this gap by exploring the economic mechanisms affecting the 
decision to adopt these contracts, both from the demand side and the supply side. 
The goal is to propose a positive analysis by focusing directly on the choices made by 
the clients or the suppliers, rather than relying on experts’ perception. The three 
chapters of this PhD thesis are briefly described in the following subsections. 
8.1 The determinants of adoption of Energy Supply Contracting: 
Empirical evidence from the Swiss market 
In order to identify the relevant determinants of adoption of energy service 
contracting, the first chapter analyzes the economic theories that can explain the 
customer’s decision, i.e. outsourcing energy services or keeping them in-house. 
Because of the long term commitment of these contracts and the incentive provided 
to the ESCO to maintain the energy performance over the contractual time, risk 
sharing is expected to play a major role in the customer’s decision. Since the ESCO 
has designed and implemented a large number of contracting projects, the 
perspective of economies of scale is also studied. These advantages, however, can 
be balanced by the fact that the long term contract is also assumed to increase 
transaction costs, i.e. search costs, bargaining, renegotiation and litigation costs, 
potential legal expenses and all the costs related to a modification of the technology 
or a transfer to another client or supplier.  
This chapter also contains a simple formal model of ESC adoption based on 
transaction costs economics. This model shows that asset specificity and contract’s 
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incompleteness, as well as the magnitude of expected transaction costs, affect 
negatively ESC adoption.18 
The conjectures based on these theories are tested using an original dataset of 2,003 
rejected and accepted ESC contracts proposed by two of the largest Swiss ESC 
suppliers. Since each client can receive several offers before accepting or definitively 
rejecting a contract, a probit model with random effects is used in order to account for 
possible correlation of the disturbances within an individual.  
Due to confidentiality and competitive reasons, data collection on energy service 
contracts is rarely possible (Mathew et al., 2005). To my knowledge, the first chapter 
of my thesis is the first study to rely on actual contractual choices to analyze the 
adoption of energy service contracting. Focusing on the clients brings a new point of 
view, which can be compared to the market views of experts. The data are collected 
at the project level, which enables me to study aspects such as specificity, contract 
duration and economies of scale. Actual contractual choices allow me to derive 
revealed preferences that are not subject to biases which potentially affect surveys 
and stated choices. 
The results show that the advantages of risk sharing and economies of scale brought 
by contracting, as well as trust in the supplier and technology reliability are important 
determinants of the client’s choice to adopt ESC. Conversely, a large number of 
decision-makers, either through intermediary clients or tenants, has a negative impact 
on the likelihood of adoption. Finally, less specific contracts, involving residential or 
new buildings are more likely to be signed. This chapter also provides guidelines for 
the ESCOs to adapt their business model to better exploit the market.  
Relying on revealed preferences nevertheless results in some limitations. First, as 
EPC is only emerging in Switzerland, the dataset includes offers of ESC only. The 
energy supply contracts in the sample are long term contracts, with a majority being 
entirely financed by the ESCO. The ESCO gets paid through a fixed fee and a 
variable fee for the useful energy consumed (room heating, cold, hot water, 
                                            
18 While transaction costs economics can also be applied to analyze EPC adoption (Sorrell, 2007), the formal model developed 
in chapter one would probably be more complex in the context of EPC adoption in order to properly account for incentives on 
energy savings and risk sharing. See Yik and Lee (2004) and Li et al. (2014) for EPC adoption models. The latter however do 
not account for transaction costs economics. 
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ventilation, etc.). There is however no contractual incentive to reduce the client’s 
energy costs. Nevertheless, although the empirical results of chapter one focus on 
ESC only, EPC is discussed throughout the chapter. This is justified by the fact that, 
as aforementioned, these two types of contracts are closely related (cf. section 2.4 of 
this chapter). 
A second limitation related to actual contractual choices results from selection bias. 
The clients who received an offer are likely to be already interested in ESC. It can 
also come from the fact that only two ESC suppliers accepted to provide full 
information about their offers. Both are experienced ESCOs and may already be 
targeting the most viable projects. Thus, while my study can capture the determinants 
leading a client to reject or sign an ESC contract, it cannot analyze the determinants 
of adoption of the clients who never received an offer. 
These limitations lead us to the motivation of the second chapter of this PhD thesis. 
8.2 The mechanisms of Energy Performance Contracting adoption: 
Empirical evidence from a discrete choice experiment 
This chapter focuses on EPC adoption. The current state of the EPC literature lacks 
empirical evidence on the mechanisms driving the decision of a client to adopt EPC. 
This is explained by the difficulty to collect a sufficient number of EPC offers, 
especially in Switzerland where EPC is only emerging. Furthermore, in order to avoid 
the selection bias affecting the analysis in the first chapter, one has to use other 
methods. 
The main contribution of chapter two relies on its methodology. Relying on a discrete 
choice experiment targeted at 297 potential clients, i.e. managers of large energy-
consuming buildings in Switzerland, the impact of contractual attributes, such as a 
performance guarantee or financing from the ESCO, are assessed quantitatively. 
While such experiments have been used in other domains (e.g. Banfi et al., 2008; 
Rose et al., 2012; Blasch and Farsi, 2014; Caputo et al., 2014; Hole et al., 2016) they 
have, to my knowledge, never been employed in the context of energy service 
contracting. I use latent class models to analyze the stated preferences, in order to 
account for heterogeneity in the value attached to the benefits and costs of EPC. The 
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econometric models used also account for the heterogeneity and complexity of the 
decision-making, by considering possible attribute non-attendance, i.e. ignorance of 
certain attributes in the choice experiment. This allows me to account for the fact that 
consumers may not necessarily act according to the standard assumptions of 
neoclassical economic theory, especially in the context of energy efficiency 
(Gillingham and Palmer, 2013) and that they have heterogeneous preferences and 
decision-making mechanisms (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, Allcott and Greenstone, 
2012). 
The choice experiment includes different types of energy performance contracts, i.e. 
with or without financing from the ESCO and with or without a guarantee on the 
energy savings. Different types of technologies are proposed within these contracts, 
such as building automation, exploitation optimizations, ventilation, envelope (walls 
and windows) refurbishment, or a new heating system (such as heat pumps, wood or 
solar panels).  
The results show that the performance guarantee provided in EPC, and the resulting 
risk sharing mechanism, has a consistent positive impact on the likelihood to adopt 
these contracts. Conversely, the financing of the contractor is valued positively only 
by a minority of respondents. These are mostly public entities, presumably with debt 
ceilings. From the latent class analysis, this study provides insights into the 
complexity and heterogeneity underlying the decision to invest in energy efficiency. 
Finally, while its risk sharing mechanism is valued positively, EPC also faces a 
reticence from potential clients. We argue that this reticence could come from a 
misunderstanding of the concept and could therefore be mitigated by fostering greater 
awareness. 
The methodology used in this chapter has also some drawbacks. First, the complexity 
of the survey leads to a low response rate and a limited sample size. Focusing only 
on Swiss potential clients in a specific time period also results in some limitations 
concerning the representativeness of the results, which may be specific to the current 
conjuncture in Switzerland. Finally, as in every survey with stated choices, I cannot 
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ascertain whether these clients, even if interested in EPC, will ever successfully 
implement such a contract in practice.  
The last point is also likely to depend on the quality of the supply side. While the 
existing literature on energy service contracting typically focuses on market barriers 
concerning the demand side, little emphasis has been put on the market barriers and 
drivers on the supply side. This leads us to the last chapter of the thesis. 
8.3 The provision of energy service contracting 
While the first two chapters of my thesis focus on the client’s perspective and provide 
an overview of energy service contracting adoption, the third chapter intends to bring 
a new perspective on the potential of energy service contracting by focusing on the 
mechanisms that can foster the supply side of both ESC and EPC. This allows me to 
consider the potential of energy service contracting in terms of business opportunities 
and market innovation in the Swiss energy market. 
This chapter assesses the extent to which changes in the energy market and energy 
policies can affect the firms’ willingness to provide energy service contracting in 
Switzerland. Because the EPC market is only emerging and in order to study the 
choices of potential ESC and/or EPC suppliers, the methodology used is again a 
discrete choice experiment. The analysis is based on a survey among 208 energy 
utilities, gas providers, engineering firms, appliances and heating systems suppliers. 
The willingness to supply certain types of energy service contracts (shared-savings 
EPC, guaranteed-savings EPC and ESC) is empirically investigated in different 
hypothetical market and regulatory contexts. 
The results show that an obligation for utilities to increase their clients’ energy 
efficiency, as in a White Certificates scheme, has a positive impact on the willingness 
to provide energy service contracts from competitors and non-utilities. An exogenous 
and positive shock on the demand side positively affects the willingness to supply 
only if the shock stems from both public and private clients. Conversely, a total 
liberalization of the electricity market or an increase in tax levies on fuels and 
electricity, do not show significant impacts on the willingness to enter the market.  
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While these results may suffer from the hypothetical character of the policies 
presented and of the respondent’s choices, this chapter still shows that focusing on 
the supply side brings new insights in the possibility to develop the market of energy 
service contracting and unlock business opportunities. Yet, further research is needed 
in order to fully understand the decision to enter the market of energy service 
contracting. 
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1 The determinants of adoption of Energy 
Supply Contracting: Empirical evidence 
from the Swiss market19 
 
Abstract 
Energy supply contracting, the outsourcing of energy-related services, is considered a 
promising tool to induce investment in energy efficiency and renewable technologies. 
Yet, some energy contracting markets grow slowly and some segments remain 
untapped. This study investigates the determinants of energy supply contracting 
adoption, using a dataset of 2,003 accepted and rejected contracts offered in the 
Swiss market. The results show that the advantages of risk sharing and economies of 
scale brought by contracting, as well as trust in the supplier and technology reliability, 
are important determinants of the client's choice. A large number of decision-makers, 
inducing higher transaction costs, negatively impacts the likelihood of adoption. Less 
specific contracts involving residential or new buildings are more likely to be signed. If 
energy service contracting is proven to facilitate investment in energy efficiency, 
policy intervention may be needed to reduce the entailed transaction costs, for 
instance by clarifying the regulatory framework regarding tenants. Trust may be 
enhanced by the government's information campaigns on renewable technologies 
and certifications of the suppliers. The results of this chapter could be used to guide 
ESCOs to adapt their business models. 
JEL Classification: L24, Q40 
Keywords: Energy service contracting, transaction costs economics, risk sharing, 
renewable energy 
  
                                            
19 A paper based on this chapter has been published in the Journal of Energy Policy (see Klinke, 2018) 
This chapter has benefited from financial support from the Swiss Federal Office of Energy and from the Swiss Competence 
Center for Energy Research SCCER CREST funded by the Commission for Technology and Innovation (Grant KTI. 
1155000154). These funding sources had no involvement in the preparation of this article. 
   
38 
 
1 Introduction 
Energy service contracting is considered as a market-based instrument that fosters 
investments in renewable and efficient energy services and combines business 
opportunities with social benefits. Indeed, these contracts have resulted in important 
energy savings (Soroye and Nilsson, 2010; Goldman et al., 2012) and investment in 
innovative renewable energy systems (Bleyl, 2011). They have also generated 
massive revenues for contractors. In 2011, the aggregate revenues were estimated to 
$5 billion in the US (Gilligan, 2011), and 3.5 to 5 billion Euros in Germany in 2013 
(Bertoldi et al., 2014). 
Despite these advantages, the potential of energy service contracting does not seem 
to be totally exploited (Backlund and Thollander, 2011). In most countries indeed, 
these contracts have been applied only to large energy consuming buildings, leaving 
out small consumers and SMEs (Backlund and Thollander, 2011; Pätäri et al., 2016). 
This study investigates the economic determinants driving the customer’s choice to 
opt for energy service contracting. The empirical analysis is based on economic 
theories that can explain energy service contracting adoption, i.e. outsourcing energy 
services or keeping them in-house. Because of the long term commitment of these 
contracts and the incentive provided to the ESCO to maintain the energy performance 
over the contractual time, risk sharing is expected to play a major role in the 
customer’s decision. Since the ESCO has designed and implemented a large number 
of contracting projects, the perspective of economies of scale is also studied. These 
advantages, however, can be balanced by the fact that the long term contract is also 
assumed to increase transaction costs, i.e. search costs, bargaining, renegotiation 
and litigation costs, potential legal expenses and all the costs related to a modification 
of the technology or a transfer to another client or supplier.   
Existing empirical literature relies on descriptive studies based on interviews of 
experts and market analyses to assess the determinants of energy service 
contracting adoption (Vine, 2005; Marino et al., 2010; Backlund and Thollander, 2011; 
Xu et al., 2011; Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). Polzin et al. (2016b) used stated 
preferences of German municipalities to quantitatively assess how stated obstacles, 
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drivers and municipality characteristics affect the willingness to consider EPC for LED 
retrofits. Due to confidentiality and competitive reasons, data collection on energy 
service contracts is rarely possible (Mathew et al., 2005). To my knowledge this is the 
first study to rely on actual contractual choices to examine energy service contracting 
adoption. More specifically, the results are based on a micro-econometric analysis of 
2,003 rejected and accepted energy supply contracting projects proposed by two of 
the largest Swiss ESC suppliers over the period 1996-2011. Focusing on the clients 
brings a new point of view, which can be compared to the market views of experts. 
The data are collected at the project level, which enables me to analyze aspects such 
as specificity, contract duration and economies of scale. The quantitative analysis 
also permits to identify the determinants of ESC adoption. Actual contractual choices 
allow me to derive revealed preferences that are not subject to biases which 
potentially affect surveys and stated choices. Finally, this study provides insights into 
the Swiss ESC market, which has seldom been analyzed in the literature. Despite 
strong financial institutions, credit-worthy private and public institutions, the energy 
service contracting market is experiencing a slow growth in Switzerland. 
Because EPC is only emerging in Switzerland, real contractual data on EPC could not 
be included in the analysis. Although focusing on ESC, this chapter provides a 
discussion on the closely-related and more abundant EPC literature. Relying on 
revealed preferences also comes at the cost of potential selection bias that might 
affect the estimation results, since only interested clients received an offer. I provide a 
discussion of this bias and potential solutions for further research. 
This study provides quantitative evidence that economies of scale and risk sharing 
are indeed advantages of energy supply contracting. The data collected show that 
these projects include innovative renewable technologies. Adoption is however 
reduced by transaction costs, that are exacerbated by the number of decision-makers 
involved, such as tenants or intermediary clients. The results show that trust in the 
ESCO and technology reliability may mitigate part of these transaction costs. Policy 
intervention may also be required to clarify the regulatory framework regarding 
tenants. Adapting the ESCO's business model may also lead to an improved 
exploitation of the market potential. ESCOs should consider the underlying trade-offs 
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when targeting clients and could propose other forms of remuneration, such as on-bill 
financing (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). They may also apply safeguard contractual 
clauses to reduce the risk of the client's bankruptcy or relocation in order to target 
non-residential buildings. 
The chapter proceeds as follows. In the next section, I present the theoretical and 
empirical background as well as the hypotheses that will be tested empirically. The 
research context, data description and the econometric model are developed in 
section 3. Descriptive statistics and estimation results are presented in section 4 
together with robustness checks, limitations and further research. Section 5 
concludes.  
2 Background and hypotheses development 
Energy service contracting consists in the outsourcing of energy-related services to a 
contractor, an Energy Service Company, through long term contracts. Two main 
types of energy service contracting exist: Energy Supply Contracting (ESC) and 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) (Sorrell, 2005). ESC usually covers the 
financing, operation and maintenance of the energy equipment, while the contractor 
exerts no or little control over the demand for final energy services. ESC typically 
includes the delivery of useful energy such as steam, hot water or coolant. The 
technologies involved are typically new heating, cooling and hot water production 
systems such as biomass, air source or geothermal heat pumps. EPC differs from 
ESC in that the contractor has a financial incentive to reduce energy costs and 
supervises energy consumption by optimizing energy equipment operation, energy 
distribution or ventilation. In both types of contract, the client can share some of the 
risk, overcome her lack of technical knowledge or limited access to capital, and 
benefit from economies of scale and incentives from the ESCO to maintain 
performance over contractual time. As a result, energy contracting has been 
considered a promising market-based instrument to overcome barriers to energy 
efficiency (especially through EPC) and renewable energy investments (especially 
through ESC) (Sorrell, 2007; Yik and Lee, 2004; Soroye and Nilsson, 2010). 
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Several authors developed a theoretical framework for energy contracting. Yik and 
Lee (2004) and Li et al. (2014) provide models for EPC viability and design based on 
net present values of future savings. Sorrell (2007) relies on transaction cost 
economics to assess energy service contracts' viability. He argues that energy 
service contracting represents a shift from vertical integration to a market-based 
organization and thus can reasonably be related to a ‘make-or-buy’ decision. The 
present study follows Sorrell's idea to ground the determinants of ESC adoption into 
the theory of the firm. It does so by combining the factors predicted by transaction 
costs economics with risk-sharing and economies of scale considerations, in order to 
analyze the most important mechanisms underlying ESC adoption. The following 
subsections present the theoretical concepts that will be empirically tested in this 
study. 
2.1 Transaction Costs Economics  
Transaction costs economics (Williamson, 1971; Lyons, 1996; Gibbons, 2005; Tadelis 
and Williamson, 2013) favors an interpretation of the ‘make-or-buy’ decision as a 
trade-off between reducing production costs through outsourcing or mitigating 
transaction costs through in-house provision. In the context of energy service 
provision, one can see energy contracting as an outsourcing decision, which reduces 
production costs and increases transaction costs. Appendix 6.1 provides a formalized 
simple theoretical model applied to energy supply contracting adoption rooted in 
transaction costs economics. This model predicts that the willingness to adopt ESC is 
inversely related to the probability that transaction costs will occur and their expected 
magnitude. In the following paragraphs, I explain which determinants are expected to 
have an impact on the probability of occurrence and the magnitude of the transaction 
costs and therefore on ESC adoption. 
In a typical ESC contract, the supplier bears the costs of design, installation, 
operation and maintenance of the equipment. Engaging in ESC is different from hiring 
engineers to design the installation. First, because the ESCO typically finances the 
installation, it bears the risk related to unexpected costs in the realization phase. 
Then, it has an ex ante incentive to design an installation that will be efficient in terms 
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of operation and maintenance during the contractual period, which typically covers 
the equipment’s lifetime. 
This provides an incentive for the ESCO to minimize the overall production costs over 
the contract duration. This, however, can be balanced by the fact that the contract is 
also assumed to increase transaction costs, as compared to self-investment, if a 
disturbance occurs. Transaction costs consist in search costs, bargaining, 
renegotiation and litigation costs, potential legal expenses and all the costs related to 
a modification of the technology or a transfer to another client or supplier. The 
disturbances in ESC could typically be technical problems, financial issues on either 
the client's or the supplier's side or a change in the occupant's energy use. The 
viability of an ESC project from a client's point of view is determined by her 
expectations regarding the magnitude and the probability of occurrence of transaction 
costs as compared to the expected gains in production costs. Several elements are 
assumed to have an impact on this trade-off, such as asset specificity, trust, contract 
duration and the number of decision-makers. They are described in the following 
subsections.  
2.1.1 Asset specificity  
Transaction costs might arise if it is costly to replace a contractor (or a client) when 
disturbances occur. In some cases, the project involves asset specificity, which 
increases the expected transaction costs when coupled with uncertainty.20 Specificity 
in energy service contracting may relate to the physical asset, the human asset or the 
site (Sorrell, 2007). Physical asset specificity refers to the level of specialized 
equipment and the related importance of auditing and designing effort incurred before 
the implementation. Human asset specificity represents the degree of expertise and 
knowledge required to design the installation (Sorrell, 2007). If these forms of 
specificities are significant, they necessitate from the contractor an important 
investment, which will be lost if the contract is prematurely terminated by the client. 
This may result in an incentive for the ESCO to choose generic technologies in order 
to minimize the investment made before the client signs the contract (Backlund and 
                                            
20 See Tadelis and Williamson (2013) for a theoretical background on the impact of specificity and Sorrell (2007) for a discussion 
of the concept applied to energy service contracting. 
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Thollander, 2011). This may explain why EPC projects typically involve well-
established technologies, such as LED, voltage optimization and building controls 
(Bleyl, 2011; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). More comprehensive retrofits such as 
envelope enhancement or innovative technologies are however less frequent (Bleyl, 
2011; Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). When clients ask for "cutting-edge" technologies, 
EPC suppliers are likely to contract without any performance guarantee (Hansen, 
2006). This may however not apply to ESC projects, which often involve innovative 
technologies, such as combined heat and power systems (Bleyl, 2011). Nevertheless, 
once a specific technology is implemented and if the supplier does not deliver on its 
mandate, it may be costly for the client to find another supplier with the adequate 
level of expertise to take over. This results in bilateral dependency between the two 
parties and higher expected transaction costs. This is captured by the first hypothesis: 
H1a. The more specific and uncommon the technology, the lower the 
probability of opting for ESC.  
The equipment specialization demanded by the client may be dictated by her 
preferences or stem from particularities of the building (e.g. interior layout, proximity 
and access to potential energy sources such as groundwater for heat pumps). 
Technological constraints are typically weaker when the building and the energy 
equipment are designed at the same time. Conversely, human asset specificity is 
higher in existing buildings since it requires a relatively larger effort for the ESC 
supplier to design the most adapted technology. This results in the following 
hypothesis:  
H1b. ESC projects are more likely to be implemented in new buildings.  
Finally, site specificity relates to the difficulty to relocate the asset in case of a hurdle. 
This matters if the client moves out or goes bankrupt. The client's solvency risk is 
seen in the literature as an important barrier from the ESCO's perspective (Helle, 
1997; Lee et al., 2015). In the case of a client’s relocation or bankruptcy, the ESCOs 
are more inclined to search for another client to take over the building together with its 
equipment rather than relocate the installation, regardless of the technology. As a 
result, site specificity is determined by the probability of finding a client ready to take 
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over the energy technology. The relative ease to find a new client can be measured 
by the building type. For instance, when the building is used for residential purposes, 
it is likely that even though the initial occupant moves out, another resident will move 
in the building and reuse the energy technology. Similarly, if the initial client goes 
bankrupt, it is expected to be easier to find a new client to take over the ESC contract. 
Conversely, it can be harder to find a substitute client or occupant with the same use 
of a non-residential building (Helle, 1997). The following hypothesis reads: 
H1c. ESC projects are more likely to be implemented in residential buildings.  
2.1.2 Trust and reliability  
Trust is likely to mitigate the client's fear of renegotiation, litigation, technical problems 
or financial issues undergone by ESCOs. As such it is expected to reduce the 
perceived probability that the contract will be renegotiated (represented by 𝜌 in the 
formal model of Appendix 6.1). This relates to the fact that one of the most important 
obstacles in energy contracting markets described in the literature is low awareness, 
lack of information and skepticism of the clients towards contracting options (Soroye 
and Nilsson, 2010; Vine, 2005; Marino et al., 2011; Hansen, 2006; Jensen et al., 
2010; Capelo, 2011; Pätäri et al., 2016; Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). Trust in the 
supplier is expected to be as important as the reliability of the technology as 
perceived by the client. These observations lead to the following hypothesis:  
H2. Trust in the ESCO and technology reliability reduce the client's expected 
transaction costs and therefore increases the willingness to adopt ESC.  
2.1.3 Contract duration  
The transaction costs model predicts that the longer the duration, the more difficult it 
is to design a contract that accounts for all contingencies that could occur in the long 
run. As a result, this increases the risk of renegotiation or litigation (represented by 𝜌 
in the formal model of Appendix 6.1). The reluctance to commit to an external firm 
during a long period of time has also been emphasized in the literature as a barrier to 
energy service contracting (Goldman et al., 2005; Hansen, 2006; Soroye and Nilsson, 
2010; Lee et al., 2015). Hence, the following hypothesis reads: 
   
45 
 
H3. The contract duration is expected to have a negative impact on ESC 
adoption. 
2.1.4 Number of decision-makers 
The magnitude of expected transaction costs is likely to increase with the number of 
parties involved in the contract. Indeed, in the case of a disturbance, renegotiation 
and adaptation are expected to be costlier the greater the number of actors involved. 
This is the case when the client is an intermediary, such as an architect, a general 
contractor or a real estate investor for instance, whose goal is to sell the building 
together with the energy supply contract. Therefore, the intermediary client who signs 
the contract is not the definitive owner or user of the building. Transaction costs may 
be expected at the time the building is resold and the energy supply contract passed 
onto the buyers, which results in the following hypothesis: 
H4a. Intermediary clients are less likely to opt for ESC.  
Transaction costs are also expected to be large if the building is rented, because the 
transfer of the costs of ESC to the tenants involves a risk of legal disputes.21 
Empirical evidence shows that this issue concerns all energy efficiency projects. 
Under-investment is indeed observed in rented buildings, which is explained by split 
incentives between the landlord, who owns the building and decides what 
investments to undertake, and the tenants who pay for the energy costs.22 One could 
argue that energy contracting may actually mitigate this barrier. ESCOs may assist 
potentially interested owners in the legal process to redirect the costs of energy 
efficiency investments to the tenants. Market analyses show however that ESCOs in 
the UK (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016), in the US and in Canada (Panev et al., 2013) 
struggle to enter the rented buildings market, including commercial centers and office 
buildings. Hence, the following hypothesis reads: 
H4b. ESC projects are less likely to be implemented in rented buildings.  
                                            
21 See discussion in the results section. 
22 See Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) and Davis (2010) for empirical evidence and the appendix of Gillingham et al. (2012) for a 
formal explanation. 
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2.2 Risk sharing 
When investing in renewable energy or energy efficiency, the client faces 
technological risks, such as unpredictable costs that arise in the construction phase of 
the project or any technological default that occurs in the equipment lifetime. The 
ESCO, on the other hand, can diversify the risk via a large portfolio of projects and 
other activities and benefit from higher technical knowledge than the client. It has also 
a better expertise in assessing a project’s risk. As a result, it is optimal for clients with 
risky projects to share the risk with the ESCO in order to gain from a better control 
and mitigation of technological risks. This results in the following hypothesis: 
H5. The larger the risk of the project, the higher the probability of ESC 
adoption.  
This hypothesis contrasts with the predictions from the incentive system theory 
(Gibbons, 2005) or moral hazard models (Lafontaine and Slade, 2007), which provide 
an alternative view of the ‘make-or-buy’ decision than transaction costs economics 
(Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991, Holmstrom, 1999).23 In these models, the principal (in 
our case the client) is expected to be less risk averse than the agent (in our case the 
ESCO). As a result, these models predict that the riskier the project, the smaller the 
likelihood to outsource. This may however not apply in the context of energy service 
contracting since the ESCO has typically a much larger economic size than the 
clients and therefore is likely to be less risk averse. 
2.3 Economies of scale 
The expected impact of a client’s size on the decision to opt for ESC combines the 
effects of transaction costs and economies of scale.  
On one hand, transaction costs imply that ESC is less viable for small consumers. 
Indeed, below a certain threshold of energy consumption, the transaction costs are 
                                            
23 These models rely on principal-agent analysis to explain the trade-offs underlying the optimal choice regarding vertical 
integration. As in the model of transaction costs economics of Tadelis and Williamson (2013), increasing the supplier’s cost 
share allows to address moral hazard and raises the supplier’s unobservable amount of effort in reduction production costs. 
Moral hazard comes from the fact that the principal cannot design the optimal payment scheme for the agent as the latter’s ef fort 
is not observable because of the presence of uncertainty. The difference between the transaction costs economics model of 
Tadelis and Williamson (2013) and moral hazard models lies in the fact that, as opposed to trading-off the effort incentive with 
transaction costs mitigation, it does so with risk sharing. Increasing the supplier’s cost share not only raises its incentive, but also 
its risk share. Assuming the agent (i.e. the supplier) is more risk averse than the principal (the client), the moral-hazard models 
predict that as the level of risk borne by the agent increases, so does the agent’s need for insurance, making in-house projects 
more desirable than externalization (cf. Lafontaine and Slade, 2007). 
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likely to outweigh the benefits of energy service contracting (Sorrell, 2017). The 
viability of ESC then increases with the client’s size as the potential for energy 
production costs savings via ESC rises and offsets the transaction costs. 
On the other hand, the economies of scale result in an attractiveness of ESC which 
decreases with size. The economies of scale brought by the ESCO are indeed 
relatively less interesting for large energy consumers who are more likely to benefit 
from in-house energy management. 
The combination of these two effects may results in an ambiguous impact of size on 
ESC adoption. Sorrell (2007) however argues that transaction costs for small 
consumers are likely to outweigh all ESC benefits, including economies of scale 
advantages. At the other extreme, very large consumers may benefit less from the 
ESCO’s advantages such as economies of scale or risk sharing since they may 
benefit from in-house energy management. As a result, ESC contracts are likely to be 
the most viable for mid-size energy consumers. This results in the following 
hypothesis, which, to my knowledge, has not been empirically tested in the literature:  
H6. The size of the client (in terms of aggregate production costs for energy 
service) has an inverted-U impact on ESC adoption. 
3 Empirical Methodology 
3.1 Research context 
Although exhaustive statistics on the Swiss ESCO market are not available, the ESC 
market turnover was estimated at 170 million Euros/year in 1999 (Bundesamt für 
Energie, 1999) and at 170-350 million Euros/year in 2017 (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 
2017). Existing market analyses and expert interviews suggest a slow growth for 
ESC, while EPC is only emerging in Switzerland (Marino et al., 2010; Marino et al., 
2011; Bertoldi et al., 2014; Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). Nevertheless, some 
experts have observed an increased interest for ESC, which is partly attributed to the 
2009 liberalization of electricity provision for large electricity consumers (>100,000 
kWh/year) (Brunner, 2009).24 This change in the regulatory framework has been seen 
                                            
24 Liberalization of the electricity provision is planned to reach smaller energy consumers (<100,000 kWh/year) in the 
coming years (DETEC, 2017). 
   
48 
 
as an incentive for electric utilities, which beforehand were enjoying regional 
monopoly, to propose new business models such as ESC in order to attract large 
consumers (Brunner, 2009).  
The Swiss context of limited growth in ESC is favorable to study the customer’s 
decision. While experts identify the existence of barriers in Switzerland, such as low 
awareness, lack of trust and financing constraints for small contractors (Marino et al., 
2010; Bertoldi et al., 2014), empirical evidence on ESC adoption from the client's 
perspective in Switzerland does not exist. The analysis of ESC adoption is particularly 
interesting in Switzerland, where the government decided in 2011 to progressively 
phase out of nuclear power. The need for market-based instruments such as energy 
service contracts to induce renewable energy and energy efficiency is all the more 
relevant in a context of reluctance of a share of the population towards policy 
intervention in the energy market. This can be seen in the recent referendum raised 
against the federal energy strategy, even though it has finally been accepted by a 
majority of the population (58.2%) on May 21, 2017. 
This study relies on ESC projects offered by two large Swiss electric utilities. Both 
firms are controlled by a public entity and are mainly active in the canton in which 
they originally had a monopoly in the provision of electricity. While their estimated 
ESC market shares are unknown due to the uncertainty surrounding the overall size 
of the market, the number and the size of projects undertaken suggests these two 
firms to count amongst the four largest ESC providers in Switzerland. They pioneered 
the provision of ESC in Switzerland and have since gained an important experience in 
the market. These two firms are moreover representative of the majority of ESC 
providers in Switzerland in terms of the firm’s type and size as shown by the answers 
to the survey conducted for the third chapter of this thesis. This survey, conducted in 
January 2017, includes answers from 208 energy utilities, gas providers, engineering 
firms, appliances and heating systems suppliers. Among them, 31 firms provide ESC 
and 9 firms are proposing EPC. A large majority of these ESC providers are electricity 
or gas providers controlled by public entities.  
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3.2 Data description 
The empirical analysis relies on a unique dataset containing 2,003 rejected and 
accepted ESC offers25 from two of the largest Swiss ESC suppliers between 1996 
and 2011. The offers are targeted at 1,214 clients in 949 ESC projects. Each 
contract’s offer is targeted at a single client, but an ESC project can include several 
clients, and thus several offers. This is typically the case when several building 
owners decide to group and have a centralized heating system installed and exploited 
by the ESCO. As can be seen in Figure 1.1, except from a peak in 2001, a minority of 
the offers in the sample have been accepted.26  
One to eight offers were proposed to each client and almost 50% of the clients 
accepted a final offer. 37% of the clients obtained a single offer (cf. Table 1.1) and 
less than 10% of the clients received more than 4 offers. The dataset is unbalanced 
since the number of rejected offers is much larger than accepted offers (cf. adoption 
rate in Table 1.1). This stems from the fact that each client cannot accept more than 
one offer. This may result in estimation bias, which will be further discussed in the 
limitation section. 
                                            
25Initially, 2,506 offers were collected, up until 2013. However, contracts from 2012 on are excluded from the analysis since they 
were still under negotiation at the end of the data collection, which results in the impossibi lity to conclude whether the offers were 
rejected or not. After excluding observations with missing values on the main variables of interests, the sample results in 2 ,003 
observations. The descriptive statistics shown in this section are based on the latter sample. 
26Only 21 offers occurred in 2001 in the sample (average number of offers per year is 125), and 18 were accepted.  
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Figure 1.1 ESC adoption 
 
Table 1.1: Number of offers per client and adoption rate 
Number of offers per client Adoption rate (%) Frequency Percent 
1 37.26 740 36.94 
2 24.16 594 29.66 
3 27.49 291 14.53 
4 19.12 204 10.18 
5 14.44 90 4.49 
6 10.00 30 1.50 
7 14.29 14 0.70 
8 10.00 40 2.00 
Average: 27.96 Total: 2,003 100 
 
While it is known when an offer has been or not rejected, the outside option is 
unknown. In some cases, the customer might have chosen an ESC contract of a 
competitor, in which case it would be wrong to consider the observed rejection as an 
actual dismissal by the client of the ESC option. This may results in biased estimates 
of the determinants of ESC adoption. However, this bias may be limited by the fact 
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that the customer is likely to choose a less comprehensive energy service when 
rejecting an ESC offer. This assumption is supported by the fact that conventional 
turnkey projects in Switzerland are much more frequent in practice than ESC. 
Another issue related to the data is its iterative process, which results from the 
negotiation between the first offer and the subsequent ones. This may also result in 
estimation bias due to endogeneity and will be further discussed in the limitation 
section. 
On average, 5 months separate the first offer from the last one. The minimum 
duration between the first and the final offer equals zero for several offers or variants 
proposed at the same time and the maximum is 7.5 years. The increase in offers 
since 2003 stems from a change in business strategy of one of the ESC suppliers, 
which opted to drastically increase prospection for ESC. 
ESC suppliers typically prospect by sending e-mails and letters to large and mainly 
private energy consumers. Private clients indeed represent 97.8% of the offers. All 
the offers are prepared by the contractors to reply to a client’s request.  Therefore, 
there may be a certain selection bias in the sample, since it includes only primarily 
interested clients. As a result, the results of this study regarding ESC adoption may 
suffer from selection bias. 
It is worth describing the characteristics of the clients targeted by the ESCOs in the 
sample.27 A majority of the clients (44%) are architects and general contractors. Then, 
40% are private owners and 15% real estate investors or investment funds. Firms 
(6.6%) and public collectivities (3%) represent a small share of clients. 
Table 1.2 provides descriptive statistics of the cost components in the offers. Each 
offer typically includes an annual fixed cost covering capital, operation and 
maintenance costs and a variable cost for primary energy purchases which depends 
on the client's energy consumption. When the client participates to the initial 
financing, the fixed cost is consequently reduced. The variable cost is usually 
determined by the price in CHF/kWh for each energy service (e.g. heating, hot water, 
                                            
27The characteristics are represented as the percentage of occurrence in non-mutually exclusive groups. Many projects 
combine several types of clients. This is why the total is more than 100%. 
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ventilation, etc.) multiplied by the annual consumption of that service (kWh/year). The 
heating and hot water consumption levels described in Table 1.2 relate to 
consumption estimates before the implementation of the contract. The variable cost 
for the remaining energy services consumptions (variable cost other cons.), may 
include ventilation, cooling, passive cooling or other energy services' costs. Table 1.2 
shows that the projects are relatively heterogeneous in costs, which is mostly due to 
differences in the customer’s size (c.f. surface in table 1.3). 
Table 1.2: Costs 
Variable mean std. dev. min. max. N 
Fixed cost (CHF/year) 31,988 67,516 0 992,906 2,002 
Client’s initial financing (CHF) 16,355 293,342 0 6,910,000 2,002 
Price heating (CHF/kWh) 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.34 1,999 
Heating consumption (kWh/year) 178.817 392.991 7,955 7,000,000 1,719 
Price hot water (CHF/kWh) 0.07 0.02 0.02 0.28 1,959 
Hot water consumption (kWh/year) 65,505 110,717 2,000 2,045,120 1,351 
Variable cost other 
cons. 
(CHF/year) 469 5,955 0 180,990 2,003 
 
3.3 Econometric model 
An energy service customer (i = 1,…,n) can either decide to sign an offer for ESC 
(j=1,..,Ji), to ask for another bid j+1 or to choose an outside option.  Customer i's 
choice is supported by a comparison of the utility obtained with the ESC offer j, 
Uij(ESC), and the outside option's utility, which is normalized to zero. The customer 
will opt for contract j if and only if Uij(ESC)>0. I observe the binary variable yij = 
1[Uij(ESC)>0]. 
  
𝑈𝑖𝑗(𝐸𝑆𝐶)  = 𝛼 + 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑍𝑖𝛿 + 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑗Γ + 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗                                                                (1) 
 
Xij represents a vector of offer characteristics, such as the technology or contractual 
terms. The vector Zi includes the characteristics of the client and the building. Year 
dummies are included to control for unobserved external factors specific to each year. 
ui are random effects and 𝜀𝑖𝑗 represent the idiosyncratic errors. 
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The choice of explanatory variables is supported by the hypotheses proposed in 
Section 2. Table 1.3 presents descriptive statistics of the covariates included in Xij or 
Zi, the corresponding hypotheses developed in Section 2, and the predicted direction 
of the effects of the covariates on the probability of adopting ESC. 
 
 
Table 1.3: Descriptive statistics of ESC adoption determinants 
 Variable name 
Proxy for empirical testing 
Predicted 
impact on 
adoption  
 mean std dev. min. max. N 
Transaction cost Economics       
H1a specificity index 
A hundred minus the share of this 
technology in all building types in 
Switzerland that year 
negative % 93.19 3.58 38.22 99.99 2,003 
H1b new building positive dummy 0.83    2,003 
H1c residential building positive dummy 0.93    2,003 
H2 canton ESCO 
trust in ESCO: same canton as ESCO 
positive dummy 0.82    2,003 
H2 oil backup 
reliability of technology: heating 
system with oil as a backup 
positive dummy 0.05    2,003 
H3 ln(duration) 
duration of the contract 
negative 
 
years 26.54 6.31 10 60 2,003 
H4a intermediary client negative dummy 0.47    2,003 
H4b rented building negative dummy 0.81    2,003 
Risk sharing      
H5 interest rate 
Project’s real interest rate set by the 
ESCO 
negative % 4.55 1.20 2.26 6.66 633 
Economies of scale        
H6 ln(total cost/year) inverted CHF/year 51,153 100,138 32,901 1,983,200 1,577 
 Client’s yearly total energy costs U-shape       
Control        
 Surface  x 1000m2 3.27 7.91 0.105 190 1,608 
 
 
 
The degree of asset specificity, as described in hypothesis H1a, is measured by an 
index which negatively depends on the diffusion of the technology proposed. More 
precisely, I measure how frequently the technology included in the offer28 is present in 
existing buildings in Switzerland (OFS, 2015). The proxy specificity index is computed 
as the complement to the share, in percent, of the Swiss buildings having the same 
                                            
28 Either for heating and/or hot water 
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technology as the one proposed in the offer at the same period.29  This proxy assumes 
that the less frequent the technology is implemented in existing buildings, the higher 
the difficulty to find another supplier with sufficient knowledge to take over the 
installation or maintenance in the case of litigation with the original ESCO. This 
increases expected transaction costs and decreases the desirability of ESC with 
respect to in-house projects. 
In order to account for increased flexibility in technology design in new buildings 
(hypothesis H1b), the model includes a dummy (new building) equating one if the 
technology of the ESC contract is installed as the building is under construction. The 
dummy residential equals one if the building is destined for residential use and relates 
to hypothesis H1c. 
Trust in the ESCO (hypothesis H2) is measured by a variable capturing probable 
historical relationship between the contractor and the client. The dummy variable 
canton ESCO equates one when the customer is located in the same canton as the 
supplier. This is supported by the fact that, until 2009, the ESC suppliers in the 
sample had cantonal monopolies for the supply of electricity, which is still the case for 
small consumers. Therefore, I assume pre-existing interactions between the ESCO 
and the clients located in the same canton. The use of this proxy is also supported by 
the testimony of an ESC expert, who observed difficulties gaining market shares in 
other cantons because of the customers' reluctance to deal with a utility originating 
from another canton. Descriptive statistics show that a majority of offers (82%) are 
proposed to clients within the same canton as the ESCO, which reflects that the 
suppliers retain a comparative advantage in terms of proximity. 
In some offers, the clients have requested for an oil heating system to work as a 
backup. A dummy oil backup, which equals 1 if oil backup is included in the offer, is a 
proxy for the perceived reliability of oil heating systems as opposed to the main 
technology in the contract. Having oil as a backup may also be seen as a flexible 
solution to uncertain future uses and energy consumption. In either case, these 
                                            
29 The buildings census is available in 1990, 2000, 2009-2014. Thus, data from the 2000 census is used for offers from years 
1996-2004 and 2009 census for years 2005-2009. 
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backup systems can be seen as a safeguard technology aimed at reducing expected 
transaction costs and therefore increase the viability of ESC projects (hypothesis H2). 
Only 5% of the projects proposed include oil as a backup technology, so that 
empirical results should be interpreted cautiously. These backup systems are used in 
similar proportions in old and new buildings, mainly in support to renewable 
technologies such as heat pumps (58%) and wood heating systems (23%). A simple 
logistic regression informs that these backups are more likely to be used in buildings 
with large energy consumption and non residential uses, such as industries or 
schools. 
In order to account for increased expected transaction costs due to longer contractual 
periods, the model controls for the contract duration (hypothesis H3). The average 
contract lasts more than 26 years, and a large majority of offers are either 15 or 30 
years contracts. The distribution of duration is highly skewed to the right, with only a 
few offers representing longer contractual periods, which supports taking the natural 
logarithm of duration in the regression model. 
The dummies for intermediary clients and rented buildings are related to hypotheses 
H4a and H4b and capture the fact that negotiation and adaptation are expected to be 
more costly when several actors have interests at stake. 
The proxy used in the model to measure the risk (hypothesis H5) is the real interest 
rate applied by the ESCO to compute the client's annuities.30 The ESC suppliers 
apply different rates depending on the technology installed, the client's type, the 
building's characteristics and size. Ranging from 2.26 to 6.66%, the rate offered to a 
specific client captures the ESCO's ex ante risk assessment of the project. Due to the 
expertise of the ESCO in these projects risk assessment, this is a good proxy of the 
project’s risk. Nevertheless, it may also capture other risks perceived by the ESCO, 
such as financial risk (e.g. client's relocation, change in energy use, or bankruptcy) 
and risk of litigation and renegotiation in the course of the contract. This represents a 
limit of this proxy, which may however be mitigated by the fact that I control for most 
of the determinants that the ESCO considers to evaluate the client’s risk. For 
                                            
30 Real interest rates were computed with the following formula: real rate=(1+nominal rate)/(1+inflation rate)-1. Monthly data on 
annual IPC inflation rate come from OCDE (2017). 
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instance, I control for the specificity index of the technology, the size and the type of 
building (new or residential).31 Concerning risk sharing, other determinants, such as 
the ESCO’s efforts, the risk aversion of both the client and the ESCO, are also likely 
to affect ESC adoption. Nevertheless, the impact of these elements is difficult to 
assess empirically. Thus, the analysis focuses primarily on the project’s risk. 
The client's aggregate production costs of energy services s = 1,…,S are used to test 
the combined impact of economies of scale and transaction costs (hypothesis H6). 
The following proxy is computed: 
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡
𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
=∑(𝑝𝑠  × 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠) + 𝑓𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 + 
S
s
𝑐𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
         (2) 
The measure for aggregate production costs is the annual cost and includes the 
variable cost, computed as the yearly consumption of each energy service multiplied 
by the corresponding energy price (ps). When primary energy purchase is not included 
in the contract, and thus no price is specified, an approximation of the market price is 
used to specify ps.32 The yearly fixed cost typically includes the amortization of the 
investment financed by the ESC supplier, the design, the operation and the 
maintenance. In some contracts the client participates to the initial financing by an 
amount represented by client initial financing, which is divided by the contract 
duration to account for the participation in the yearly total cost. Aggregate production 
costs are expressed in natural logarithm in the regression in order to mitigate the 
effect of outliers and heterogeneity.  
Finally, the variable surface represents the squared meters heated surface dedicated 
to the client33 and is used as a control for size effects. 
                                            
31 In appendix 6.3, I also added a control for private or public clients. 
32 ElCom (2014), Surveillant des prix (2014) and OFS (2016) data on monthly or yearly energy prices are used for the 
estimation of energy prices, and depend on either the month or the year of the offer, and the size of energy consumption per 
year. When the energy is electricity and data is available, the electric supplier and the technology also has an influence on the 
variable cost. Following Phillips (2010), I assume that geothermal, groundwater and lake-water heat pumps use 35% and air-
water heat pump 25% of final energy. Ventilation or cooling is assumed to be present in the building only when it is specified in 
the ESC contract. However, each customer is assumed to consume at least space heating and hot water.  
33 In most of the cases, the offer is for one client and one building. In some cases however, there may be several clients in a 
same building. 
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3.4 Estimation method 
As each client faces one or several offers, the dataset is treated as an unbalanced 
panel. I apply a random effects probit model, in which idiosyncratic errors are 
assumed to be independent across offers and individuals, and are assumed to follow 
a standard normal distribution, 𝜀𝑖𝑗~N(0;1). 𝑢𝑖~N(0;𝜎
2) are client-specific random 
effects, which vary across clients and are assumed to be unrelated with the 
regressors and independent across individuals. As opposed to a pooled estimation, 
random effects allow the disturbances 𝑣𝑖𝑗 = 𝑢𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑗  to be correlated within an 
individual. The Log-Likelihood function is approximated using the Gaussian 
quadrature with Hermite integration formula suggested by Butler and Moffitt (1982). In 
addition, project-clustered robust standard errors are used to allow for correlation 
within the projects. In order to evaluate the magnitude of the impact of each variable 
on the probability of signing the ESC contract, the average marginal effects34 of each 
variable on the prediction that yij = 1 are computed.35 
  
                                            
34 i.e. marginal effects averaged over the sample 
35 These results obtained by estimating the random effects will be compared with the average marginal effects obtained when 
assuming ui = 0, i.e. imposing the random effects to equal zero. 
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4 Results and discussion 
4.1 Descriptive analysis 
Figure 1.2 shows how frequently each technology appears in the accepted offers of 
the sample.36 To underline the technology diffusion, Figure 1.3 provides the shares of 
technologies based on data covering all Swiss buildings (OFS, 2015). 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2  Technology in accepted offers            Figure 1.3 Technology in Swiss buildings 
 
Heat pumps (mostly geothermal), included in 88% of the offers, are largely 
predominant in the sample. They are followed by district heating (9%) and wood, 
either woodchips or pellets (7.3%). Oil heating systems, mostly used in combination 
with another technology, are present in 5% of the cases while gas represents a share 
of 2.5% and solar panels 1.9%.37 Except in the first years of the sample, the diffusion 
of the technologies in accepted offers (Figure 1.2) is very similar to the one in the 
complete sample. Figures 1.2 and 1.3 show that the technologies most often 
proposed by the ESC suppliers are very uncommon as compared to the one 
                                            
36 For illustration reasons in 1.2 and 1.3 and in order to represent the relative shares, the technologies have been classified i n 
mutually exclusive groups corresponding to OFS (2015). Because many offers in the sample include a combination of 
technologies, the main technology in terms of power is illustrated in the figure. An exception is made for oil, which is always used 
as a back-up in the sample. I still decided to show separately the group of offers including these oil back-ups. District heating is 
also a special case as it represents a separated group while it can use the same energetic agents as the other groups (e.g. 
wood, electricity for heat pumps). In the econometric analysis however, each combination of technologies has its own specificity 
index. 
37 These numbers are the percentage of occurrence in non-mutually exclusive groups. Since many projects combine several 
technologies, the total exceeds 100%. 
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implemented in Swiss buildings. This translates into a high specificity index (average 
93.1 in Table 1.3). The specificity index is also high in existing buildings, with an 
average for the specificity index equal to 93.9% among old buildings in the sample. 
Several innovative technologies appear among the offers, such as groundwater, lake-
water, air or residual heat pumps and co-generation. A small share of observations 
(236 offers) includes data on the technology used before the ESC project. Out of 
these, 93.4% relied on oil, 3.5% on electricity, and 3% on gas at the moment of the 
offer. These observations suggest that ESC favors renewable energy technology.  
Table 1.3 informs that new and residential buildings concern a large majority of the 
offers (83% and 93% respectively). This suggests that the barriers mentioned earlier 
for old and non-residential buildings imply an ex ante selection. In the survey lead for 
the chapter 3 of this thesis, we find that Swiss firms interested in providing ESC favor 
targeting residential buildings, together with education facilities and industries.  
The descriptive statistics do not suggest, however, the ex ante selection against 
rented buildings as these represent 81% of the offers. Likewise with intermediary 
clients who represent a considerable share of the offers (47%). Table 1.4 provides the 
share of accepted offers contingent on whether an offer relates to a rental building or 
if an intermediary client is involved. 
 
 
Table 1.4: Accepted, rejected offers by rented buildings and intermediary client 
 not rented all or partly rented 
rejected offer 184 (49%) 1,259 (77%) 
accepted offer 194 (51%) 366 (23%) 
total 378 1,625 
 direct client intermediary client 
rejected offer 655 (62%) 788 (83%) 
accepted offer 398 (38%) 162 (17%) 
total 1,053 950 
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The table informs that a higher share of rejected offers occurs when the building is 
either completely or partly rented (77%) and when the client is an intermediary (83%), 
which is in line with the predictions based on higher expected transaction costs. This 
leads to the following question: Why these two ESC suppliers target rented buildings 
and intermediary clients, despite these being associated with a higher rate of rejected 
offers? A possible explanation lies in the fact that the contractors primarily target 
residential buildings and especially multi-family houses, which represent less specific 
clients that can easily be replaced in the case of a relocation or a bankruptcy. 
However, this comes at the cost of an increased risk of legal disputes with tenants, 
since residential buildings consist in rental housing in most cases38 (85% in this 
sample). A similar dilemma occurs with intermediary clients. ESC is mostly targeting 
new buildings, and the primary interlocutors for new buildings in the sample are 
intermediary clients (54%) who will resell the building with the contract. These 
represent additional interlocutors and increase expected transaction costs. These two 
dilemmas are analyzed further in the next section. 
4.2 Estimation results 
The estimation results based on equation 1 are provided in column 1 of Table 1.5. 
Due to the small sample size resulting from missing values for the interest rate, the 
yearly total cost and the surface, the regression in column 2 omit these variables. To 
capture the impact's magnitude of each determinant on ESC adoption, the average 
marginal effects are provided beside the coefficients.39 
 
 
  
                                            
38 This is also the case in general in Switzerland. According to the federal census of the population from the Swiss federal 
statistics Office, 66% of the Swiss housing were rented in 2000. 
39 The estimated average marginal effects are similar if we estimate random effects or if we set them to equal zero. 
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Table 1.5: Estimation results 
Random Effects Probit 
dependent variable:  
offer accepted (y=1) 
(1) (2) 
coefficient 
Average 
marginal 
effect coefficient 
Average 
marginal 
effect 
specificity index -0.007 
(0.029) 
-0.002 0.009 
(0.013) 
0.002 
new building 0.966*** 
(0.293) 
0.220*** 1.050*** 
(0.159) 
0.226*** 
residential 1.385** 
(0.622) 
0.316** 0.997*** 
(0.214) 
0.203*** 
canton ESCO 0.073 
(0.199) 
0.017 0.550*** 
(0.127) 
0.135*** 
oil backup - 
- 
- 0.541*** 
(0.203) 
0.160** 
ln(duration) 0.836 
(0.582) 
0.190 0.262 
(0.198) 
0.070 
intermediary client -0.633*** 
(0.165) 
-0.144*** -0.553*** 
(0.086) 
-0.153*** 
rented -1.183*** 
(0.416) 
-0.270*** -1.224*** 
(0.197) 
-0.382*** 
interest rate 0.276* 
(0.156) 
0.063*   
ln(total cost/year) -0.493*** 
(0.162) 
-0.112***   
surface (x1000m2) 0.055*** 
(0.017) 
0.013***   
observations 529 2,003 
groups 321 1,214 
year dummies yes yes 
 y=0 y=1 y=0 y=1 
?̂?=0 
(%) 
407 
(97.84) 
84 
(74.34) 
1,368 
(94.80) 
353 
(63.04) 
?̂?=1 
(%) 
9 
(2.16) 
29 
(25.66) 
75 
(5.20) 
207 
(36.96) 
Notes: Upper part of the table: Project-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Average marginal effects 
(AME) on Pr(y=1) are estimated based on estimated coefficients. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1 Lower part of the 
table: See Appendix 6.2 for details on year dummies. y=0 (resp. y=1) indicates observed values of y, ?̂?=0 (resp. 
?̂?=1) indicate predicted values of y using estimated random effects and set to 1 if P(y=1|x) ≥ 0.5, 0 otherwise. 
 
The proxy for asset specificity, i.e. the specificity index (hypothesis H1a), has no 
significant impact on ESC adoption. This could be explained by the fact that ESC 
represents an instrument for the owner to benefit from the ESCO's technical expertise 
and risk sharing, which promotes the implementation of innovative technologies. 
ESCOs may also have an incentive to target these technologies because they 
represent lower operating costs. 
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The hypothesis (H1b) that adoption is more likely in projects involving new buildings 
is favored here, with a probability of adoption 22 to 23 percentage points greater. 
ESC projects are also more likely to be signed (20 to 32 percentage points) in 
residential buildings, favoring hypothesis H1c. 
The importance of trust (hypothesis H2), as observed by Xu et al. (2011), is favored in 
the larger sample (column 2)40, with a 14 percentage points increase in the probability 
of signing the contract if a former relationship exists between the ESC supplier and 
the client (which is the case if the client lies in the ESCO's canton).  
The probability of adopting ESC increases by 16 percentage points if the technology 
includes an oil heating system backup. This variable could however not be included in 
the model of column 1, since oil backup is only present in rejected offers in this 
smaller sample. In the larger sample, interacting the variable oil backup with a trend 
shows that its impact does not change through time, suggesting that the need for 
reliable technologies is likely to be as important for clients in 2011 than it was in the 
1990s.41 This in turns suggests that renewable energy heating systems may still be 
perceived as unsure or insufficient.  
The coefficient on contract duration (hypothesis H3) has no significant impact on ESC 
adoption, while a negative impact is suggested by both transaction cost economics 
theory and observations of the ESCO markets (Goldman et al., 2005; Soroye and 
Nilsson, 2010; Lee et al., 2015). The absence of a significant result may stem from 
the fact that contract duration often equals the technology's lifetime. Therefore, the 
negative impact predicted may be outweighed by the positive perception on long 
lasting technologies.  
As expected, a greater number of decision-makers taking part in the ESC contract, as 
it is the case when the client is an intermediary (hypothesis H4a) or when the building 
is rented (hypothesis H4b), decreases the probability of opting for ESC. The results 
confirm the observation of untapped potential in rented buildings (e.g. Nolden and 
Sorrell, 2016; Panev et al., 2013). Renting the building is the most important obstacle 
                                            
40 The variable canton of the ESCO is however not significant in the smaller sample of 529 observations.  
41 In the larger sample, this was tested by using a time trend interacted with the variable oil backup, which had no significant 
impact. 
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considered, with a negative impact on adoption ranging from 27 to 38 percentage 
points. The negative effect seems to come from the risk of legal disputes with tenants, 
rather than from landlord-tenants split incentives. Indeed, a dummy variable capturing 
the fact that the owner lives in the building has no significant impact on ESC adoption, 
once the fact of having a tenant is controlled for. The perceived risk of legal disputes 
stems from the legal framework of transferring the costs of ESC to the tenants, which 
remains unclear in Switzerland.42 
The average marginal effects provide some answers to the aforementioned dilemmas 
concerning residential - and often rented - buildings as well as new building frequently 
involving intermediary clients. The results show that the negative impact of rented 
buildings more than offsets the positive effect of residential buildings.43 The contractor 
would get a larger rate of adoption by targeting non-residential buildings such as 
industries or non-rented administrative buildings. The barrier related to tenants may 
also explain why ESCOs are struggling to reach the residential sector in Finland 
(Suhonen and Okkonen, 2013). On the other hand, the cost implied by the 
involvement of intermediary clients seems to be compensated by the positive impact 
of a new construction on ESC adoption.44 
The real interest rate, measuring the project’s risk (hypothesis H5), has a significant 
positive impact on ESC adoption. A one percentage point increase in interest rate 
raises by 6 percentage points the probability of signing the contract. This means that 
the riskier the project, the higher the client’s probability of signing the contract. This 
result differs from Polzin et al. (2016b), who showed in the context of EPC adoption 
that collectivities tend to ignore the advantage of risk-sharing brought by the 
outsourcing of energy services to an ESCO.  
Finally, while the client’s size in terms of squared meters (surface) has a small 
significant positive effect, the measure for aggregate production cost, ln(total 
                                            
42 When the energy equipment is external to the building, as for district heating, the owner is legally allowed to transfer the costs 
of operation, maintenance, energy purchase and investment amortization into the renting charges (ancillary costs). Theoretically, 
the owner could do the same when the energy equipment is within the building but owned by a third party, as in ESC. However, 
this has never been subject to a legal precedent. Thus, the risk of legal dispute remains high. 
43 In regression 2, a Wald test on the marginal effects of the variables rented and residential rejects the null hypothesis of 
marginal effects being identical in absolute value: the impact of rented is significantly greater (99% confidence level).  
44 A Wald test on the marginal effects of new and intermediary client in regression 2 rejects the null hypothesis of marginal 
effects being identical in absolute value: the impact of new is significantly greater (99% confidence level).  
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cost/year), displays a significant and negative impact on ESC adoption. The predicted 
inverted-U shape relationship between the client size and ESC adoption (hypothesis 
H6) is not confirmed, since the squared term of ln(total cost/year) is not significant (cf. 
Appendix 6.3). The fact that transaction costs render ESC undesirable for small 
energy consumers is not confirmed here. This result must however be viewed 
cautiously since the dataset is characterized by a selection of relatively large clients: 
85% of the offers are targeted at clients with yearly energy costs greater than CHF 
15,000, which corresponds to the consumption costs of buildings with half a dozen 
apartments. Another proxy for economies of scale has been tested, i.e. the size of the 
installations in terms of power (kW). The latter has no significant impact on ESC 
adoption, even when interacted with technology dummies such as heat pumps.45 
4.3 Limitations, robustness checks and further research 
The limitation of this research relies first on the possible selection bias. First, this 
results from the fact that the sample includes only interested clients since they 
requested an offer. This may prevent the analysis to capture all the determinants of 
ESC adoption. The selection bias is also likely to affect the types of technologies 
involved in these contracts. This also comes from the fact that only two ESC suppliers 
accepted to provide full information about their offers. Both are experienced ESCOs 
and may already be targeting the most viable projects, e.g. large-size new residential 
buildings. Because non-residential buildings and ESC solutions with oil are under-
represented in the sample, this may result in estimation biases. Further research 
would need to compare this study’s results with analyses based on offers made from 
other contractors and on clients who never received an ESC offer, such as small 
energy consumers. The latter could be done using a survey with stated preferences. 
Then, the dataset is characterized by a larger number of rejected, as opposed to 
accepted, offers. This, according to King and Zeng (2001), may lead to an 
underestimation of the predicted probability of signing the contract. This can also be 
                                            
45 The empirical analysis does not include technology-specific dummies as they have no significant impact on ESC adoption (cf. 
appendix 6.4). 
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seen at the bottom of Table 1.5, in which fitted values of y are better at predicting y = 
0 than y = 1 in both regressions.  
A first strategy to check the validity of the results is to perform a bootstrap without 
replacement, i.e. to randomly select a subsample of rejected offers, which are equal 
in number to the accepted offers. Average marginal effects for both regressions are 
computed with balanced samples, using random subsamples of rejected offers, with 
113 rejected offers for regression (1) (respectively 561 for regression (2)). The 
average marginal effects results, after 500 random draws, are presented as 
histogram plots in appendix 6.5. The results show that the average marginal effects 
are close to the values of Table 1.5. A few variables show a more important impact in 
the larger sample (regression (2)), such as canton ESCO, new building, residential 
and intermediary client. This however does not affect the conclusion of tenants 
offsetting the advantages of residential building and new buildings being interesting to 
target despite the frequent involvement of intermediary clients.46 One can also note 
that average marginal effects computed this way are characterized by the presence of 
many outliers in the smaller sample (regression (1)), for residential and rented 
variables for instance. This is probably explained by the small sample, which is 
consequently reduced to 226 observations.  
This bootstrap strategy may however not be sufficient to properly account for the 
problem of an unbalanced sample. The number of rejected offers is also larger within 
the clients. This may result in a bias towards picky clients, since these are over-
represented by the number of offers they have rejected. In other words, the number of 
offers to a client may be endogenous, i.e. related to the probability of adoption. A 
strategy to test this possibility consists in performing a bootstrap without replacement,  
in this case by selecting a subsample of rejected offers within each client with more 
than one rejected offers. The results are shown in appendix 6.6 with 500 random 
draws, keeping a maximum of one rejected offer per client. The histograms suggest 
that, although all marginal effects keep the same sign and significance, some of the 
                                            
46 Indeed, the distribution of the average marginal effects (AME) of intermediary clients lie between -0.15 and -0.25 and new 
buildings AME from 0.26 to 0.36. Rented buildings lie between -0.31 and -0.41 while residential lie between 0.20 to 0.35. 
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coefficients may be slightly biased. This is the case for canton ESCO47, duration, new 
and residential building, rented buildings and intermediary clients. In fact, except for 
rented buildings in the large sample, the magnitudes of the marginal effects are larger 
in absolute value when using the bootstrap strategy. Thus, the impacts presented in 
the results section are robust although they may be somehow underestimated in their 
strength. An exception is rented building which may have an impact that may be 
slightly overestimated in the large sample.48 One can also note that the results about 
the tradeoffs are robust. Indeed, rented buildings negative impact still compensate the 
positive effect of residential buildings and the positive impact of new buildings offset 
the negative effect of having an intermediary client. Finally, one can note that this 
bootstrap strategy results in a significant positive impact of specificity and contract 
duration on adoption,49 which contradicts the literature.  
Third, the dataset is characterized by an iterative process between the first offer and 
the subsequent ones, which results from negotiation between the two parties. The 
first implication lies in the fact that the offers made to a client are not independent. 
Using the random effects to account for this issue may not be sufficient if the random 
effects correlate with the regressors. Relaxing the random effects assumption of 
uncorrelated effects, by using fixed effects or correlated random effects for instance 
(Wooldridge, 2009), is not suitable to this dataset. Within variation of the variables of 
interest is indeed insufficient, i.e. the offers to each client do not change sufficiently 
from one another. Another result of this issue lies in the possible endogeneity. 
Indeed, the contractual attributes of the accepted offers will be determined by the 
client’s negotiation. Therefore, the explanatory variables may not be exogenous. An 
additional robustness check consists in including only the final offer for each client. 
The results are shown in Appendix 6.7. Except for the interest rate, which becomes 
insignificant, all other variables gain in magnitude and exhibit the same significant 
sign. The specificity index and the contract duration also have a significantly positive 
impact on ESC adoption, but only in the larger sample. Further research may 
consider other methods to deal with this issue. One could for instance model this 
                                            
47 In the big sample only. 
48 AME= -0.38 in the basic regression and ranges from -0.33 to -0.37 in the bootstrap. 
49 Only in the large sample for specificity. 
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negotiation process using dynamic games. Using discrete choice experiments is also 
another method to make sure that the regressors are exogenous. 
Another limitation lies in the proxy used to measure asset specificity, i.e. the 
specificity index. The proxy is imperfect because most existing Swiss buildings were 
built before the 1990s (OFS, 2015), while 82% of the buildings in the sample have a 
construction date that coincides with the timing of the project (therefore after the 
1990s). A better proxy would compare the offers' technology with Swiss buildings of 
the same age. The construction year is however unavailable in my sample. In order to 
account for this potential problem, the specificity index is interacted with a dummy 
equating one for existing buildings. I find no statistical difference of the specificity 
proxy's impact on ESC adoption between old and new buildings. The fact that the 
specificity index has no significant impact may also come from a reverse causality 
bias between ESC adoption and specificity (Masten, 1996; Saussier, 2000). Indeed, 
the client may choose the level of asset specificity, given her choice to adopt ESC or 
not. This could be tested in future research using an instrumental variable for asset 
specificity, such as the proximity to energy sources, e.g. lakes or groundwater for 
technologies such as heat pumps. Finally, one should note that the proxy for asset 
specificity used here may also reflect market power, as it measures the difficulty to 
find another supplier. The effect of market power on ESC adoption is ambiguous and 
may also suffer from reverse causality. Hence, further research should focus on 
alternative measures for asset specificity. 
Several other robustness checks were performed to test whether relaxing the 
assumptions underlying the random-effects probit model and changing the 
approximation method affects the results. 
First, relying on a random-effects logit model, rather than on a random-effects probit 
model, results in quantitatively similar average marginal effects.50  
The quality of the quadrature approximation of the random-effects probit model has 
been checked and confirmed.51  
                                            
50 Differences lie at the hundredth. 
51 This has been done by changing the number of integration points and assess how it affects the results. The relative 
differences between the coefficients when changing integration points from 8 to 16 (instead of 12 in table 4) were very 
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The results are also robust to an increase in sample size resulting from an estimation 
of missing values in energy consumptions based on the buildings’ type and size.52 
Finally, I showed that the project’s risk has a positive effect on adoption. This 
suggests a need for clients with projects including larger risk to shed it onto the 
ESCO. Further research concerning risk would be needed to study the client’s and 
the ESCO’s risk aversion. Plausible proxies for risk aversion are difficult to find. I 
tested whether the offer being targeted at a private vs. a public client has any impact - 
either directly or through the interest rate - on adoption. The use of this determinant is 
supported by the fact that public entities are often considered in the economic 
literature as being risk neutral.53 This variable has nevertheless no significant impact 
(see Appendix 6.3).54 Then, I analyze other measures for the project’s risk as 
perceived by the client. In ESC, the client typically bears the risk of energy prices 
variations55. Their impact was tested using several measures. First, I used a ratio of 
fixed cost on total cost which measures the part of the energy cost that is not subject 
to uncertainty. Then, a measure of prices variability (namely the standard deviation)56,  
was tested. These have no impact on adoption (cf. appendix 6.3). 
5 Conclusion and policy implications 
This study examines the economic determinants of adoption of energy supply 
contracting (ESC). Conjectures based on economic theories and observations of 
ESCO markets are tested quantitatively using an original dataset of rejected and 
accepted ESC offers from two Swiss ESC suppliers over the period 1996-2011. 
These ESC projects involve a large share of renewable energy technologies.  
                                                                                                                                         
small (of the order of x10-6 to x10-8 ), suggesting a quadrature approximation of quality. 
52 Hot water consumption was assumed to be 75MJ per squared-meter heated surface (i.e. 75/3.6 kWh per m2) in residential 
building and 50MJ in non-residential buildings. New buildings (respectively old buildings) were attributed a heating consumption 
of 100MJ/m2 (respectively 250MJ/m2). This method permits to increase the sample to 575 observations. 
53 See for instance McAfee and McMillan (1986). 
54 This may come from the fact that public clients represent a very small share in the sample (2.25%), making it difficult to test it 
properly. 
55 When primary energy supply is included in the contract, as in a standard ESC contract, the variable cost determined into the 
contract is indexed each year to the corresponding energetic agent's index, as set by OFS (2014). There exists however some 
contracts called “light contracting", where the client keeps on buying the primary energy to her initial energy supplier. In this 
case, the variation in variable cost is determined by the variation in the market prices of the corresponding energetic agents with 
data from OFS (2016). 
56 Price volatility was computed with 2000-2014 data on monthly energy prices (OFS, 2016) for “light contracting" and of 
monthly energy indices (OFS, 2014) for standard ESC contracts.  
   
69 
 
The results suggest that clients with risky projects are willing to share the risk with the 
ESCO, who can diversify via a large portfolio of projects and other activities, and have 
a better control of technological risks. Economies of scale also appear to be a 
determinant of ESC adoption. This result should, however, be taken cautiously with 
regard to the insufficient share of small clients in the dataset. Asset specificity does 
not display a negative effect on ESC adoption as predicted by economic theory. While 
this must be confirmed by future empirical research, this would be good news for 
policy makers. Indeed, if asset specificity is proven to have no impact on customer 
choice, it may be non-strategic for the contractors to propose generic technologies as 
it has been observed on EPC markets (Mills, 2003; Sorrell, 2007).57  
This study also provides quantitative evidence that ESC adoption is smaller in rented 
buildings. This can be related to the perceived legal issue linked to rented buildings 
caused by a lack of clear legislation on the transfer of the contract costs to the tenant. 
Having an intermediary client, who plans to sell the building with the ESC contract, 
also increases expected transaction costs and thus reduces ESC adoption. On the 
other hand, if the project relates to a new or a residential building, the probability of 
contract adoption increases. This suggests low penetration of ESC in more complex 
buildings such as industrial facilities, office buildings and commercial centers, which 
represent higher risks for the contractor if the client relocates or goes bankrupt. 
If energy service contracting is proven to foster investment in renewable technologies 
and energy efficiency, the priority for policy makers would be to address market 
failures, such as the lack of clear legislation in Switzerland regarding the transfer of 
energy contracting costs to the tenants. This study shows that ESC suppliers cannot 
reach several market segments because of the transaction costs involved. According 
to transaction costs economics, these costs can be mitigated by the ex ante effort to 
design as complete a contract as possible with respect to future uncertainty. National 
and international ESCO associations propose general guidelines and standard 
contracts to reduce transaction costs (Polzin et al., 2016a). The impact of these top-
                                            
57 Non-strategic here is considered as a decision that may not contribute to the competitive advantage of the firm (cf. 
Cooremans, 2011). This point may however be challenged by the fact that the risk may offset the gain in value resulting from 
proposing innovative technologies. Therefore, proposing generic technologies may still be strategic for ESCOs. This point mer its 
further research. 
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down approaches has however been limited in practice (Nolden et al., 2016). The 
knowledge required to design such contracts calls for the intervention of facilitators, 
working as intermediaries between the clients and the ESCOs, who provide technical 
and administrative support (Bleyl et al., 2012; Nolden et al., 2016; Polzin et al., 
2016a). This study provides rationale for encouraging these bottom-up and tailor-
made solutions provided by facilitators, for instance through subsidies on their start-
up costs as suggested by Nolden and Sorrell (2016). I show that the perceived 
reliability of the technology and a pre-existing relationship with the ESCO may also 
reduce the client's expected transaction costs. Trust may also be enhanced by 
government campaigns raising public awareness and certifying the ESCOs.  
I argue that the potential could be better exploited by the ESCOs, were they to adapt 
their business model. First, the ESCOs must fully account for the trade-offs 
underlying the type of clients they are targeting. Residential and new buildings 
present the advantage of less specific investments and more flexibility in the 
technological installation. Yet, these advantages must be balanced with 
disadvantages of involving tenants and intermediary clients. While advantages related 
to new constructions offset the expected transaction costs incurred by intermediary 
clients, this is not the case for residential buildings destined for rental use. Second, 
were the legal situation to be clarified, ESCOs could use other repayment schemes 
such as on-bill financing (Nolden and Sorrell, 2016). This may significantly reduce 
transaction costs for rented buildings as well as for buildings with large risks of 
relocation. Finally, in order to target other types of clients, such as old or non-
residential buildings, ESCOs may consider safety nets or contractual clauses 
regarding the client's risk of relocation or bankruptcy. These may include real estate 
liens or guarantee fund among several ESCOs. 
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6 Appendix 
6.1 A simple model of ESC adoption rooted in transaction costs 
economics 
The model described here uses a simplified version of the formal model developed by 
Tadelis and Williamson (2013). In Tadelis and Williamson's model, a buyer optimizes 
over both the degree of externalization (z) and the mode of governance. In the model 
presented here, the energy customer optimizes over the degree of externalization 
only. I argue that in the context of energy service contracting, this is sufficient to 
distinguish between the different types of energy service provision to capture the 
trade-offs underlying energy service contracting adoption in the context of transaction 
cost economics. 
The limitation of this model lies in the fact that it does not properly account for risk 
sharing58 and economies of scale. 
6.1.1 Basic Setup  
A customer willing to acquire an energy service, such as heating, lighting or cooling 
faces a multitude of options in terms of organizational structure and outsourcing 
degree. First she can opt for full in-house provision, which is akin to vertical 
integration of the energy service. In that case, the supplier is an employee such as an 
energy manager, who takes care of each necessary activity k=1,…,K in order to 
provide energy services. These include the analysis of the adequate equipment 
needed, its purchase and installation, the operation and maintenance as well as the 
energy purchase. The employee is allocated with a fixed wage (F1) and the 
corresponding amount needed to pay each activity’s cost (𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑘
𝐾
𝑘 ). Hence, the total 
cost for the client is F1+C and the cost's share (z1) borne by the employee is null.  
The customer can also opt for energy supply contracting, where the supplier, i.e. the 
ESC contractor, is paid a fixed price (F2) to take care of the whole process including 
operation and maintenance. In addition the customer pays a variable cost 
corresponding to her energy consumption. In this kind of contractual relationship, the 
cost share borne by the supplier (z2= (cd + cp + cm)/C) is large and includes design and 
                                            
58 See McAfee and McMillan (1986) and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) for formal models of risk sharing. 
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engineering costs (cd), purchase and installation costs (cp) and operation and 
maintenance costs (cm).59 Hence, the total cost for the client60 is F2+(1-z2)C and the 
cost borne by the ESC supplier is z2C. 
The main difference between the various organizational structures of energy provision 
can be summarized by the supplier's cost share z, which can also be seen as an 
externalization's degree. Any combination of fixed and variable payments is a 
possible option. Thus, z is considered as a continuous variable that can take any 
value between 0 and 1. The customer's final choice for energy service provision will 
depend on her optimal choice for z*, which results in ESC adoption if and only if:  
z* ≥ z2  ⇔ Uij(ESC) > Uij(other provision) ⇔ yij = 1       (1)  
where z2 is the ESCO's cost share ratio, which includes all necessary energy service 
activities costs except energy purchase.61 yij takes the value 1 if individual i signs the 
ESC contract j proposed, and equals zero otherwise. The following subsection 
describes how the cost share ratio z is optimally chosen by the customer in the 
transaction costs economics framework. 
6.1.2 Production costs  
Production costs are given by:  
 𝐶(𝑒) = 𝑐̅ −  𝑒             (2)  
and represent the total costs for all the activities necessary to provide useful energy, 
i.e. 𝐶(𝑒) = 𝐶 = ∑ 𝑐𝑘
𝐾
𝑘 . 0 ≤ 𝑒 < 𝑐̅ represents the endogenously chosen amount of 
supplier's effort put into the project, which depends on z. The supplier's opportunity 
cost of effort is y(e), assuming y’(e) > 0, y’(0) = 0, y’’(e) > 0, y’’’(e) = 0. As in Tadelis 
and Williamson (2013) and in agency theory, it is further assumed that it is not 
possible to contract directly on unobservable effort.  
                                            
59 A priori, ESC seems to be very close to a conventional turnkey project, where the only difference in the former is that the 
operation and maintenance costs are borne by the supplier. However, in practice, this represents an important difference since 
this provides the ESCO with the incentive and the mean to control and optimize the equipment performance during the entire 
contract's time. In the majority of the ESC contracts considered in this chapter, the contract's time corresponds to the expected 
lifetime of the equipment. 
60 In ESC, (1-z2)C typically equals the variable cost corresponding the client’s energy consumption,  
61
 Since a higher degree of externalization than z2 is not observed in my sample, the choice can without loss of 
generality been simplified to opting for ESC if and only if z* = z2. 
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6.1.3 Transaction costs62  
Transaction costs K(z) > 0 are incurred ex post63 in the case that an exogenous 
disturbance occurs and that adaptations are needed in order to obtain the same utility 
value v from the energy service. Depending on the kind of disturbances, transaction 
costs can in practice be borne either by the ESCO or the client. However, assuming 
perfect competition ex ante, i.e. at the time of the tendering process, any ESCO's 
expected transaction cost will be incorporated into its bid and will consequently be 
transferred to the client (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Bajari et al., 2014). It is assumed 
that K’(z) > 0, i.e. the higher the supplier's cost share the higher the transaction costs. 
Furthermore, K’’(z) ≥ 0 is assumed so that the gain from adaptation when a higher 
share is borne by the supplier is evolving at a non-decreasing rate. Since transaction 
costs are incurred ex post, at the time the customer must choose whether to adopt 
ESC, it is the expected value of the transaction costs that matters. And a disturbance 
is not sufficient in itself to incur transaction costs. Transaction costs are expected to 
occur with a probability 𝜎𝜌, i.e. only if the interaction of two components take place.64 
First, contract's incompleteness will appear in 𝜌 ∈ [0,1] which corresponds to the 
probability that the contract will be renegotiated due to a disturbance. Second, asset 
specificity will be represented by 𝜎 ∈ [0,1], which is the probability that the supplier (or 
the buyer) cannot be replaced by a competitor when disturbance occurs.  
a) Ex post versus ex ante transaction costs 
Tadelis and Williamson (2013) emphasize that ex post adaptation is the main problem 
of organization under focus in the transaction costs economics (TCE). According to 
them, it is even the main difference between TCE, focusing on ex post adaptation, 
and agency-based theories or property rights theory, which focus on ex ante 
alignment of incentives.   
The model presented here follows Tadelis and Williamson (2013) and thus considers 
only ex post transaction costs, i.e. renegotiation costs after the contract is signed, 
which simplifies significantly the mathematical model. This assumption does not 
                                            
62 In Tadelis and Williamson, 2013, transaction costs are defined as the sum of the production costs and ex post adaptation 
costs. I however changed the denomination and named transaction costs what Tadelis and Williamson named adaptation costs.  
63 See section 6.1.3.a). 
64 As a result, expected adaptation costs are given by 𝜎𝜌𝐾(𝑧) 
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mean that ex ante transaction costs do not occur. But they are considered as 
exogenous as they are expected to be captured in the contract’s incompleteness 𝜌. 
Ex ante transaction costs relate to the costs incurred before the contract is signed, 
such as contractual design costs, the time needed to choose the technology, the 
ESCO and possible intermediary agents, and to monitor the quality of service. Of 
course a less restrictive assumption would consider that the customer can choose to 
invest time and money before signing the contract, i.e. increase ex ante transaction 
costs and reduce the probability of ex post renegotiation 𝜌.  
A more comprehensive model would consider this trade-off between ex post 
adaptation costs and ex ante design costs. This has been done by Bajari and Tadelis 
(2001) who develop a model where the buyer can endogenously choose the degree 
of design completeness in response to the project complexity. They find that in more 
complex projects, the effort invested ex ante will result in contracts that are weakly 
less complete, ceteris paribus. This does not mean that in case of very high task 
complexity the buyer will put no effort in trying to define additional possible 
contingencies in the contract. But even if she does provide this effort, it will not reduce 
the probability of ex post renegotiation 𝜌. This result justifies the choice of Tadelis and 
Williamson (2013) to consider only ex post transaction costs and treat contract's 
incompleteness as an exogenous variable. 
Testing empirically the importance of ex post vs. ex ante transaction costs is out of 
the scope of this study. However, my empirical analysis is aligned with this theoretical 
model since the determinants of the hypotheses H1 to H4 can be captured by the 
asset specificity (𝜎), the contract’s incompleteness (𝜌) or the magnitude of expected 
ex post adaptation costs (𝐾′(𝑧)). My empirical analysis complement this model by 
adding risk (hypothesis H5) and economies of scale (hypothesis H6) as other 
determinants of ESC adoption. 
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6.1.4 Optimization and results  
The supplier's profit maximization and the first order condition are given by:  
max
𝑒
Π(𝑒, 𝑧) = 𝐹 − 𝑧(𝑐̅ − 𝑒) − 𝑦(𝑒)        (3) 
𝐹𝑂𝐶 ∶  𝑦′(𝑒) = 𝑧          (4) 
The first order condition implies, following y’’(e) > 0, that 𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑧 ⁄ > 0. Thus, a relatively 
higher supplier's cost share provides him with an incentive to increase effort and 
hence, reduces production costs.  
The customer's optimization is presented by:  
max
𝑧
𝑈(𝑒, 𝑧) = 𝑣 − 𝜎𝜌𝐾(𝑧) − 𝐹 − (1 − 𝑧)(𝑐̅ − 𝑒) 
𝑠. 𝑡.       𝑒 = 𝑦′
−1
(𝑧)        (5) 
where 𝑣 − 𝜎𝜌𝐾(𝑧) is the expected gross benefit from the transaction and is positive 
because it is assumed 𝑣 − 𝐾(𝑧) > 0, i.e. the energy service's value is such that it is 
always worth taking the risk of ex post transaction costs. The customer optimizes 
expected gross benefit minus payment, given the supplier's optimal amount of effort 
provided, which is represented in the incentive compatibility constraint.  
The customer's first order condition is:  
𝐹𝑂𝐶 ∶ 𝐹(𝑧, 𝜎, 𝜌) =  𝑐̅ − [𝑦′
−1(𝑧)] + (1 − 𝑧)[(𝑦′
−1
)′(𝑧)] − 𝜎𝜌𝐾′(𝑧) = 0      (6) 
Using the implicit function theorem, I find:  
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜎
=
𝜕𝐹(𝑧, 𝜎, 𝜌)
𝜕𝜎
𝜕𝐹(𝑧, 𝜎, 𝜌)
𝜕𝑧
= −(
−𝜌𝐾′(𝑧)
−2[(𝑦′−1)′(𝑧)] + (1 − 𝑧)[(𝑦′−1)′′(𝑧)] − 𝜎𝜌𝐾′′(𝑧)
    )       
Because 𝑦′−1(𝑧) = 𝑒 ≥ 0 and I assumed 𝑦′′(𝑒) > 0, it is then possible to show that:  
(𝑦′
−1
)′(𝑧) =
1
𝑦′′(𝑦′−1(𝑧))
> 0 
Furthermore, Since, y’’’(e)=0: 
(𝑦′
−1
)′′(𝑧) =
−𝑦′′′ (𝑦′
−1(𝑧)) (𝑦′
−1
)′(𝑧)
(𝑦′′(𝑦′−1(𝑧)))2
= 0 
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And because I assumed K’(Z)>0 and K’’(z) ≥ 0, I find: 
𝜕𝑧
𝜕𝜎
=
𝜌𝐾′(𝑧)
−2[(𝑦′−1)′(𝑧)] − 𝜎𝜌𝐾′′(𝑧)
< 0 
Thus, 𝜎 (similarly 𝜌) has a negative impact on the solution of the customer's 
optimization, and thus on the customer's optimal choice z*. Finally, the client signs the 
ESC contract if and only if z* ≥ z2 . As a result, asset specificity 𝜎 and contract's 
incompleteness 𝜌 have a negative impact on the probability of opting for ESC. 
Furthermore, 𝐾′(𝑧), which can be related to the magnitude of expected transaction 
costs, also positively affects the impacts of 𝜎 (respectively 𝜌) on ESC adoption.  
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6.2 Estimation results with year dummies 
Table 1.6: Estimation results with year dummies 
Random Effects Probit 
dependent variable: offer 
accepted (y=1) 
(1) (2) 
specificity index -0.007 (0.029) 0.009 (0.013) 
new building 0.966*** (0.293) 1.050*** (0.159) 
residential 1.385** (0.622) 0.997*** (0.214) 
canton ESCO 0.073 (0.199) 0.550*** (0.127) 
oil backup  0.541*** (0.203) 
ln(duration) 0.836 (0.582) 0.262 (0.198) 
intermediary client -0.633*** (0.165) -0.553*** (0.086) 
rented -1.183*** (0.416) -1.224*** (0.197) 
Interest rate 0.276* (0.156)  
ln(total cost/year) -0.493*** (0.162)  
Surface (x1000m2) 0.055*** (0.017)  
year: 1998  0.975 (0.752) 
year: 1999  0.606 (0.662) 
year: 2000  0.270 (0.619) 
year: 2001  1.810*** (0.676) 
year: 2002  -0.811 (0.791) 
year: 2003  -0.323 (0.634) 
year: 2004  0.119 (0.627) 
year: 2005  0.105 (0.602) 
year: 2006  -0.178 (0.603) 
year: 2007 -0.813** (0.351) 0.395 (0.605) 
year: 2008 0.434 (0.456) 0.564 (0.615) 
year: 2009 -0.577 (0.404) 0.524 (0.605) 
year: 2010 0.103 (0.349) 0.762 (0.610) 
year: 2011  0.588 (0.625) 
observations 529 2,003 
groups 321 1,214 
Notes: Project-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.025 * P<0.1. In column two, 
Base: years 1996 and 1997. In column 1, several years dummies are omitted because of collinearity 
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6.3 Other tests 
Table 1.7: Other tests 
Random Effects Probit 
dependent variable:  
offer accepted (y=1) 
(1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Squared term for 
ln(total cost/year) 
Public building 
Fixed cost/total 
cost 
Std.dev of 
energy prices 
specificity index -0.001 
(0.029) 
0.002 
(0.024) 
-0.000 
(0.028) 
-0.010 
(0.028) 
new building 0.962*** 
(0.294) 
1.186*** 
(0.256) 
0.949*** 
(0.949) 
1.016*** 
(0.316) 
residential 1.483** 
(0.651) 
1.016** 
(0.442) 
1.440** 
(0.673) 
1.549** 
(0.699) 
canton ESCO 0.057 
(0.200) 
0.210 
(0.185) 
0.098 
(0.199) 
0.089 
(0.199) 
ln(duration) 0.607 
(0.571) 
0.125 
(0.403) 
0.979 
(0.610) 
1.010* 
(0.579) 
intermediary client -0.632*** 
(0.166) 
-0.641*** 
(0.167) 
-0.652*** 
(0.165) 
-0.663*** 
(0.162) 
rented -1.248*** 
(0.423) 
-0.980*** 
(0.346) 
-1.248*** 
(0.424) 
-1.323*** 
(0.426) 
interest rate 0.287* 
(0.157) 
0.370** 
(0.015) 
0.316* 
(0.162) 
0.289* 
(0.156) 
interest rate x public 
building 
 -0.288 
(0.362) 
  
ln(total cost/year) 2.026 
(3.234) 
 -0.591*** 
(0.181) 
-0.604*** 
(0.177) 
ln(total cost/year)2 -0.126 
(0.161) 
   
surface (x1000m2) 0.082** 
(0.032) 
 0.053*** 
(0.017) 
0.057*** 
(0.017) 
public building  0.788 
(1.721) 
  
Fixed cost/total cost   -1.958 
(1.448) 
 
Std-dev of monthly 
energy prices 
   0.068 
(0.041) 
observations 529 614 529 529 
groups 321 380 321 321 
year dummies yes yes yes yes 
     
Notes: Project-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1. Ln(total cost/year) 
and surface omitted in (2) in order to avoid public variable to be omitted because of collinearity.  
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6.4 Estimation results with technologies dummies 
Table 1.8: Estimation results with technologies dummies 
Random Effects Probit 
dependent variable:  
offer accepted (y=1) 
(1) (2) 
coefficient  Coefficient  
heat pump -0.089 
(0.570) 
 0.094 
(0.450) 
 
wood 0.703 
(0.549) 
 -0.245 
(0.287) 
 
gas 0.604 
(0.743) 
 0.798 
(0.847) 
 
district 0.354 
(0.731) 
 0.190 
(0.504) 
 
solar 1.031 
(0.681) 
 -0.126 
(0.487) 
 
specificity index -0.082 
(0.068) 
 -0.008 
(0.025) 
 
new building 1.074*** 
(0.326) 
 1.081 
(1.683) 
 
residential 1.844** 
(0.694) 
 1.005 
(1.110) 
 
canton ESCO 0.111 
(0.208) 
 0.521 
(0.954) 
 
oil backup . 
. 
 0.613 
(0.946) 
 
ln(duration) 1.818** 
(0.741) 
 0.255 
(0.783) 
 
intermediary client -0.689*** 
(0.164) 
 -0.550 
(0.949) 
 
rented -1.478*** 
(0.438) 
 -1.260 
(1.463) 
 
interest rate 0.278* 
(0.163) 
   
ln(total cost/year) -0.666*** 
(0.169) 
   
surface (x1000m2) 0.067*** 
(0.017) 
   
observations 529 2,003 
groups 321 1,214 
year dummies yes yes 
     
Notes: Project-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Oil backup omitted in (1) because there is no 
accepted offers with oil backup in the model of column (1). *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1 
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6.5 Robustness check: random draws of balanced subsamples 
Average Marginal Effects with y as balanced, regression (1) from Table 1.5 
 
Regression (2) from Table 1.5 
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6.6 Robustness check: random draws of rejected offers within each 
client 
Table 1.9: Bootstrap 
 Small sample 
(reg. 1 of Table 1.5) 
Big sample 
(reg. 2 of Table 1.5) 
Total clients 
321 1 214 
Total observations 529 2 003 
Clients with one observation  
(not affected by bootstrap) 
180 740 
Clients with two observations: 
one accepted and one rejected  
(not affected by bootstrap) 
 
39 140 
Clients with one accepted and 
several rejected  
(affected by bootstrap) 
 
22 141 
Clients with none accepted and 
several rejected  
(affected by bootstrap) 
 
80 193 
Total number of clients in the 
bootstrap strategy 
321 1 214 
Total number of observations 
in the bootstrap strategy 
382 (180+39×2+22×2+80) 1495 (740+140×2+141×2+193) 
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Bootstrap: Average Marginal Effects with max. 1 rejected offer per client 
reg. (1) from Table 1.5 
 
Bootstrap: Average Marginal Effects with max. 1 rejected offer per client 
reg. (2) from Table 1.5 
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6.7 Regressions with the final offers only 
Table 1.10: Estimation results with the final offers only 
Probit 
dependent variable:  
offer accepted (y=1) 
(1) (2) 
coefficient  Coefficient  
specificity index 0.039 
(0.037 
 0.048** 
(0.022) 
 
new building 1.598*** 
(0.352) 
 1.863*** 
(0.186) 
 
residential 2.313*** 
(0.699) 
 1.007*** 
(0.252) 
 
canton ESCO 0.084 
(0.248) 
 0.854*** 
(0.170) 
 
oil backup  
 
 0.577** 
(0.285) 
 
ln(duration) 0.099 
(0.524) 
 0.577** 
(0.237) 
 
intermediary client -1.058*** 
(0.215) 
 -1.124*** 
0.127) 
 
rented -1.540*** 
(0.417) 
 -1.283*** 
(0.217) 
 
interest rate 0.146 
(0.193) 
   
ln(total cost/year) -0.899*** 
(0.195) 
   
surface (x1000m2) 0.078*** 
(0.021) 
   
observations 321 1,214 
year dummies yes yes 
     
Notes: Project-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. Oil backup omitted in (1) because there is no 
accepted offers with oil backup in the model of column (1). *** P<0.01 ** P<0.05 * P<0.1. In the case of the final offers 
being proposed the same date (e.g. several variants of the contract), the accepted offer is kept. If all last offers of the 
same date are rejected, the least expensive is kept for the regression. In column (2), all 18 offers of 2001 are 
accepted and are therefore dropped together with the year dummy 2001. 
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2 The determinants of adoption of Energy 
Performance Contracting: Empirical 
evidence from a discrete choice 
experiment65 
 
Abstract 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) consists in outsourcing the design, the 
operation, and possibly the financing of an energy-efficiency project. The 
contractor provides the client with a reduction in energy costs in exchange of a 
fixed fee or part of the savings achieved. This study analyzes the mechanisms 
underlying EPC adoption and how particular contractual clauses are valued by 
potential clients. The analysis is based on a discrete choice experiment among 
297 managers of large private and public buildings in Switzerland. In order to 
analyze heterogeneity in preferences and decision-making processes, I compare 
conditional logit models with latent class models accounting for attribute non-
attendance. The empirical analysis shows that the performance guarantee, and 
the resulting risk sharing mechanism, consistently improves the willingness to 
adopt EPC. The financing of the contractor is valued positively only by a minority 
of respondents. These are mostly public entities, presumably with debt ceilings. 
This study provides insights into the complexity and heterogeneity underlying the 
decision to invest in energy efficiency. While its risk sharing mechanism is valued 
positively, EPC also faces a reticence from potential clients, which may partly stem 
from a misunderstanding of the concept and could therefore be mitigated by 
fostering awareness. 
Keywords: Energy efficiency, transaction costs, risk sharing, Energy Service 
Company (ESCO) 
                                            
65
Based on Klinke et al. (2017), chapter III. This research has benefited from financial support from the Swiss Federal 
Office of Energy and from the Swiss Competence Center for Energy Research SCCER CREST funded by the Commission 
for Technology and Innovation (Grant KTI. 1155000154). 
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1 Introduction 
Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) belongs to the set of instruments available for 
reaching the objectives defined by the Swiss Energy Strategy 2050. Indeed, these 
contracts typically involve energy conservation, energy efficiency or renewable 
energy. They also represent market-based solutions that do not necessarily require 
the government’s intervention, and as such, are expected to be less costly for the 
government. 
Switzerland’s building sector satisfies a priori many of the prerequisites of a 
developed EPC market: strong financial institutions, a significant number of credit-
worthy private and public companies with limited budget, an increasing need for 
building renovation and finally, the policy context of ambitious energy efficiency and 
CO2-reduction objectives. However, the actual situation differs from this expectation. 
Although a limited but growing interest seems to exist on the supply side and a few 
contracts have been initiated, the concept remains unknown to many potential clients, 
including public entities (Bertoldi et al., 2014). The first Swiss EPC call for tenders has 
been launched in 2016 and the market is still in its infancy, lagging behind 
neighboring countries, such as Germany or France (Bertoldi et al., 2014). 
In this context and in order to fully exploit the benefits of EPC, one should review the 
mechanisms driving the decision of a client to adopt these contracts. The main 
channels that can foster EPC adoption, such as risk sharing, access to capital, 
technical expertise and enduring performance have been highlighted in the literature 
(Sorrell, 2007; Capelo, 2011; IEA-RETD, 2013). However, quantitative evidence in 
support of these conjectures is scarce and is rarely based on the customer’s 
perspective, but rather on interviews of experts. A recent exception is Polzin et al. 
(2016b) who surveyed 1,298 German municipalities. Using stated choices, they 
assess the determinants of the probability of considering EPC for street lighting LED 
retrofits. They find that municipalities do not value the risk-sharing advantages of 
EPC. However, when constrained by budget or human resources capacity, they are 
more likely to consider EPC options.  
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The current state of the EPC literature however lacks empirical evidence on the 
decision mechanisms of EPC adoption and how they are affected by the contractual 
terms. Relying on a discrete choice experiment targeted at managers of large energy-
consuming buildings in Switzerland, I assess quantitatively the impact of contractual 
attributes, such as a performance guarantee or financing from the ESCO. While such 
experiments have been used in other domains (e.g. Banfi et al., 2008; Rose et al., 
2012; Blasch and Farsi, 2014; Caputo et al., 2014; Hole et al., 2016) they have, to my 
knowledge, never been employed in the context of energy service contracting. 
Second, I use latent class models to analyze the stated preferences, in order to 
account for heterogeneity in the value attached to the benefits and costs of EPC. The 
econometric models also account for the heterogeneity in the decision-making 
process, by considering possible attribute non-attendance, i.e. ignorance of certain 
attributes in the choice experiment. The fact that consumers do not necessarily act 
according to the standard assumptions underlying the neoclassical economic theory 
has been cited as a specificity of energy efficiency investments decision-making 
(Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). Heterogeneity in preferences and in decision-making 
is also characterizing the decision to invest in energy efficiency (Jaffe and Stavins, 
1994, Allcott and Greenstone, 2012). Being aware of the existence of these behaviors 
in the case of energy efficiency and EPC (Bleyl et al., 2012) is of considerable 
importance as they explain why policy instruments such as information campaigns 
are insufficient to induce investment (Tietenberg, 2009). 
The next section develops a series of hypotheses concerning the contractual 
attributes and how they may affect the choice of a potential client to adopt EPC. 
Section 3 presents the research context and the methodology, and in particular the 
survey design and the econometric framework. A description of the data and 
summary statistics are provided in section 4. The results are presented in section 5, 
followed by robustness checks and guidelines for further research. A conclusion is 
provided in the final section. 
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2 Background and hypotheses development 
The basic principle of EPC consists in a contractor designing, installing, exploiting 
and sometimes financing energy efficiency measures in a client’s building. EPC 
differs from ESC in the fact that the contractor does have an influence on the demand 
for final energy services. By monitoring secondary conversion equipment, the 
contractor provides its client with a reduction in energy costs in exchange for a fixed 
fee or part of the savings achieved. Typical measures proposed within EPC are 
efficient lighting, more efficient heating production and distribution systems, heating 
control systems, energy automation systems, and occasionally improved insulation of 
the building envelope and combined heat and power (CHP) systems (IEA-RETD, 
2013). The two dominant EPC models are shared savings and guaranteed savings 
(Hansen, 2006): 
 Shared savings: the ESCO typically finances or receives financing by a third 
party in order to design and implement the project. Energy cost savings are 
then shared between the two parties.  
 Guaranteed savings: In this model, the client carries the financing or gets 
financing by a third party. The ESCO guarantees that the value of energy 
saved will meet a certain threshold. Otherwise, the ESCO covers the gap. In 
these types of contracts, the ESCO is typically paid a fixed fee. 
Other energy performance contract’s schemes exist. For instance, the forfaiting 
scheme involves a third-party investor. The investor finances partly or completely the 
installation and gets in return a corresponding predefined fixed share of the savings 
(from the client or the ESCO). As in the guaranteed-savings scheme, the client also 
pays a fixed fee to the ESCO which in return provides a guarantee on the energy 
savings achieved.  
The shared savings model tends to be favored in younger EPC markets, while the 
guaranteed-savings scheme is more developed in mature markets. For instance, the 
US EPC market, which is considered as one of the most mature ones (Fang et al., 
2012; and Panev et al., 2014), has been developing since the 1970s and was initially 
based on the shared-savings model (Langlois and Hansen, 2012). This has 
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drastically changed and projects are now financed with long-term debt or leases. 
Nowadays, US ESCOs prefer to serve as facilitators to provide financing rather than 
directly financing themselves (ICF, 2007; IEA-RETD, 2013). This can as well explain 
the differences between the types of EPC schemes used in Europe as compared with 
those in the US. Indeed, shared savings is the dominant model used in Europe, while 
90% of the contracts in the US are rather using guaranteed savings schemes. Since 
the European ESCO is a younger market, clients are likely to be less confident and 
aware about this new business model, and usually let the ESCO finance the 
investment and bear the financial risk as it is the case in the shared savings model 
(Hansen, 2006; Marino et al., 2011). In the US, on the other hand, confidence of the 
consumer leads them to invest in EPC projects, through guaranteed savings schemes 
(Goldman et al., 2005). 
These market analyses provide insights on the reasons why an EPC contractual 
scheme may be more efficient at attracting customers depending on the market 
situation. However, empirical evidence based on the customer’s perspective is 
lacking. The present study assesses how potential clients value the contractual 
clauses and how it affects their decision to adopt EPC. The focus is particularly 
placed on the two contractual clauses that distinguish the main EPC schemes, i.e. the 
financing from the ESCO and the performance guarantee. The mechanisms through 
which these contractual clauses may affect EPC adoption are described in the 
following subsections. 
2.1 Financing from the ESCO 
A building manager willing to implement energy efficiency measures may have limited 
access to capital. This has been cited as a market failure characterizing investments 
in energy efficiency, in cases where the lender cannot distinguish between good or 
bad credit risk borrowers (Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). This phenomenon is 
exacerbated if borrowers with a high energy savings potential have poor credit risk 
profiles (Palmer, Walls and Gerarden, 2012). Moreover, energy efficiency 
investments usually cannot be guaranteed by a collateral and the returns rely upon 
uncertain future energy cost savings (Hansen, 2006). Taken together, these elements 
result in higher interest rates hampering consumers to invest. Building owners or 
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managers may also be insufficiently informed about the financing options or subsidies 
available when making their decisions (IEA-RETD, 2013). Other constraints may 
prevent entities from investing in energy efficiency, such as debt ceilings (particularly 
affecting the public sector) or limited budget for non-core activities (in the case of 
private firms). 
ESCOs may facilitate access to financing, either by paying for the installation 
themselves through the shared-savings EPC scheme, or by guaranteeing a third-
party investment via the forfaiting scheme (Swissesco, 2016). Li et al. (2014) find 
empirical evidence that ESCOs can partly relieve the clients of their financing need, 
using a sample of 140 EPC projects implemented in China. This is captured by the 
first hypothesis: 
H1: Financing from the ESCO has a positive impact on EPC adoption 
This hypothesis may be challenged by the fact that the financing from the ESCO in 
the forfaiting scheme will provide added value only if the third party investor evaluates 
the ESCO with a better risk profile than the client. In the shared-savings scheme, 
ESCOs may also have difficulties to find the necessary capital at favorable costs 
(Nolden and Sorrell, 2016; Panev et al., 2014). Whether the facilitated access to 
capital provided by ESCOs is indeed valued by building managers depends on their 
actual credit constraints with respect to energy efficiency investments. Given the 
context prevailing in Switzerland at the time of this study, and in particular the low 
level of interest rates, the financing of ESCOs may be unattractive as compared to 
bank credits. Also, public entities may be able to circumvent debt ceilings via the 
financing of ESCOs only if the EPC project is off-balance sheet.66 As a matter of fact, 
expert interviews reported in Klinke et al. (2017) suggest that the financing flexibility 
of EPC is not considered as a decisive advantage by Swiss ESCOs. 
2.2 Energy savings guarantee and risk sharing 
The risk reduces the number and amount of investments undertaken in energy 
efficiency (Anderson and Newell, 2004). Risk stems from financial or technical 
uncertainties. In the former case, it relates to unexpected realization costs or future 
                                            
66 As reported in Klinke et al. (2017), the off-balance sheet financing of EPC is not always feasible. 
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energy price variations. The technical risk in energy efficiency investment relates to 
unexpected technical failures of the equipment, under-performance or uncertain 
energy savings. Based on 50 retrofitted residential multifamily buildings in 
Switzerland, Khoury and Hollmuller (2017) find that realized energy savings do not 
meet the expected savings, but are instead considerably lower due to a variety of 
reasons, such as a mismatch between actual use and standards, uncertainty in 
facility managers and users’ behaviour or poor input data quality.67 
Imperfect information may also intensify the apparent risk of energy savings 
investments if the lack of technical knowledge prevents the investor from 
appropriately assessing ex ante the potential of an investment (Tietenberg, 2009; 
Gillingham and Palmer, 2013). Gathering the necessary information about the 
differences in quality of these investments may also be too costly (Allcott and 
Greenstone, 2012; Sorrell et al., 2004). 
EPC is designed to give both the ESCO and the customer the incentive to reduce 
energy costs. ESCOs either provide a performance guarantee or get paid a share of 
the achieved energy savings. In either case, the client benefits from the technical 
knowledge of the ESCO and shares some of the performance risk. This leads to the 
second hypothesis: 
H2: Performance guarantee68 and the resulting risk sharing mechanism has a 
positive impact on EPC adoption 
A guarantee comes at the cost of a risk premium paid by the client to the ESCO. 
Respondents are likely to have heterogeneous preferences and perceptions towards 
the technological risk. Recent research from Polzin et al. (2016b) show that German 
municipalities underestimate the risks associated with street lighting LEDs retrofits 
and therefore do not value the risk sharing advantage of EPC. Because this result 
may be specific to the LED technology with relatively low risk on the energy savings 
achieved, this study seeks to further analyze the impact of the performance 
                                            
67 According to their model, 500MJ/m2/year expected savings translate in 310MJ/m2/year realized. 
68 We refer here to the general understanding of performance guarantee, which can either be provided indirectly through the 
shared-savings scheme or directly via the guaranteed-savings or the “forfaiting” scheme. Although for simplicity, in the choice 
experiment analysis, we consider the direct guarantee only, it is assumed to capture the general effect of direct and indirect 
performance guarantees provided by EPC. 
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guarantee on EPC adoption. It does so by considering the technical risk and the 
provision of a guarantee on the energy savings.69 Because the technology involved in 
these contracts is likely to have an impact, the empirical analysis of the present study 
controls for the different kind of technologies proposed, e.g. envelope enhancement, 
heating production or building automation. 
2.3 The costs of EPC 
The financing and performance guarantee of ESCOs give rise to transaction costs. 
For instance, protocols for the measure and verification of the energy savings must 
be contractually agreed upon in order to mitigate the potential moral hazard that may 
occur from the consumer’s side or asymmetry of information regarding the ESCO’s 
effort. These transaction costs, as well as the risk premium, are included in the 
client’s annual payment to the ESCO. The latter is expected to have a negative 
impact on EPC adoption.  
Energy performance contracts also imply long contractual periods. The impact of the 
contract duration is ambiguous a priori: on the one hand, duration is valued negatively 
by the respondents reluctant to a long-term commitment. On the other hand, a longer 
contractual period increases the duration of the performance maintenance and also 
unlocks more comprehensive refurbishments. Private entities may be more 
responsive to the first argument while public entities are likely to attach greater value 
to the second. 
Finally, EPC adoption may be hampered because of other reasons (Backlund and 
Thollander, 2011; Pätäri et al., 2016; Stuart et al., 2016). In the Swiss context where 
the concept remains relatively unknown, the lack of awareness is likely to translate 
into reluctance towards EPC solutions. Empirically, this reticence may appear in the 
way costs and energy savings are valued depending on whether they are presented 
in an EPC or not, once all other contractual clauses are controlled for. It may also 
appear through the fact that some respondents never choose EPC, regardless of the 
                                            
69 The uncertainty on future energy prices is voluntarily excluded from the performance guarantee in the analysis in order to 
decrease the complexity of the choice experiment. In Switzerland in practice, the performance guarantee typically covers both  
technical and price variation risks since the energy price is often fixed for the contractual period and the guarantee is expressed 
in CHF saved. In the choice experiment, we voluntarily presented the guarantee as kWh saved in order to disentangle the 
technical and financial risk. 
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attributes presented. Follow-up questions on the reasons why EPC is disregarded by 
the potential clients provide additional guidelines for ESCOs and policymakers. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Research context 
EPC is a market niche in Switzerland, which has started to develop only recently. The 
first public tender for EPC was published in Fall 2016. In Spring 2017, to our 
knowledge, 5 to 10 ESCOs had implemented EPC projects in Switzerland with a total 
of around 25 EPC contracts signed. The clients are hotels, industries, education and 
health facilities, private office buildings, residential buildings and shopping centers. In 
addition to the ESCOs which have implemented EPC projects, 5 to 10 additional 
ESCOs are active on the Swiss EPC market without having signed any contracts yet. 
Based on the survey lead for chapter 3 of this thesis, I estimate around 40 contracts 
under negotiation in Spring 2017, mainly with private entities. 
The market being only at its infancy in Switzerland, we would expect the shared-
savings scheme to be favored, as in other emerging EPC markets. However, some 
Swiss EPC experts refute the need of financing from the ESCO. They even explain 
the delay of the Swiss EPC market by the sufficient availability of financing for 
investments into energy efficiency measures (Klinke et al., 2017, chapter II). While 
financing from the ESCO might have been a trigger to the EPC market in other 
countries, this may not be the case in Switzerland.  
In the Swiss context, it is crucial to understand how potential clients indeed value the 
different contractual clauses of EPC. Focusing on the client’s point of view allows me 
to bring objective insights into the contractual mechanisms that can attract new clients 
and develop the Swiss EPC market.  
3.2 Survey design 
3.2.1 Target group 
The survey is targeted at the potential demand side of EPC in Switzerland. It includes 
participants from both the public and the private sectors. The selection of private 
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buildings is performed by a bottom-up approach70 focusing on the technical energy 
savings potential, with an emphasis on relatively complex and therefore non-
residential buildings. In total, around 2,200 addresses are collected including 
representatives of public entities, building owners and managers in charge of public 
or private education and health facilities, shopping centers, hotels, sport facilities and 
offices (public administration, banks, and insurance companies). Industries are not 
targeted to avoid large heterogeneity across respondents. The list of participants 
includes institutions from all regions of Switzerland. The survey exists in the two main 
national languages (French and German). More details about the position of the 
participants within the organization and their role in decision making are provided in 
section 4.2.2. The letter sent to respondent is provided in appendix. It was aimed to 
motivate potential respondents to participate to the survey while minimizing at the 
same time the potential sample selection issues. The mention of the support of the 
Swiss federal office of energy was aimed at providing the necessary neutrality to 
mitigate sample selection. 
3.2.2 Survey structure and choice experiment 
The survey divides into five main parts described in the appendix. The methodology 
for the choice experiment is described in the next subsections. 
a) Introductory elements to the choice experiment 
Four choice tasks are presented to each respondent in the choice experiment. The 
respondents have to imagine the situation in which revisions in the building were soon 
to be necessary. In each task, they are invited to decide if they would opt for energy 
efficiency measures, with or without contract, or if they would choose a simple 
overhaul. As illustrated in Figure 2.1, each choice task is presented as a two-step 
process in which the respondent first has to choose between simple overhaul and 
investing in energy efficiency measures without contract. In a second step, an EPC 
proposition is added to these 2 alternatives.  
 
Assume your building will soon require a revision. Which option would you consider? 
                                            
70 The addresses collection and mailing has been performed by TEP Energy Gmbh, an energy consultancy. The majority of 
addresses come from lists of addresses publicly available on websites of specific domains (high schools and universities, health 
care facilities, hotels, banks and insurance institutions, municipalities, cantonal and federal administrative buildings). For other 
affectations (e.g. sport facilities), no website was available so that addresses come from google research.  
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Choice task 1/4 
 Investment without 
contract 
Simple overhaul 
Measure Building automation 
Wall and windows 
painting 
Total cost 
120CHF/m2 heated surface 
(120’000 CHF) 
80CHF/m2 heated 
surface 
Energy savings 
Expected 5% (can vary 
from 4% to 6%) 
No energy savings 
 □ □ 
Now a contractor offers you a contract. Which option would you consider? 
 
Energy Performance 
Contract 
Investment without 
contract 
Simple overhaul 
Measure 
Building insulation + 
automation 
Building automation 
Wall and windows 
painting 
Total cost 
200CHF/m2 heated surface 
(200’000 CHF), from which 
the contractor finances 60% 
and you 40% 
120CHF/m2 heated surface 
(120’000 CHF) 
80CHF/m2 heated 
surface 
Energy savings 
39% guaranteed savings 
(but can reach 48%) 
Expected 5% (can vary 
from 4% to 6%) 
No energy savings 
Contractual terms 
21.55CHF/m2 heated surface 
(21’550 CHF) per year 
during 10 years 
  
 □ □ □ 
Figure 2.1 Choice task example71 
 
The simple overhaul alternative has a cost but no energy savings, while investments 
without contract include a cost, predicted energy savings and an interval for the 
extent of energy savings. Energy performance contract adds the possibility of the 
ESCO financing part of the upfront cost, the possibility to have a guarantee on the 
savings (therefore, reducing the energy savings variation presented) an additional 
payment fee to the ESCO and a contract duration. 
Shortly before starting the choice experiment, two kinds of information are randomly 
presented to the respondents. First, additional information is provided on energy 
efficiency measures regarding their non-monetary benefits such as comfort, safety 
and CO2 emissions mitigation. Second, the respondents are informed that EPC also 
provides the client with guarantee on the upfront cost of the installations. Depending 
                                            
71 The total costs in parentheses (200’000 CHF) and total annual costs of the contract (21’550 CHF) were directly computed in 
the experiment, using the respondent’s former indication on the building’s heated surface in squared meters. It was left blank for 
respondents who did not provide this information. The elements with a dashed-under-line provided further information to the 
respondent in a pop-up if she moved the mouse over these. 
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on a random distribution, respondents can see both information, one of them or none. 
This strategy is aimed at determining whether these additional features of EPC and 
energy efficiency measures have an impact on the decision process. Ideally, this 
information would have been added as attributes in the choice experiment. However, 
due to the complexity of the choice tasks, this information was randomly provided 
before the choice experiment in order to assess their impact without further increasing 
the information burden within the choice tasks. These two additional pieces of 
information, if provided to the respondent, are expected to increase their willingness 
to opt for EPC. 
b) Choice experiment design 
The choice experiment is designed so that the types of energy efficiency measures 
proposed are relevant to the respondent. In order to do so, information regarding the 
realized retrofits in the building of interest is obtained from a prior question of the 
survey. The respondents are then accordingly distributed in different types of choice 
experiments, as illustrated in Figure 2.2. For instance, for a building in which the only 
refurbishment realized since the year 2005 relates to its envelope, the respondent is 
directed towards type 2’s choice experiment, which includes measures such as new 
heating systems (with or without building automation) or building automation. The 
simple overhaul alternative (without energy efficiency measure) is, in this case, a 
revision of the boiler.  
The final designs are elaborated using the Ngene software, which determines the 
combinations of attributes levels seen by the respondents in each choice task. 
Attributes and levels are presented in Table 2.1. 
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Figure 2.2 Choice experiments allocation 
 
 
 
  
Revision/ 
replacement 
implemented 
since 2005:
none
(envelope 
partially or 
not, heating  
syst. not)
-automation
-new heating syst + automation
overhauling 
(revision boiler)
-automation 
-envelope enhancement 
(±automation)
overhauling 
(painting walls and/or 
windows)
envelope 
(wall+ 
windows)
heating 
(envelope 
partially or 
not)
heating 
&envelope
ventilation
-automation 
-operation optimization 
(±automation)
-hotwater solar (±automation)
-biogas+automation
-green electricity  
mix+automation
overhauling (technical 
revision of building and 
ventilation)
no ventilation
-automation 
-hotwater solar (±automation)
-biogas+automation
-green electricity 
mix+automation
-ventilation(±automation)
status quo
type 3 
type 2 
type 1 
type 4 
type 5 
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Table 2.1: Attributes and levels in the choice experiment design 
Attributes Energy efficiency investments levels Overhauling levels 
Total up-front cost 
(includes realization cost 
but not payment to ESCO) 
CHF/m2 heated surface 
Types1+3 
80–100–120–150–180–200–250–300 
Types2+4+5 
80–100–120–150 
Types 1-4 
20–40–60–80 
Type 5 
0 
Energy efficiency measure 
Allocation determined 
according to the upfront 
cost 
Type 1 
BA,HP+BA,Wood+BA,Envelope,Envelope+BA 
 
Type 2 
BA,HP+BA,Wood+BA 
Type 3 
BA,Envelope,Envelope+BA 
 
Type 4 
BA,Nebo+,solar+BA,biogas-green elec.+BA 
 
Type 5 
BA,ventil.,solar+BA,biogas-green elec.+BA 
Type 1 
Revision boiler,painting wall 
and/or windows 
Type 2 
Revision boiler 
Type 3 
painting wall and/or windows 
Type 4 
technical revision of building and 
ventilation 
Type 5 
do nothing 
Expected Energy savings 
 
% kWh saved 
Types 1+3 
5–10–20–30–40–50–60–70 
Types 2+4+5 
5–10–20–30 
0 
Energy savings variation 
% of expected energy 
savings 
Types 1-5 
20–40–50–60 
- 
Part of up-front cost  
financed by ESCO  
% 
Types 1-5 
0–30–60–100 
 
Guarantee from the ESCO Types 1-5 
1-Expected energy cost savings guaranteed 
2-guaranteed savings at 0.5*upper bound determined 
by the savings variation level 
3-guaranteed savings at upper bound determined by 
the savings variation level 
4-No guarantee 
 
Annual Payment to ESCO 
(interest rate (r) and 
ESCO’s value added (VA) 
in equation (1)) 
CHF/m2 surface heated 
Types 1-5 
(0%; 0%)  
(5%; 5%) 
(10%; 10%) 
(15%; 15%) 
 
Contract duration 
Years 
Types 1-2-3 
5–10–15–20 
Types 4-5 
5–10 
 
Notes: BA: building automation and control system (BACS class B): This includes automatic detection for lighting and daylight 
control, combined light and heating automatically controlled, control and optimization of operations, alarming and monitoring  
functions. HP: heat-pump. Wood: woodchips or pellets. Nebo+: durable energy operation optimization of ventilation and air 
conditioning, adaptation of operation durations, reduction of air volumes, optimization of air humidity, reduction of electric 
needs for air transportation, control of air purification. Ventil: installation of a controlled ventilation. 
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The 5 types of design are performed using D-efficient Bayesian designs72 in which the 
signs of the priors are based on economic theory. Cost, risk on savings and payment 
to the ESCO are assumed to have a negative effect on adoption, while expected 
savings and guarantee on savings are expected to have positive impacts. A prior of 
value zero is set on duration and the financing of the ESCO.73 Since no priors exist on 
the size of the impacts, the magnitude of the coefficients is set so that each attribute 
has a similar impact on the profit maximization function. This assumes that no 
attribute is more important than another in the decision process. While being 
potentially restrictive, this hypothesis presents the advantage of hampering an 
attribute to become artificially important in the estimation. Several constraints are 
applied to the design elaborations in order to avoid irrelevant or dominated 
alternatives.74 
In a second step, the types of energy efficiency measures are allocated to the 
alternatives with respect to the upfront cost according to estimations derived from 
Jakob et al. (2014).75 Typically, measures such as envelope enhancing are assigned 
to the highest costs (120-300 CHF/m2) and building automation to the lowest costs 
(80-120 CHF/m2). Details of measures-costs allocation for each design type are 
provided in appendix 7.3. 
 
 
                                            
72 5 designs with 48 rows divided into 12 blocks of 4 choice tasks were elaborated. 
73 Contract duration may be negatively valued by entities for whom outsourcing operation and maintenance may be constraining, 
while it may be positively valued by entities who perceive guarantees and maintenance benefits in a longer run. The impact of  
the financing of the ESCO is positive for credit constrained entities, but may be negative for entities with access to credit at good 
conditions. 
74 Constraints were for instance implemented to avoid dominated strategies when considering only cost and savings. Also, if the 
level for the payment to ESCO attribute was zero, then the financing of the ESCO was constrained to be larger than zero, in 
order to make sure that the payment was always positive in the EPC alternative. Finally, the risk on savings was set to be 
smaller for very large amount of expected savings in order to avoid energy savings upper bounds larger than 85%. 
75 Jakob et al. (2014) provide the costs for façade insulation enhancement (fig. 8, p.48) and window insulation enhancement (fig. 
10, p.50) as CHF/m2 of wall or window. In order to translate these costs into CHF/heated m2, we used building geometries data 
(keeping only offices, hospitals, hotels, schools, commerce) and wall surface/heated surface, windows surface/heated surface 
ratios provided by TEP Energy GmbH. We estimated the ranges of cost for walls and windows enhancement in CHF/heated 
surface from 50 CHF/m2 (for a large (>30’000m2) new building school) to 930 CHF/m2 (for a small (330m2) new office building 
with a large share of windows and a high ratio wall surface/heated surface). Because the 1st quartile was at 120CHF/m2 and the 
3rd quartile was at 345 CHF/m2, we conclude that a range lying between 120-300 CHF/m2 is plausible. We proceeded similarly 
for overhauling costs assuming painting cost of 80-140CHF/wall m2 and 50-200CHF/window m2. Building automation costs are 
also provided in Jakob et al. (2014) in table 11 as price per room and we estimated a range assuming rooms of 50-60m2 for 
schools, and 15-20m2 for residential buildings, p. 54. New heating systems (wood and heat pumps) always proposed with 
building automation are estimated to have an upfront cost of 100-180CHF/heated m2 and operation optimization, solar panels 
and biogas/green electricity mix of 80-150CHF/heated m2. 
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The yearly payment to the ESCO in CHF/m2 is computed from the levels determined 
by Ngene according to the following formula: 
 
𝐴𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑡𝑜 𝐸𝑆𝐶𝑂 =
𝐸𝑆𝐶𝑂 𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒 × 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑟
1 − (1 + 𝑟)−𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡 × 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
            (1) 
 
Where ESCO financing share is the percentage of upfront cost (cost) financed by the 
ESCO, duration is the contract duration, r is the interest rate and added value is 
expressed as a share with the levels presented in Table 2.1. The first term on the 
right-hand side is thus the typical annuity computation resulting from the credit made 
by the ESCO. The second term represents a value added captured by the ESCO, 
which is set to be proportional to the upfront cost and the contract duration. 
c) Follow-up questions 
After responding to the four choice tasks, a question assesses the certainty with 
which the respondent makes her decision. Then, depending on the choices made by 
the respondents, several follow up questions appear. If, for instance, the respondent 
always choose the simple overhaul alternative, the fourth choice task is again 
presented but excluding the overhaul option. The respondent has to state which one 
of the 2 options (Investment without contract or EPC) she would choose or if she 
would be indifferent between the two. This additional choice task ensures that 
sufficient data is collected to estimate the attributes’ coefficients, even in the case a 
large share of the respondents always choose the overhaul option.  
Specific questions are asked to respondents who never invest in energy efficiency 
measures and/or never opt for EPC. Special emphasis is put on the potential issue to 
transferring the costs to the tenants, trust towards the ESCO and perceived legal and 
accounting difficulties. 
Finally, in order to study preference heterogeneity and attribute non-attendance 
patterns, the respondents have to state up to 4 of the most important attributes they 
were considering when making their choices. 
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3.3 Data collection 
The survey creation software Sawtooth is used to prepare and host the survey online. 
A hundred respondents, corresponding to various building types, were selected for a 
first pretest in September 2015. A second pretest was targeted at the non-
respondents of the first pretest and 25 additional respondents in order to obtain 
further feedback on the survey’s structure and content.76 After incorporating feedback 
from the pre-test, the main survey is sent to a further 2,090 participants in June 2016, 
using both post and e-mailing. Reminder e-mails and phone calls were undertaken in 
August 2016 and data collection ended in mid-October 2016. 
3.4 Econometric framework 
The decision to opt for energy efficiency measures, with or without contract, as 
opposed to adopt a simple overhaul is derived from the random utility framework 
(McFadden, 1974). Since the respondents in this study are public institutions and 
private firms, the framework is considered as a random profit maximization 
framework.77 πit,j represents the profit of respondent’s institution i choosing alternative 
j which can be epc (for EPC), ee (for investment in energy efficiency measures 
without EPC) or ovh (for simple overhaul) in choice task t. Typically, the profit πit,j= 
Vit,j+ εit,j is constituted of an observed component Vit,j and a residual term εit,j capturing 
the unobserved heterogeneity across choice tasks, alternatives and institutions. The 
respondent selects the alternative in order to maximize her institution’s profit. The 
observed component of the profit is described for each alternative as follows: 
𝑉𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑒   = 𝛽0,𝑒𝑒   +    𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑒 + 𝛽4
′𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑒 
𝑉𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐  = 𝛽0,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽2𝑠𝑎𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽3𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽4
′𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐  
                 +𝛽5𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽6𝑔𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑒𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽7𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐 + 𝛽8𝑑𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡,𝑒𝑝𝑐  
𝑉𝑖𝑡,𝑜𝑣ℎ  = 𝛽1𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡,𝑜𝑣ℎ                                                                                                                            (2)  
                                            
76 These pretests were initially also aimed at collecting initial preferences regarding the choice experiment attributes in order to 
estimate more precise priors to construct a D-efficient Bayesian design for the main survey’s choice experiment. However, the 
number of respondents in the pretest is not sufficient to estimate these priors. Therefore, as for the pretest, I constructed a 
Bayesian D-efficient design using economic intuition for the sign of the coefficients of each attributes. 
77 This follows the strategy used by the empirical research on the firm’s location decision problem which typically uses discrete 
choice experiments and the random profit maximization framework (e.g. Carlton, 1983). 
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where 𝛽0,𝑗 denotes the alternative-specific constants with overhaul treated as 
baseline, costit,j is the upfront cost in CHF/heated m2, savingsit,j are the savings in % 
kWh saved, riskit,j represents the energy savings variation determined in terms of the 
difference in percentage points from the expected savings, and measuresit,j is a 
vector of four types of energy efficiency measures (envelope, technique78, electricity 
or biogas mix, new heating system).79 Energy performance contracting adds several 
attributes describing contractual terms which include financingit,j (the amount of 
upfront cost financed by the ESCO in CHF/heated m2), guaranteeit,j (a dummy for 
guaranteed savings), paymentit,j (the annual payment to ESCO in CHF/m2) and 
durationit,j (the contract duration in years). The overhaul alternative includes only the 
attributes’ cost, with all other attributes set equal to zero.80 In the baseline analyses, 
the parameters are assumed to be equal across alternatives (i.e. the cost has the 
same impact in the overhaul as in the energy efficiency or the EPC alternative), 
except from constants which are alternative-specific. 
a) Conditional logit model 
In the conditional logit framework (McFadden, 1974, also referred to as the 
multinomial logit by Hensher et al., 2015), the probability that individual i chooses 
alternative j in choice task t is expressed by: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑗) =
exp (𝑉𝑖𝑡,𝑗)
∑ exp (𝑉𝑖𝑡,𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
 , 𝑗 = 1,… , 𝐽                                                            (3) 
where Vit,j represents the observed part of the profit as described in equation (2). This 
expression follows from the assumption that the error terms εit,j are independently and 
identically distributed and drawn from a generalized extreme value distribution. This in 
turn implies that an individual’s unobserved preference for a certain alternative is 
independent of her unobserved tastes for other alternatives, a restrictive hypothesis 
                                            
78 Building automation (BA), installation of ventilation or durable energy operation optimization of ventilation and air conditi oning 
(NEBO+) 
79 Taking groups for the type of energy efficiency measures reduces the number of parameters to estimate, which is particularly 
useful in the attribute non-attendance exploration with latent class models. The models were also improved when taking groups 
as opposed to individual dummies. This strategy is also supported by the fact that the purpose of the research is to study 
contractual mechanisms inducing investment in energy efficiency and not to estimate the willingness to pay for specific energy 
efficiency measures. The overhaul measures are not controlled for in the analyses since the emphasis is put on energy efficiency 
investments and EPC alternatives, while overhaul is taken as a baseline. 
80 In the design type 5, the overhaul alternative is replaced by the status quo in which all attributes -including cost- are set to 
zero. 
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known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). The parameters βi in 
equation (2) are the arguments maximizing the following log-likelihood function: 
ln ℒ =∑ln∏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                     (4)      
where Probit is defined in equation (3). 
3.4.2 Relaxing the assumption of attribute full attendance 
Due to the complexity of the choice experiment, some respondents may have ignored 
some of the attributes when making their decision. Adopting an attribute processing 
rule under which, one or several attributes are ignored may come from a voluntary 
basis to focus only on the more salient and important attributes, or may be somehow 
unconscious and stem from a simplification of the decision process. The reason that 
leads respondents to ignore some attributes is difficult to establish empirically.81 
Regardless of its cause, numerous studies show that accounting for a so-called 
attribute non-attendance (thereafter referred to as ANA) has an important impact on 
the parameters estimates (e.g. Campbell et al., 2011; Rose et al., 2012; Hensher et 
al., 2012; Lagarde, 2013; Caputo et al., 2014; Hole et al., 2016). 
Two methods may be used to analyze ANA in the decision process, based either on 
respondent’s stated heuristics or on inferred attribute processing strategies. 
a) Conditional logit model with stated weights on attributes 
The first method consists in directly asking the respondents which attributes were 
taken into consideration or ignored during the decision process (Hensher et al., 2005; 
Hensher and Rose, 2009). In our survey, the respondents were asked to state one to 
four of the most important attributes in their decision. These answers may then be 
used to account for heterogeneity in the decision process and assess its impact on 
the parameters estimated. In practice, the parameters are interacted with dummies 
equating one if the attribute has been considered important in the respondent’s 
decision. It is to be noted that this method crucially relies on the reliability of the 
                                            
81 Weller et al. (2014) have studied the impact of choice experiment dimensions on attribute non-attendance and showed that it 
does not depend on the design dimension, but that it may be influenced by the number of alternatives and sets. 
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responses related to the importance of the attributes (see for instance Hess and 
Hensher, 2010).82 
b) Latent class model 
The second approach consists in exploring attribute processing strategies using 
inference. Typically, this is done using a latent class framework in which restrictions 
are imposed on the parameters to account for attribute ignorance (Campbell et al., 
2011; Hensher et al., 2012; Lagarde, 2013). Hess and Hensher (2010) show that the 
ANA inferred at the individual-level is not consistent with the stated decision process 
answered directly by respondents. This supports the strategy to use both methods to 
compare the estimation results. The second advantage of latent class model is that it 
allows to account for both heterogeneity in attribute attendance and heterogeneity in 
attribute preferences. In the specific context of energy efficiency investments and 
EPC, accounting for this heterogeneity is important as it is expected to have a 
significant impact on the client’s decision (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994, Allcott and 
Greenstone, 2012). Finally, the latent class model does not rely on the restrictive 
assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA). 
In the latent class model, individuals are assigned into q classes of ANA patterns in a 
probabilistic fashion, which in the same framework as equation (3) results in the 
following probability of choosing alternative j in choice task t: 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡|𝑞(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 = 𝑗|𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠 = 𝑞) =
exp (𝛽𝑞′𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗)
∑ exp (𝛽𝑞′𝑥𝑖𝑡,𝑗)
𝐽
𝑗=1
                                                           (5) 
where xit,j are the attributes described in equation (2) and βq is one possible vector of 
attribute non-attendance pattern in which the ignored attribute coefficients are set to 
zero. This approach can be seen as a random parameter model with a discrete 
distribution83 allocating individuals into classes with different combinations of 
attributes ignored. The probability for each individual i to belong to class q is given by:  
                                            
82 Because of the characteristics of the question asked, i.e. respondents could not tick more than four important attributes, we 
were forced to make some assumptions regarding heuristics for those who ticked four attributes. Specifically, we assumed that if 
the respondent chose four attributes or ticked the answer “no attribute is more important than another”, then she was assumed to 
have fully attended to all attributes. 
83 The latent class method, as opposed to the mixed logit model, presents the advantage of having no specific assumption about 
the distribution of the parameters across respondents but only estimate the underlying distribution in a discrete manner.  This 
allows me to detect some groups of respondents. The latent class model is also suitable to account for attribute non-attendance. 
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𝐻𝑖𝑞 =
exp (𝜃𝑞)
∑ exp (𝜃𝑞)
𝑄
𝑞=1
                                                                                                                      (6) 
And the log likelihood function to be maximized to estimate the parameters is 
transformed as follows: 
ln ℒ =∑ln∑Hiq
Q
q=1
∏𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑡|𝑞
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑁
𝑖=1
                                                                                                 (7)      
The allocation of individuals within classes is a priori unobserved by the researcher. 
The Bayes’ formula can be applied to retrieve the posterior individual-specific class 
probabilities. 
The difficulty in this method relates to the many combinations of ANA patterns. With 
eight attributes considered in this study, there are 28=256 possible combinations and 
therefore 256 potential classes. While some studies test all combinations (Lagarde, 
2013) using an iterative algorithm eliminating the irrelevant classes in the process, 
other studies focus on a subset of attributes (Hensher et al., 2012; Weller et al., 
2014). Accounting for all combinations requires the use of equality-constrained latent 
class models84 (Lagarde, 2013; Hensher et al., 2012). This reduces the number of 
parameters to be estimated in the iteration and allows the analyst to detect irrelevant 
classes, which are determined by null average posterior class probabilities. This 
method however comes at the cost of restraining the heterogeneity to be only in 
attribute non-attendance patterns and not in preferences. While the method with 
equality-constrained latent class models has been tested and is provided in the 
appendix, the main results focus on a strategy using an unconstrained latent class 
model in order to account for heterogeneity in both attendance and preferences. In 
order to assess the most relevant ANA patterns, I use information provided by the 
respondents’ stated importance of attributes: 
1. Using respondents stated attribute importance, I analyze all combinations of 
important attributes concerning at least 4 persons in the sample. Each 
combination of important attributes represents a potential class. 
                                            
84 In which parameters are constrained to be the same across classes. 
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2. Using an iterative process, the best combination of classes is determined by 
comparing unconstrained85 latent class models’ Akaike and Bayesian 
information criteria. 
3. After selecting the best combination of ANA classes, I study how individual or 
building characteristics can affect the class allocation. In order to do the latter, 
equation (6) is transformed by replacing the vector of parameters θq with a dot 
product of it with a vector of individual-specific variables zi. 
3.4.3 Interpretation of the coefficients 
One should note that when interpreting the results, this study focuses on the sign and 
significance of the coefficients rather than on magnitudes or willingness to pay 
estimates. This is justified by the purpose of this study, which is to assess whether 
the determinants affect the customer’s choice and if so, in which direction. While 
some estimates of willingness to pay are provided for some attributes, these must be 
viewed cautiously because of the specificities of this study’s choice experiment. 
Indeed, the choice experiment involves two attributes for the cost, i.e. upfront cost 
and annual payment to the ESCO. For simplicity, the willingness to pay estimates 
provided in the results section account only for the coefficient on the upfront cost 
attribute. Other strategies to estimate willingness to pay in further research are 
presented in section 5.3. 
4 Data 
4.1 Response rate 
In total, 2,215 survey invitations were sent, out of which 2,203 were successfully 
delivered (cf. Table 2.2). 533 (26%) of the respondents logged in the online survey, 
and 297 respondents fully completed the survey (13% of invitations delivered). The 
low completion rate is likely to be due to the complexity of the choice experiment and 
the required information about the building (e.g. retrofits done and planned, year of 
construction, year and type of heating system, yearly energy consumption). The 
response rate varies greatly between the categories of respondents. The highest rate 
                                            
85 “Unconstrained” means that coefficients are not constrained to be equal across classes as opposed to the equality-
constrained latent class model. 
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of response is obtained with schools (56 %), whereas hotels are associated with the 
lowest rate (4 %). 
 
Table 2.2: Response rate by participant group, including pretest. 
 Invitations 
sent 
Non-
delivered 
Delivered Survey started Survey completed 
    Freq. % of 
delivered 
Freq. % of 
delivered 
Schools 247 3 244 201 82% 136 56% 
Hospitals 92 1 91 26 29% 14 15% 
Public entities 1010 2 1008 74 7% 48 5% 
Sport facilities 33 1 32 0 0% 0 0% 
Hotels 504 8 496 41 8% 20 4% 
Shopping centers 91 4 87 9 10% 7 8% 
Banks/insurance 233 0 233 31 13% 18 8% 
Unspecific 5 0 12 - - - - 
Other    151 - 54 - 
Total 2215 19 2203 533 26% 297 13% 
 
 
4.2 Descriptive statistics of the participants 
4.2.1 Building characteristics 
Education facilities represent the largest share in the sample (Table 2.3), followed by 
public administration and offices. A majority of buildings in the sample are publicly-
owned and not rented. A large number of buildings in the sample correspond to the 
typical EPC target: sizeable old buildings, medium to large energy consumption86 and 
retrofit opportunities. Indeed, almost a third of the buildings are constructed between 
1966 and 1979 and 85% of the sample are built before 1990. A majority of buildings 
(57%) has a surface larger than 2,000m2. In terms of retrofits opportunities, 60% of 
the heating systems were installed before 2005 and only 3% of the buildings had an 
envelope insulation enhancement since the construction. 
 
  
                                            
86 Median electricity costs are ca 50,000CHF/year and median energy costs (excluding electricity) are ca 25,000CHF/year. 
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Table 2.3: Building types 
 Freq. 
Percentage in sample 
(N=297) 
(%) 
percentage of publicly-
owned buildings 
(%) 
Percentage of 
(partly) rented 
buildings 
(%) 
Education facility 145 48.82 97.18 22.07 
Offices 22 7.41 63.64 68.18 
Hotel 20 6.73 0.00 15.00 
Hospital 14 4.71 71.43 35.71 
Public administration 50 16.84 100.00 48.00 
Shopping center 7 2.36 0.00 100.00 
Sport facility 10 3.37 100.00 30.00 
Residential 14 4.71 71.43 100.00 
Mixed 5 1.68 40.00 100.00 
Other 10 3.37 80.00 40.00 
Total 297 100 82.25 37.71 
 
4.2.2 Characteristics of respondents 
195 respondents (66%) are located in the German speaking area of Switzerland. 
Respondents occupy different responsibilities within the institutions. Managers in 
charge of cantonal or municipal buildings represent the largest share of respondents 
(32%), followed by facility managers (25%), energy managers (16%), owners (12%), 
municipal councilors (10%) and financial managers (3%). All respondents are 
involved in the decision process regarding the building retrofits. 129 respondents 
(43%) take directly part in the decision. The remaining share plays a role in the pre-
selection of the options, advising or making propositions to the decision-makers. 
157 (53%) out of the 297 respondents who complete the survey state to be already 
familiar with the concept of energy performance contracting.87 
                                            
87 93% of the respondents claim that they understand clearly the concept, after being exposed to the explanation on energy 
performance contracting in the survey. 
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4.3 Summary statistics of the attributes 
The summary statistics of the attributes of interest are provided in Table 2.4. The 
upfront cost is zero for status quo alternatives. Expected savings and savings 
variation are set to zero in overhaul/status quo alternatives, involving no energy 
efficiency measures. Similarly, all the contractual elements concerning only the EPC 
alternative are set to zero in the other options. Some energy performance contracts 
do not provide any guarantee or do not involve financing of the ESCO. However, all 
contracts involve a yearly payment to the ESCO and a positive contract duration. The 
allocation of respondents across the 5 design types shapes the distributions of the 
attributes’ levels (cf. end of appendix 7.3).  
Before entering the choice experiments, 49% of the respondents are randomly 
provided with additional information on energy efficiency non-monetary benefits and 
47% on the advantage of EPC of having a guarantee on the costs.88  
 
Table 2.4: Summary statistics of attributes 
Variable Mean Std. 
dev. 
Min Max N 
Attribute of overhaul, energy efficiency, EPC alternatives  
 upfront cost (CHF/m2 heated surface) 119.3 77.8 0 300 5,940 
Attributes of energy efficiency and EPC alternatives  
 expected savings (% kWh saved) 18.7 21.8 0 70 5,940 
 savings variation (±% from expected savings) 7.0 8.2 0 30 5,940 
Attributes of EPC alternatives   
 upfront cost by ESCO (CHF/m2 heated surface) 16.8 46.8 0 300 5,940 
 savings guarantee (dummy) 0.1    5,940 
 payment to ESCO (CHF/m2year heated surface) 2.7 7.9 0 82.1 5,940 
 contract duration (years) 2.5 5.6 0  20 5,940 
 
                                            
88 Out of these, 54 participants (18%) receive both information. 
   
110 
The frequency at which each energy efficiency or overhaul measure was proposed to 
the respondents in the survey’s choice experiment is presented in the appendix 7.4.   
In the empirical analysis, the technologies are grouped in four dummies, i.e. 
technique (building automation, exploitation optimization, controlled ventilation), 
biogas/electricity mix (biogas mix if already has a gas heating system, green 
electricity mix), heating (new heat pump, new wood heating, solar panels) and 
envelope (wall and windows insulation). Because building automation is proposed 
both alone and in combination with other measures, it is the most often proposed 
(46% of the alternatives). 28% of the options include envelope enhancement, 17% 
new heating systems and 14% propose a mix of biogas or green electricity. 
4.4 Stated attribute importance 
Cost, savings and energy efficiency measures are the attributes that are the most 
often stated as important (resp. by 78%, 74% and 73% of the respondents).89 Savings 
variation and EPC contractual attributes are considered important for a smaller share 
of respondents (53% for guarantee and 60% for upfront financing from ESCO). Table 
2.5 provides additional details on the patterns of attributed non-attendance stated by 
at least 6 persons. These are the patterns that are considered in the latent class 
models exploration. 23 individuals state that no attributes are more important than 
another in their decision making.90 Although respondents could provide four attributes 
considered as important, a majority of them (52%) lists one to three attributes. This 
supports the hypothesis of attribute non-attendance in the sample. 
 
 
 
 
                                            
89 A simple logit regression of stating the cost as an important attribute on a set of regressors does not allow to identify  
determinants of attribute importance, as these appear to be non-significant. The following regressors are tested: private 
buildings, rented buildings, the yearly energy and electricity costs of the building, the language, age, gender, education and 
experience of the respondent. Surprisingly, stated barriers to energy efficiency investments (e.g. non economic viability of these 
investments, destruction planned for the building, protected buildings) do not have an impact on considering the cost as an 
important attribute either. 
90 This can either be interpreted as full-attendance or none-attendance. In the empirical results, I assumed these respondents to 
have fully attended all attributes. 
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Table 2.5: Combination of important attributes (>6 persons) 
Combination of important attributes Nb resp. Share 
No attribute is more important than another 23 0.08 
Cost-savings-measure 19 0.06 
Cost- savings-measure-risk 16 0.05 
Cost-savings 13 0.04 
Cost- savings-measure-financing by ESCO 12 0.04 
Cost 9 0.03 
Cost- savings-measure-guarantee / savings-measure a 7 (2x) 0.02 (0.05) 
a In the last line of the table, two groups of 7 individuals can be observed. 7 individuals considered costs, savings, measure and 
guarantee from the ESCO and 7 other stated that savings and measures were important attributes in their choices. 
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5 Results 
5.1 Investment choices 
 
 
Figure 2.3  Experiment choices 
Notes: percentage of respondents (out of N=297) choosing each option and switching from one option to another, once EPC is 
additionally proposed (percentage based on average number of persons across the four choice tasks). The dashed green arrow 
represents respondents who I call “EPC responsive”. The red arrows represent choices that do not satisfy the independence of 
irrelevant alternative (IIA) assumption. 
 
The distribution of respondents by option choice is provided in Figure 2.3, averaged 
across the 4 choice tasks. The decisions when two alternatives are proposed 
(overhaul or energy efficiency without contract), are compared to the situation in 
which options of energy performance contracts are also included. On average 5.3% 
respondents choose the simple overhaul in the initial two alternatives case and switch 
for EPC when it becomes available. These represent more than 21% of the 75 
respondents who choose overhaul in the first place. From another point of view, 34 
out of the 297 respondents switch at least once from overhaul to EPC when it 
becomes available. This gives a rough idea on the number of persons for whom EPC 
might mitigate some barriers to investments in energy efficiency. I analyze in section 
5.2.1 which mechanisms of EPC are valued by these respondents that I call “EPC 
responsive”. 
choice
invest in EE (without EPC)
74.9%
invest in EE (without EPC)
51.9%
EPC
29.4%
overhaul / status quo
25.1%
overhaul / status quo
18.7%
5.3% 
49.2% 
24.1% 
17.8% 
0.8% 
2.7% 
Choice with 2 alternatives Choice with 3 alternatives 
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An average of 2.7% persons chooses overhaul initially and changes to investment in 
energy efficiency without contract once the choice becomes available. Conversely, an 
average of 0.8% respondents change their mind from investment to overhaul once 
EPC alternative is added. These incoherent decisions, taken at least once by 29 out 
of 297 respondents, represent situations in which the independence of irrelevant 
alternative (IIA) assumption is not satisfied. This may result in biases in the 
estimations of conditional logit models. In the robustness checks section, the models 
are estimated after excluding these respondents. 
Despite the variations in the attributes levels, the decision patterns are very similar 
across choice tasks, i.e. 46% of respondents choose the same alternatives (energy 
efficiency, EPC or overhaul) in all choice tasks.91 This observation supports the 
assumption of heterogeneous preferences across respondents. 
While 26 respondents never choose energy efficiency without contract, more than 
50% (149) of the sample of 297 completes never opt for EPC. The main reason 
mentioned is the unwillingness to outsource the operation and maintenance. This 
may result from a reticence to lose control over the operation or a fear to forgive 
existing facility managers or employees. The latter case would however be a 
misperception since the ESCO typically supervises the operation by providing the 
facility managers with training courses to manage the new equipment (Swissesco, 
2016). The second most frequently invoked argument is that EPC is not economically 
viable.92 Other motives put forward by the respondents are legal issues resulting from 
such contracts, complex tendering process and contracts.93 14 respondents do not 
provide any reasons explaining why they never opt for EPC. All but one of these 
respondents were unfamiliar with EPC before completing the survey. A biased 
perception of EPC is visible in the other motivations provided by respondents for not 
choosing the contracts. For instance, some respondents stated that EPC was not 
                                            
91 The respondents with persistent choices are not necessarily those who spent the least time on the choice tasks. This can be 
seen in a pairwise correlation of -0.14 between median time spent on choice tasks and a dummy equating one when the 
respondent chose always the same alternative. This correlation does not change when omitting the respondents stating that their 
building is already efficient, protected or planned to be destroyed to compute the median time spent on choice tasks.  
92 A t-test shows that there is no significant difference in the mean size among respondents who see EPC as not economically 
viable and the others. The size is described here in terms of the building’s heated surface.  
93 See Klinke et al. (2017) for a qualitative analysis for other reasons why respondents never choose energy efficiency measures 
or EPC. 
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possible since the building is public or because they were financially constrained. In 
fact, EPC are typically targeted at institutions with these characteristics. 
While EPC has been deemed a valuable instrument to facilitate investments in energy 
efficiency in foreign markets (e.g. Capelo, 2011; IEA-RETD, 2013), in an emerging 
market such as Switzerland it appears a priori that the willingness to adopt EPC is 
lower than the willingness to adopt energy efficiency investments without contracts. 
5.2 Estimation results 
The estimation results are provided in Table 2.6 for the basic conditional logit (column 
1). The results based on a conditional logit and attributes interacted with dummies for 
attribute’s importance is provided in column 2. These dummies equate one when the 
individual states to consider the attribute as important and zero otherwise.94 The 
latent class model for inferred attribute non-attendance (ANA) is provided in Table 2.7 
and the iterative process leading to this model’s specification is presented in appendix 
7.5. Comparing Tables 2.6 and 2.7, one concludes that accounting for ANA increases 
the performance of the models according to the log likelihood, the Bayesian 
information criterion (BIC) and the Akaike-Schwartz Information Criterion (AIC). 
From a policy design perspective, relying on a latent class model is the appropriate 
estimation strategy. Indeed, this model distinguishes specific groups of respondents. 
This permits to avoid biases in the estimates due to respondents who did not attend 
to the attributes, while accounting for heterogeneity in both preferences and attribute 
non-attendance. 
As compared to the other models, the conditional logit with full attendance (table 2.6, 
column 1) does not capture any effect for the contractual attributes of the yearly 
payment to the ESCO and the contract’s duration. Except from the financing of the 
ESCO, all the contractual attributes become statistically significant once stated 
weights, i.e. attribute stated importance, are controlled for in column 2. The annual 
payment to the ESCO has the expected negative significant impact on the decision to 
opt for EPC. Contract duration has a statistically significant and negative impact for 
the respondents who considered this attribute, suggesting that the disadvantages of a 
                                            
94 Full attendance (i.e. all dummies equate one) is assumed when the individual ticked the maximum number of attributes 
possible (i.e. 4 attributes) and when the respondent chose the option: “no attribute is more important than another”.  
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long-term contract may, for these individuals, offset the advantages. The latent class 
model then permits to refine the analysis and shows that EPC contractual attributes 
are valued differently between classes. 
 
Table 2.6: Estimation conditional logit 
dependent variable: choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
Conditional logit 
full attendance 
(1) 
Conditional logit 
stated weights 
(2) 
upfront cost  
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
expected savings 
 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
savings variation  
 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
savings guarantee  
 
0.401** 
(0.160) 
0.918*** 
(0.214) 
payment to ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
contract duration  
 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.038** 
(0.015) 
measure envelope  
 
0.860* 
(0.441) 
0.680*** 
(0.274) 
measures group technique 
 
0.409** 
(0.186) 
0.087 
(0.199) 
 measures group biogas/green electricity mix  
 
0.025 
(0.394) 
0.167 
(0.311) 
measures group heating 
 
-0.071 
(0.392) 
-0.073 
(0.310) 
alternative specific constant energy efficiency alternat. 
 
0.409 
(0.415) 
0.638*** 
(0.221) 
alternative specific constant EPC alternative  
 
-0.243 
(0.520) 
-0.045 
(0.251) 
   observations 5,940 5,580 
individuals 297 279 
Log-likelihood -1,839 -1,641 
AIC 
BIC 
3,709 
3,792 
3,307 
3,393 
Notes: Conditional logits are estimated using stata. Conditional logit stated weights uses an interaction of attributes with 
dummies of individual-stated attributes importance. These dummies equate one when the individual states that she considers 
this specific attribute as important and zero otherwise. Individual-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, 
**P>0.05, *P<0.1. 
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Table 2.7: Latent class model with inferred attribute non-attendance 
Dependent variable:  
choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
 
 
 
Latent class model 
Inferred attribute non-attendance 
(6classes) 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     Upfront cost  -0.016*** 
(0.005) 
-0.006* 
(0.003) 
-0.006 
(0.006) 
0 
 
-0.111*** 
(0.025) 
 
Expected savings 
 
0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.034*** 
(0.006) 
0.031** 
(0.012) 
0.017** 
(0.007) 
0 
 
Savings variation  
 
-0.030 
(0.032) 
0 0 0 0 
Upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
0.019 
(0.012) 
0 0 0 0 
Savings guarantee  
 
-0.167 
(0.634) 
0.660** 
(0.319) 
0 0 0 
 
Payment to ESCO  
 
-0.147** 
(0.057) 
0 0 0 0 
Contract duration  
 
-0.345*** 
(0.105) 
0 0 0 0 
Measures envelope  
 
7.135*** 
(1.127) 
0.280 
(1.067) 
-2.474*** 
(0.902) 
-0.688 
(0.796) 
0 
 
Measures technique  
 
2.175*** 
(0.635) 
0.282 
(0.391) 
1.874** 
(0.834) 
-0.566 
(0.356) 
0 
 
Measures biogas/electricity mix 
 
2.800*** 
(0.654) 
-0.819 
(0.944) 
-1.303* 
(0.757) 
-1.291* 
(0.715) 
0 
 
Measures heating 
 
1.095** 
(0.950) 
-0.312 
(0.975) 
0.104 
(0.851) 
-2.098** 
(0.822) 
0 
 
      
ASC energy efficiency alternative 
 
0 3.753*** 
(1.093) 
0 0.691 
(0.772) 
0 
 
ASC EPC alternative 
 
0 3.978*** 
(1.138) 
0 0.896 
(0.823) 
0 
 
Class probability as a function of stated weights group  
Constant 1.046*** 
(0.297) 
0.777** 
(0.313) 
-0.716 
(0.521) 
0.652** 
(0.326) 
0 
 
Familiar with EPC (dummy) 0.625 
(0.450) 
0.808* 
(0.463) 
0.938 
(0.671) 
-0.359 
(0.589) 
0 
Average posterior class probabilities 0.363 0.309 0.075 0.159 0.094 
observations 5,940 
Individuals 297 
Log-likelihood -1214 
AIC 
BIC 
2,513 
2,755 
 
 Notes: Estimated using Nlogit. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Attribute non-attendance is 
expressed as coefficients being constrained to equal zero. Familiar with EPC means the concept was known to the respondent 
before the survey. ASC stands for alternative-specific constant. 
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Five classes are retained in the best latent class model specification.95 Respondents 
considering EPC contractual clauses are split into two classes (classes 1 and 2). Both 
classes are characterized by an average posterior class probability around one third. 
In the first group, respondents value negatively the payment to the ESCO and the 
contract duration. The respondents are also more sensitive to the upfront cost. In the 
second class, respondents are relatively more sensitive to the savings and the 
guarantee offered by EPC. The individuals previously familiar with the EPC concept 
are more likely to belong to the second class, i.e. valuing positively the guarantee.96 
In the second class, respondents are also more likely to choose energy efficiency 
investments, with or without contracts, as expressed by the alternative-specific 
constants.  
In the third and fourth classes, respondents consider savings and measures.97 The 
sensitivity to energy savings and measures is different in these two classes. With a 
class probability slightly larger than 9%, the last class covers individuals considering 
only cost. 
Some classes showed a very large p-value for alternative specific constants (ASC). 
This suggests another type of non-attendance, i.e. label non attendance. Indeed, for 
the respondents in these classes, the label of the alternative has no impact and the 
attributes entirely capture the differences of preferences among the alternatives. This 
type of non-attendance has to be accounted for. Thus for these classes, the 
alternative specific constants are also set to equal zero.98  
                                            
95 See appendix 7.5 for an explanation on how this model’s specification was selected. 
96 See appendix 7.5, other characteristics had no influence on the class probabilities. These include private vs. public buildings, 
tenants, yearly energy/electricity costs, heated surface, retrofits done and planed, random information on non-economic benefits 
of energy efficiency investments, random information on cost guarantee from EPC, EPC not economically viable as stated by the  
respondent, function, experience, age, gender, education of the respondent. I also tested whether dummies for belonging to 
specific groups of stated attribute importance matters in the class probability. 
97 Even if the cost is not significant in the third class, merging these two classes does not improve the model. The signs and 
significance, cost and savings attributes are the same when omitting class 4. The model performance is lower and the only 
difference lies in the signs and significance of the measures in class 3. This suggests that classes 3 and 4 have different 
preferences regarding measures and separating them permits to capture those differences. 
98 This phenomenon is however not observed in all classes (e.g. classes 2 and 4). The model of Table 10 was also tested by 
completely omitting ASC in all classes. The model showed a milder performance in terms of information criteria, but the results in 
terms of sign and significance are similar. Appendix 7.6 shows the results when the ASC are not constrained. The main 
difference lies in the fact that the payment to the ESCO is not significant in the first group. The most important results, i.e. 
financing from the ESCO being insignificant and the guarantee being positively values in the second class, remain. The 
willingness to pay for a guarantee is the same up to the thousandth. Moreover, merging classes 3 and 4 also result in poorer 
performance when ASC are not constrained. 
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The most important result relies in the fact that, in all the models, having part of the 
upfront cost financed by the ESCO is not significantly valued by the respondents 
which a priori contradicts hypothesis H1. This is also true in the latent class model, 
which did not show a specific class of respondents for whom financing of the ESCO 
would matter. This result, which may be specific to the current Swiss conjuncture, 
contrasts with the general observation by Panev et al. (2014) that financing EPC 
projects is one of the most important issues. 
Conversely, the performance guarantee is positive and statistically significant in all 
the models. This coincides with hypothesis H2, as a guarantee from the ESCO is 
consistently increasing the probability of adopting EPC. The latent class model shows 
however that it concerns less than a third of the respondents. Using the coefficients of 
the second class of the latent class model, the willingness to pay for a guarantee in 
energy savings is estimated at 104.5 CHF/m2.99 This positive impact of a guarantee 
contrasts with the evidence presented in Polzin et al. (2016b), who find that 
municipalities do not value positively the risk-sharing advantage of EPC in LED 
retrofits projects.  
5.2.1 Differences in preferences of respondents who are EPC responsive 
In order to test further the financing of the ESCO attribute (Hypothesis H1), I focus on 
the respondents whose decisions suggest that they may face barriers to energy 
efficiency investments potentially solved by EPC. These are typically the individuals 
who choose overhaul when EPC is not available and change for EPC when it is 
proposed. A dummy EPC responsive is created which equates one for all the 
respondents behaving in this way in at least one choice task. It concerns 34 
participants (11% of the sample) and a majority of them (27) are representing public 
buildings, especially education facilities (17 buildings). The dummy EPC responsive is 
                                            
99 This estimates is however not significant, and the 95% confidence interval is (-39;248). For the median respondent (with 2,500 
m2), the willingness to pay for a guarantee equals 261,250CHF. The median building in the sample incurs yearly energy costs of 
around 19 CHF/m2.99 Considering a median contractual duration of 10 years in the choice experiment, the energy costs over the 
lifetime of the contract can be approximated to 190 CHF/m2. The willingness to pay for a guarantee amounts to 55% of these 
energy costs. 
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interacted with all attributes and Table 2.8 shows the results when keeping only the 
interactions that are statistically significant.100  
First of all, the coefficient for upfront cost presents a greater negative magnitude for 
these respondents, which may suggest that they are limited in terms of credit 
possibilities. The difference between the cost estimates is confirmed by a Wald test 
rejecting equality at more than 90% confidence level. These respondents are more 
likely to value significantly and positively financing by the ESCO, with a difference 
significant at more than 99% confidence level. These respondents also value to a 
greater extent the fact of having a guarantee, as displayed by the statistically 
significant coefficient on Savings guarantee x EPC responsive (>99% confidence 
level). Their estimated willingness to pay for a guarantee101 amounts to 174 CHF/m2 
as compared to 70 CHF/m2 for respondents who are not responsive to EPC.102 For 
respondents being EPC responsive, the estimated willingness to pay for 1% of 
upfront cost financed by the ESCO is estimated at 1.09 CHF/m2 (95% confidence 
interval [0.41; 1.78]). The median upfront cost being 100 CHF/m2 in the choice 
experiment, the estimated willingness to pay is 1.09 CHF/m2 for each additional 
1 CHF/m2 paid by the ESCO. 
These results suggest that while a majority does not value the financing of the ESCO, 
a relatively small number of exceptions may be credit constrained. Since these are 
mostly public entities, this may suggest legal constraints on credit limits, such as debt 
ceilings. These respondents may also have limited budget for non-core activities. For 
these respondents, hypothesis H1 is favored and is in line with the findings of Polzin 
et al. (2016b) who find higher willingness to consider EPC when financially-
constrained. 
 
 
                                            
100 This dummy has also been tested as an individual characteristic influencing the classes’ probabilities in the unconstrained 
latent class model. The model however could not converge when accounting for this variable. 
101 95% confidence interval is [90; 259]. This equals to 435,000CHF for the median size respondent (2,500 m2) and 
175,000CHF for respondents who are non-responsive to EPC. 
102 95% confidence interval  [-39; 178] 
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Table 2.8: Impact of contractual clauses for individuals responsive to EPC 
Dependent variable: choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
Conditional logit 
 
Upfront cost  
 
-0.003** 
(0.002) 
Upfront cost x EPC responsive 
 
-0.008*** 
(0.002) 
Expected savings 
 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Savings variation  
 
0.011 
(0.008) 
Upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
Upfront cost financed by ESCO x EPC responsive  
 
0.009*** 
(0.003) 
Savings guarantee  
 
0.235 
(0.175) 
Savings guarantee x EPC responsive  
 
1.390*** 
(0.286) 
Payment to ESCO  0.001 
(0.013) 
Contract duration  
 
-0.022 
(0.016) 
Measures envelope  
 
0.965** 
(0.444) 
Measures group technique 
 
0.405** 
(0.187) 
Measures group biogas/green electricity mix  
 
0.142 
(0.396) 
Measures group heating 
 
0.027 
(0.398) 
Alternative specific constant energy efficiency alt. 
 
0.337 
(0.415) 
Alternative specific constant EPC alternative 
 
-0.283 
(0.525) 
  
Observations 5,940 
Individuals 297 
Log-likelihood -1,787 
AIC 
BIC 
3,606 
3,714 
Notes: Individual-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. EPC responsive indiv. is a 
dummy which equates 1 for respondents who, at least in one choice task, chose overhaul when EPC was not available and then 
switched to EPC once proposed. 34 respondents (11% of the sample) belong to the group of EPC responsive individuals.  
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5.2.2 Impact of individual or building characteristics 
As in the latent class model, being familiar with EPC is proven to be positively related 
to the willingness to adopt energy efficiency measures, with and without EPC in the 
basic conditional logit model (cf. Appendix 7.8, column (1)). This is shown by 
interacting a dummy for EPC familiarity with alternative-specific constants of energy 
efficiency and EPC options. 
Other individual and building characteristics are tested and do not have a significant 
impact, neither in the latent class model (with class probabilities) nor when interacted 
with attributes in the conditional logit model. For instance, private vs. public buildings 
do not result in significantly different estimates (cf. Appendix 7.8, column (2)), even 
when interacted with the contract duration attribute in the conditional logit model (cf. 
Appendix 7.8, column (4)). This result contrasts with the presumption of a divergence 
in contract duration valuation. Moreover, private firms do not value significantly 
differently a guarantee or the financing of the ESCO, as compared to public entities 
(cf. Appendix 7.8, column (4)). 
The fact of having tenants does not show a significant impact on the likelihood to 
invest in energy efficiency, with or without contract (cf. Appendix 7.8, column (2)). The 
determinant is not significant either when interacted with the payment to the ESCO. 
This results contrasts with the observation of split incentives in rented buildings 
resulting in lower energy efficiency investments.103 This study’s result may be 
explained by the fact that buildings with tenants are a minority in the sample (38%) 
and, more importantly, private rented buildings represent a small share of the 
buildings (8%). Split incentives issues may indeed be less representative in public 
rented buildings, for which the motivation to retrofit is not only economically-driven. 
Therefore, this sample may not be representative to analyze split incentives in energy 
efficiency investments. 
There is no evidence of scale effects in the decision patterns, as captured by controls 
for energy and/or electricity yearly costs (cf. Appendix 7.8, column (2)), or heated 
surface. The reason not to adopt EPC as stated by the respondents, such as EPC 
                                            
103 See Murtishaw and Sathaye (2006) and Davis (2010) for empirical evidence and the appendix of Gillingham et al. (2012) for 
a formal explanation. 
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being seen as not economically viable, are also tested and do not have a significant 
impact on the willingness to invest with or without EPC either (cf. Appendix 7.8, 
column (6)). Finally, the random information provided on the non-monetary benefits of 
energy efficiency investments, as well as the guarantee on costs provided by EPC, 
does not have a statistically significant impact on the decision to invest (cf. Appendix 
7.8, column (5)). 
I test whether the function of the respondent in the firm/institution has an impact on 
the investment decisions (cf. Appendix 7.8, column (3)). If the respondent is the 
energy manager of the building, the likelihood to invest in energy efficiency with and 
without EPC increases. This could be explained by the fact that energy managers are 
likely to be better informed about the options to invest in energy efficiency and their 
positive benefits, including EPC, which may induce adoption. This also means that 
energy managers do not perceive performance contracts as a threat to their job. 
When the respondent is a person in charge of municipal or cantonal buildings, there 
is a significant reticence to opt for energy efficiency, with and without EPC. Moreover, 
the participant’s tenure within the firm/institution also affects negatively the propensity 
to opt for EPC. Age, gender and the role in the decision process of the respondent 
does not have any significant impact. Finally, the building types do not have 
statistically significant impact on the willingness to invest in energy efficiency, with or 
without contract. 
5.2.3 Relaxing assumption of equality of parameters across alternatives 
149 respondents (50% of the sample) never opt for EPC. Moreover, the previous 
results show that a large share of individuals does not attend to attributes specific to 
the EPC alternative. This suggests a reticence to invest in energy efficiency through 
EPC, which is not entirely captured by the observed contractual attributes (e.g. 
payment to the ESCO, duration). In order to study this conjecture further, a 
conditional logit with alternative specific estimates for all attributes is estimated. The 
results are provided in Table 2.9.  
 
 
   
123 
Table 2.9: Alternative-specific estimates of attributes 
Dependent variable: choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
clogit 
 
  Upfront cost x alt=ee 
 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
Upfront cost x alt=epc 
 
-0.006*** 
(0.002) 
Upfront cost x alt=overhaul 
 
-0.003 
(0.003) 
Expected savings x alt=ee 
 
0.014*** 
(0.005) 
Expected savings x alt=epc 
 
0.009 
(0.006) 
Risk: savings variation x alt=ee 
 
0.002 
(0.011) 
Risk: savings variation x alt=epc 
 
0.014 
(0.014) 
Upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
0.000 
(0.002) 
Savings guarantee  
 
0.284** 
(0.144) 
Payment to ESCO  
 
-0.007 
(0.011) 
Contract duration  
 
-0.026** 
(0.012) 
Measure envelope  
 
0.923** 
(0.436) 
Measures group technic  
 
0.474** 
(0.185) 
Measures group biogas/green elec mix  
 
0.007 
(0.384) 
Measures group heating 
 
-0.081 
(0.383) 
Alternative specific constant overhaul alt. 
 
-0.328 
(0.425) 
Observations 5,940 
Individuals 297 
Log-likelihood -1,838 
AIC 
BIC 
3,708 
3,815 
Notes: Individual-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Interactions 
of attributes with alternative specific constants, except from the measures which are used as controls and not 
interacted. 
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While the cost of the overhaul alternative does not have a significant impact on 
adoption, this attribute is perceived as worse in the EPC alternative than in the 
alternative of energy efficiency without contract (Wald test with a 95% confidence 
level). These significant differences in the cost attribute suggest a smaller willingness 
to invest in energy efficiency through EPC than without contract, even when 
controlling for all other observed differences between the two options. This means 
that other perceived obstacles, not presented in the choice experiment, explain a 
reticence to opt for EPC. An overview of the stated reasons was presented in section 
5.1. Considering alternative-specific estimates results in a significant negative impact 
of contract duration as opposed to the basic conditional logit model in Table 2.6 
column (1). This also points towards the perceived disadvantage of long run 
commitment with an external firm. 
5.3 Robustness checks and further research 
I previously used an unconstrained latent class model, i.e. with varying coefficients 
across classes, to account for heterogeneity in both attributes attendance and 
preferences. As opposed to an equality-constrained latent class model104 however, 
this increases the model’s parameters to estimate and irrelevant classes are also 
more difficult to detect.105 As a result, it is impossible to analyze all ANA combinations 
using unconstrained latent class model. In order to check the robustness of the latent 
class model of Table 2.7, I use a method with equality-constrained latent class 
models to assess the relevant ANA combinations. The method follows the iterative 
algorithm proposed by Lagarde (2013) to analyze ANA of single, pair and triple 
ignored attributes.106 The irrelevant classes, i.e. with zero average posterior class 
probability, are dropped. The classes surviving to this process are then compared to 
patterns with four to seven attributes not attended to. In order to limit the number of 
                                            
104 In which parameters are constrained to be the same across classes. 
105 Indeed, equality-constrained latent class models by forcing non-zero parameters to be equal across classes allows to detect 
irrelevant classes since these show an average posterior class probability equating zero. In unconstrained latent class model , it 
is really rare to obtain an estimated class probability of zero. 
106 This process, beginning with single attributes ignored and following with a higher number of attributes ignored makes the 
assumption that a single-attribute ignored pattern is considered irrelevant at an early stage has no chance to become relevant 
once more attributes are ignored. In this process, the dummies for technologies groups representing the attribute for the energy 
efficiency measures are considered as a block and therefore assumed to be either all ignored or fully considered. This is justified 
by the fact that in this study, the focus is not on the willingness to adopt specific technologies but rather to assess the willingness 
to opt for energy efficiency measures as a whole, i.e. taking the measures as controls and focusing on contractual clauses, cost 
and savings, driving the decision. 
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possible combinations to consider, I use the stated (one to four) important attributes. 
All combinations concerning at least 4 persons in the sample are tested. This process 
is implemented in the software Nlogit. The final model is presented in appendix 7.7 
and includes 7 classes. As in the unconstrained model, two classes (classes 1 and 6) 
include attendance to EPC attributes. These however represent a smaller share 
(around one third) of the individuals than in the unconstrained model. Cost, savings 
and measures are still the attributes being the most often considered. While larger in 
magnitude, the coefficients obtained are similar in sign and significance to the results 
found in the conditional logit with stated weights (Table 2.6 column 2).107 In order to 
test whether equality constraint across classes is a restrictive assumption, one can 
compare the information criteria of constrained and unconstrained models. 
Constraining the model of Table 2.7 leads to a poorer performance in terms of 
information criteria. This suggests that accounting for preference heterogeneity 
represents an advantage. 
The design of the choice experiment, by asking the respondents to first choose 
between energy efficiency and simple overhaul and then propose the same two 
alternatives with an additional EPC option, provides information on potential 
incoherent choices. For instance, a respondent stating to prefer simple overhaul in 
the choice task with two alternatives should have no reason to switch for energy 
efficiency once an additional option, i.e. EPC, is proposed. This kind of decision 
patterns does not satisfy the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives 
(IIA), necessary to estimate conditional logit models without bias. One should 
however note that the latent class model does not suffer from the IIA restriction. I still 
check the robustness of the conditional logit models results when ignoring these 
incoherent choices that occur at least once for 29 respondents in this sample. 
Robustness is also tested by omitting the choice tasks in which the respondent take 
less than 5 seconds to answer108, and by eliminating the choice tasks in which the 
                                            
107 Only risk has an unexpected significant positive sign, which may be explained in heterogeneity in the way risk is perceived. 
We can indeed show that some respondents considered the upper bound, the lower bound or both. This translates in a 
misleading positive coefficient in the equality constrained latent class model. 
108 This relates to 25 observations out of the 5,940. 
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participant states to be uncertain109 on her choice. I also estimate all conditional logit 
models while omitting respondents who state that their building is already energy 
efficient (8 respondents), planned to be destroyed (3 respondents) or protected (6 
respondents). Eliminating these choice tasks and individuals (cf. appendix 7.9), 
together or individually, does not affect the signs of the estimates shown for 
conditional logit models in Tables 2.6, 2.8 and 2.9. The differences in magnitudes are 
relatively small. This also has no impact on the sign and significance of coefficients 
related to individual and building characteristics described in section 5.2.2. 
The models are also estimated when accounting for differences across choice tasks, 
by interacting choice tasks dummies with the alternative-specific constants, in order to 
control for the possibility of decreased attention throughout the choice experiment. 
Accounting for it also does not affect the variables of interest in all conditional logit 
models, with a maximal difference in the estimates of two-tenths (cf. appendix 7.10).  
The present study is subject to limitations due to the limited sample size and the low 
response rate. This has to be put in the perspective of a complex survey with difficult 
decision processes for respondents.  
Another limitation comes from the fact that the choice experiment involves 
hypothetical situations presented to respondents within public administration, firms or 
other institutions. Adapting the random utility model while accounting for profit 
maximization may be too simplistic in this case. The final decisions regarding energy 
efficiency investments are likely to involve a complex decision process with several 
decision-makers. This is not accounted for in this study. I tried to minimize this issue 
by selecting in the survey only the participants who have a role to play in the 
decisions regarding the building in the real life. Nevertheless, further research in this 
domain should consider organizational behavior of the institutions observed in order 
to analyze in further detail the relevance of the choices made by the respondents in 
the experiment. 
                                            
109 Respondents stating that they consider their choice as being a clear decision are 62% in task 1, 68% in task 2 and 72% in 
tasks 3 and 4. 
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The estimates for willingness to pay presented in the analysis are also subject to 
limitations since they are computed using the upfront cost coefficient only. The choice 
experiment nevertheless involves two attributes for the cost, i.e. upfront cost and 
annual payment to ESCO. Another possibility to compute willingness to pay would 
include the coefficients on both these attributes. This would first require making an 
assumption on the interest rates considered by respondents, in order to translate it 
into actualized value of all the annuities paid to the ESCO during the contract 
duration. Moreover, the attribute non-attendance patterns found in the previous 
section suggest that there is heterogeneity in the way that respondents considered 
the two cost attributes. Some of the participants may have considered cost alone, 
payment to the ESCO alone or a combination of them. In the same way, some 
respondents may have translated payment into an actualized value and added it to 
the upfront cost. This heterogeneity in the decision process heuristics could be 
examined in further research relying, for instance, on more elaborated versions of 
latent class models. The attribute non-attendance latent class models I used in this 
chapter could be further developed using the so-called common-metric attribute 
aggregation. In the same way that Nlogit permits to constrain parameters to be equal 
to zero in certain classes to account for ANA, it can allow two parameters to be 
estimated as being aggregated in other classes.110 Both ANA and aggregation can be 
part of the same class. This could be an interesting strategy to be applied in further 
research exploring the willingness to pay for energy savings, ESCO’s guarantee, 
financing of the ESCO or willingness to accept contract duration. 
Other research would also be needed in order to determine whether the lack of 
necessity of financing of the ESCO from a large share of the respondents is specific 
to the Swiss context, and if it is due to the current conjuncture or if it reflects a 
structural phenomenon. 
The present study also focuses typically on potential clients of EPC, i.e. large energy 
consumers with consequent energy savings potential. It would however be interesting 
to enlarge the focus to assess how smaller energy consumers would value EPC 
                                            
110 See Hensher et al. (2015) for more details. 
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contractual terms. Pätäri et al. (2016) show for instance that Finnish SMEs are 
financially constrained because of other investment needs. A survey targeted at 
SMEs could be useful to assess whether external financing becomes more interesting 
relative to a guarantee. This could bring other policy implications for small energy 
consumers. 
Landlord-tenant split incentives and legal issues linked to the transfer of retrofit costs 
to the tenant did not show any significant impact on the willingness to adopt energy 
efficiency measures, contrasting with the results from the first chapter of this thesis in 
the context of energy supply contracting. This subject should be further tested using a 
sample with a higher share of privately-owned rented buildings, such as residential 
buildings, office buildings and shopping centers. 
Finally, the exploration of attribute non-attendance provides insights into the 
behaviors influencing the decisions to invest in energy efficiency. Further research is 
needed to examine how non-standard behavior (according to the neoclassical 
economic theory) or strategy considerations could be exploited to foster investment in 
energy efficiency. More specifically, non-standard beliefs resulting from a systematic 
underestimation of discounted future energy costs as compared to the present 
purchase price may be examined using the aforementioned common-metric attribute 
aggregation to estimate willingness to pay for energy savings. 
6 Conclusion 
This chapter analyzes the determinants underlying EPC adoption and how potential 
clients value the contractual attributes. The analysis is based on a survey of 297 
managers and owners of large private and public energy-consuming buildings in 
Switzerland. 
The econometric analysis shows that financing from the ESCO positively affects EPC 
adoption only for a minority of respondents. These are mostly public entities, 
presumably constrained by debt ceilings. They could also represent institutions with 
limited budget for non-core activities. This result implies that for a majority of 
respondents in our sample, the financing of ESCOs is not a driver of EPC adoption. A 
possible explanation is that one can always find the necessary financing for an 
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economically sound project (Cooremans, 2012). Moreover, this result has to be 
interpreted in the current Swiss economic context characterized by low interest rates.  
A first implication of this result lies in the fact that, in order to attract new EPC clients, 
energy performance contract may be adapted to contribute to each clients’ core 
business, for instance via non-energy benefits. This evolution in the EPC value 
proposition has already occurred in the mature US EPC market, where ESCOs have 
diversified and now propose new benefits within EPC, such as water conservation, 
tradable emission credits or avoided operation and maintenance. These benefits are 
transformed in dollar value and incorporated into the guaranteed or the shared 
savings schemes (Stuart et al., 2016). 
A second implication is the need to clarify the extent to which public entities are 
legally entitled to use the financing from the ESCO to circumvent credit constraints 
such as debt ceilings. For budget constrained public entities with debt ceilings, this 
would be possible if they are allowed to consider the EPC project as an off-balance 
sheet operational expenditure. The rationale for legally allowing off-balance sheet 
financing in that case is supported by the fact that the risk is shared with the ESCO. 
While the financing from the ESCO is positively valued only by a small minority of the 
respondents, the performance guarantee provided by the ESCO has a persistent and 
significantly positive impact on the willingness to adopt EPC. This result is important 
to develop the Swiss EPC market. While, in other countries, financing from the ESCO 
has triggered the EPC market in its early stage (Hansen, 2006; Marino et al., 2011), 
the Swiss context may be different. An implication for Swiss ESCOs relies in the fact 
that presenting EPC as a risk-sharing mechanism is likely to attract more customers 
than presenting it as a financing tool. This Swiss specificity may be an explanation of 
the relatively late development of the domestic EPC market, as compared to 
neighboring countries, such as Germany. 
The positive effect of the risk sharing mechanism suggests that EPC could help 
mitigate barriers to energy efficient investment. This conjecture nevertheless needs 
further research of the impact of EPC guarantee on the probability to invest in energy 
efficiency. If risk sharing is proven to induce energy efficiency investment, this would 
   
130 
provide important policy guidance. While EPC may not be suitable for small energy 
consumers due to the entailed transaction costs, alternative instruments could 
provide other forms of performance guarantee to induce energy efficiency 
investments in all market segments. 
This study fails to capture any impact of landlord-tenant split incentives on energy 
efficiency investments or EPC adoption. The conjecture should however be tested 
further by using a sample with a larger share of private rented buildings. I find no 
divergence in the decision-making or in the valuation of contractual attributes 
between private and public entities. The energy costs and the size of the building do 
not have a significant impact either. However, I show that if the respondent is an 
energy manager, the willingness to adopt EPC and energy efficiency increases. 
Directors of cantonal or municipal buildings show less interest in energy efficiency 
and EPC. This lack of interest towards EPC is stronger the longer the tenure of the 
respondent. 
The results show important heterogeneity in the decision-making processes when it 
comes to energy efficiency and energy performance contracting. Some respondents 
simplified their decision process by using attribute non-attendance. This study 
provides insights into the complexity underlying the decision to invest in energy 
efficiency investment and to adopt EPC. Further research in that domain could 
provide crucial answers to foster energy efficiency investments. 
Finally, while EPC risk sharing mechanism is valued positively, it also faces a 
reluctance from potential clients which is likely to be caused by a lack of 
understanding. I argue that informing clients about EPC is primordial to reduce this 
reticence. The recent efforts provided by the Swiss federal government to foster 
awareness of EPC solutions should therefore be upheld. More specifically, I pointed 
towards specific misunderstandings of EPC which could be easily overcome with 
information dissemination.  
   
131 
7 Appendix 
7.1 Letter of invitation to participate to the survey 
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7.2 Survey content 
Part 1: Introductory questions on the building and the respondent 
This section gathers general information on the building such as its type and location. 
The responsibility of the respondent and its decision role regarding the building is also 
assessed. If the respondent declares having no role in the decision process regarding 
investments, operation or revisions on energetic or technical aspects of the building, 
she is asked to give the contact of another person in charge and exits the survey. 
This implies that only respondents with a role to play in the decision process complete 
the survey. Therefore, part 1 is also intended to capture the potential heterogeneity in 
the respondents’ roles. 
Part 2: Current situation of the building 
The second part aims at capturing in detail the building characteristics, such as the 
construction year, the presence of tenants and the size in terms of heated floor area 
(square meters). Special emphasis is put on the type of heating system and its age. 
Information on energy and electricity yearly costs is also collected as well as the 
presence of ventilation or cold in the building. The respondents are then asked to 
state if the building is managed by an employee in charge of the energetic and 
technical aspects, if it is certified with the ‘Minergie’ label (Beyeler et al., 2009) and if 
an audit has been made since 1990. Finally, grid questions as in the following figure 
gather information on planned and realized retrofits on the walls, roof, windows, 
lighting, heating, ventilation and building automation. 
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Figure 2.4 Example of question on realized and planned retrofits 
 
Part 3: Information on Energy Performance Contracting 
Because the energy performance contracting market is only emerging in Switzerland, 
I expect to have a relatively high share of respondents unfamiliar with this notion. A 
complete section is therefore allocated to explain the concept in detail. This includes 
the following figure, describing the EPC concept; an EPC example illustrated and a 
simplified definition of these contracts: 
“Some companies provide their client with adapted energy efficiency improvement 
measures. Through a contract of mid- to long-run, these providers insure the 
operation and maintenance of the installations. Sometimes they finance, completely 
or in part, the upfront investment and/or they guarantee the client that the energy 
savings will achieve a minimal amount, otherwise they pay the difference. In return, 
the client pays a fee during the contract duration.” 
For simplicity, the definition of EPC does not distinguish the “shared-savings” from the 
“guaranteed-savings” scheme. In the choice experiment, some of the contracts 
proposed include both a guarantee and a part of the investment financed by the 
ESCO. It is therefore important in the definition not to exclude one from the other. 
Also, because of the necessity to simplify the choice tasks in the experiment, only 
fixed payments are presented in the contract. I therefore exclude from the definition 
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the case in which the client can pay according to a share of the energy savings 
achieved as in the “shared-savings EPC” scheme. 
 
 
The definition, diagram and example are selected in order to explain the EPC concept 
as precisely and briefly as possible. The selection is made on a pretest targeted at 
non-energy professionals in the circle of acquaintances of the authors. In these test 
survey, the respondents are asked between several combinations of explanations, 
examples and diagrams which one was the clearest. The combination used in the 
survey is the one which makes the majority of respondents satisfied in this pretest. 
After the explanations of the EPC concept, the respondent is asked about her level of 
understanding of these contracts. This is used further to test the potential impact of 
misunderstanding on the choices made in the experiment. 
 
Presta-
taire 
Client 
(Vous) 
Contrat de 
performance 
énergétique 
Analyse 
Conception 
Installation 
Financement 
Suivi 
Formation 
 
Paiement 
Données, 
informations 
Collaboration 
 
Fournisseurs 
Investisseurs 
Fabricants/fournisseurs 
Bureaux d’ingénieur 
Installateurs 
Figure 2.5 EPC concept diagram 
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Figure 2.6 Example and illustration for EPC concept 
Part 4: Choice experiment 
See section 3.2.2. 
Part 5: Decision process 
Because of the potentially important heterogeneity in the decision process and the 
roles the respondent plays in it, this part aims at assessing some factors that can 
have an impact on the decisions made in reality. For instance, I ask whether in 
practice the respondent can take alone certain or all the decisions she makes in the 
choice experiment. It is also assessed whether a certain contract duration or a budget 
limit forces the respondent to consult other sections in the firm/entity to make the 
decision. This ensures that I account for the fact that there may be threshold effects in 
the levels of costs and duration for some respondents. 
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Part 6: Socio-economic statistics of the respondent 
Since the emphasis of the survey is rather on the building characteristics, questions 
on the respondent himself are reduced to a minimum. These include only the age, the 
gender, the level of education and the number of years of experience in the current 
function in the entity/firm. 
Part 7: Contact and end 
Finally, the respondents are asked to give their e-mail address if they are interested in 
receiving the results of the study. An open question dedicated to remarks concludes 
the survey. 
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7.3 Allocation of energy efficiency measures according to upfront 
costs 
The percentage represents the share of alternatives with the corresponding cost 
which is allocated with that type of energy efficiency measure. 
Table 2.10: Allocation measures type 1 
 COST (CHF/heated m2) 
 80 100 120 150 180 200 250 300 
E
E
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 t
y
p
e
 
BA 
only 
25% BA 
only 
50% Heat 
pump +BA 
25%  
Wood+BA 
20%BA 
only 
20% 
Envelope 
only 
40% Heat 
pump+BA 
20% 
Wood + 
BA 
25% 
Envelope 
only 
50% Heat 
pump+BA 
25% 
Wood+BA 
25% 
Envelope 
only 
50% Heat 
pump+BA 
25% 
Wood+BA 
50%Envelope 
only 
50% Env+BA 
Env+BA Env+BA 
Notes: BA: building automation and control system (BACS class B): This includes automatic detection for lighting and daylight 
control, combined light and heating automatically controlled, control and optimization of operations, alarming and monitoring 
functions. HP: heat-pump. Wood: woodchips or pellets. Nebo+: durable energy operation optimization (“Betriebsoptimierung”) of 
ventilation and air conditioning, adaptation of operation durations, reduction of air volumes, optimization of air humidity, reduction of 
electric needs for air transportation, control of air purification. 
 
Table 2.11: Allocation measures type 2 
 COST (CHF/heated m2) 
 80 100 120 150 
E
E
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 
ty
p
e
 
BA only 25% BA only 
50% Heat pump +BA 
25% Wood+BA 
25%BA only 
50% Heat pump+BA 
25% Wood + BA 
50% Heat pump+BA 
50% Wood+BA 
 
Table 2.12: Allocation measures type 3 
 COST (CHF/heated m2) 
 80 100 120 150 180 200 250 300 
E
E
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 t
y
p
e
 BA only BA only 50%BA only 
50% 
Envelope 
only 
 
Envelope 
only 
Envelope 
only 
50%Envelope 
only 
50% Env+BA 
Env+BA Env+BA 
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Table 2.13: Allocation measures type 4 
 COST (CHF/heated m2) 
 80 100 120 150 
E
E
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 t
y
p
e
 
25% BA only 
25% Nebo+ only 
25% solar panels 
hotwater 
25% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
25% BA only 
25% Nebo+ only 
25% solar panels 
hotwater 
25% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
33% Nebo+ only 
33% solar panels 
hotwater 
33% biogas/green 
elec+BACS  
33% Nebo+ only 
33% solar panels 
hotwater 
33% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
 
Table 2.14: Allocation measures type 5 
 COST (CHF/heated m2) 
 80 100 120 150 
E
E
 m
e
a
s
u
re
 t
y
p
e
 
25% BA only 
25% ventilation 
25% solar panels 
hotwater 
25% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
25% BA only 
25% ventilation 
25% solar panels 
hotwater 
25% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
33% ventilation 
33% solar panels 
hotwater 
33% biogas/green 
elec+BACS  
33% ventilation 
33% solar panels 
hotwater 
33% biogas/green 
elec+BACS 
 
The allocation of respondents across the different types of choice experiment, depending on 
the revisions they already implemented since 2005, results in a large majority (68%) facing 
type 1, i.e. the design proposing both envelope enhancement and new heating systems (with 
or without building automation). Type 3, including only envelope enhancement, is faced by 68 
respondents (23%). 12 respondents have already implemented envelope enhancement and 
are thus proposed measures including new heating systems and automation (type 2). A 
minority of respondents (4%) already revised both the envelope and the heating systems 
since 2005. Hence, they see type 4 (9 respondents) and type 5 (4 respondents). 
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7.4 Summary statistics of technology attributes 
Table 2.15: Summary statistics of measures 
N=5,940 
Variables (dummies) 
Mean 
(% of N) 
Group dummy technique 46.35 
 building automation 46.01 
 exploitation optimization 0.69 
 controlled ventilation 0.25 
Group dummy biogas/electricity mix 13.64 
 biogas mix (if already gas) 13.43 
 green electricity mix 0.20 
Group dummy cheating 16.90 
 new heat pump 11.03 
 new wood heating 5.13 
 solar panels 0.74 
Dummy envelope 27.95 
Overhaul façade, windows (painting) 23.54 
Overhaul boiler revision 14.58 
Overhaul technical revision 1.21 
Note: In the choice experiment, one alternative can include several measures (e.g. heat pump + building automation) .  
N represents the total number of observations in the choice experiment analysis, i.e. the number of alternatives (3+2) multip lied 
by the number of choice tasks (4) and the total number of respondents (297).  
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7.5 Iterative process leading to the unconstrained latent class model 
of Table 2.7 
This appendix described how the unconstrained latent class model specification has 
been chosen. The relevant ANA patterns are based on the respondents' stated 
weights. All combinations displayed in Table 2.5, which concern more than 6 persons, 
are considered. By an iterative process and starting with the groups representing the 
largest number of respondents, I test how including each group affects the efficiency 
of the model in terms of information criteria (Akaike and Bayesian information 
criteria). I start with a latent class model with two classes: 
1. Full attendance, representing the group of respondents stating that no 
attribute was more important than another in their decision (23 persons) 
2. Only upfront costs, savings and the energy efficiency measures are 
attended to (as these attributes are stated as important by 19 persons in 
the sample). All other attributes are constrained to zero. 
I subsequently add the other classes, in the same order as in Table 2.5. When the 
class lead to smaller information criteria, it is kept, otherwise it is removed. In this 
manner, seven latent class models with two to six classes are tested.111 The final 
combination of selected ANA patterns is presented in Table 2.7.  
Once I determine the classes, I test whether individual or building characteristics have 
any impact on the class probabilities. Being familiar with EPC is the only 
characteristic showing a significant impact.112 
Five classes are retained in the best model.   
                                            
111 From the model which minimizes information criteria, I check whether a more efficient model can be found by omitting one of 
the classes, or by adding a class previously eliminated. A second full attendance class or a complete none attendance class 
(with and without ASC) are also added to check whether the model would be improved. This is not the case. 
112 I tested other characteristics such as private vs. public buildings, tenants, yearly energy/electricity costs, heated surface, 
retrofits done and planed, random information on non-economic benefits of energy efficiency investments, random information 
on cost guarantee from EPC, EPC not economically viable as stated by the respondent, function, experience, age, gender, 
education of the respondent. These individual and building characteristics were also tested by using interaction in conditional 
logit models. The results are provided in section 5.2.2 and appendix 7.8. I also tested whether dummies for belonging to specific 
groups of stated attribute importance matters in the class probability. These dummies happen to be non-significant. This might 
suggest that the inferred attribute non-attendance not exactly corresponds to the weights stated by the respondents. 
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7.6 Unconstrained latent class model without label non-attendance 
Table 2.16: Latent class model without ASC set to zero 
Dependent variable:  
choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
 
 
 
Latent class model 
Inferred attribute non-attendance 
(6classes) 
 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
     Upfront cost  -0.017*** 
(0.005) 
-0.007** 
(0.004) 
-0.010*** 
(0.003) 
0 
 
-0.051 
(0.056) 
 Expected savings 
 
0.022** 
(0.011) 
0.037*** 
(0.007) 
0.017*** 
(0.006) 
0.002 
(0.019) 
0 
 
Savings variation  
 
-0.048 
(0.029) 
0 0 0 0 
Upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
0.019 
(0.025) 
0 0 0 0 
Savings guarantee  
 
-0.628 
(0.780) 
0.749** 
(0.331) 
0 0 0 
 
Payment to ESCO  
 
-0.147 
(0.148) 
0 0 0 0 
Contract duration  
 
-0.304** 
(0.128) 
0 0 0 0 
Measures envelope  
 
5.316*** 
(0.915) 
0.496 
(2.097) 
-34.162 
(0.22e07) 
2.106 
(4.823) 
0 
 
Measures technique  
 
1.237* 
(0.691) 
0.300 
(0.384) 
0.552 
(0.356) 
0.916 
(0.568) 
0 
 
Measures biogas/electricity mix 
 
2.094*** 
(0.592) 
-0.667 
(2.052) 
-34.291 
(0.22e07) 
-0.978 
(4.794) 
0 
 
Measures heating 
 
0.501 
(0.569) 
0.178 
(1.980) 
-34.340 
(0.22e07) 
-33.068 
(0.27e14) 
0 
 
      
ASC energy efficiency alternative 
 
1.768 
(0.78e07) 
3.113 
(1.951) 
33.909 
(0.22e07) 
-1.039 
(4.79e14) 
-1.416 
(1.77e27) 
 ASC EPC alternative 
 
2.188 
(1.53e07) 
3.254* 
(1.969) 
34.667 
(0.22e07) 
-3.330 
(4.90e14) 
-62.245 
(0.77e27) 
 Class probability as a function of stated weights group  
Constant 1.098*** 
(0.364) 
0.816** 
(0.374) 
0.353 
(0.419) 
-0.025 
(0.572) 
0 
 
Familiar with EPC (dummy) 0.612 
(0.476) 
0.809* 
(0.483) 
0.318 
(0.572) 
-0.803 
(0.919) 
0 
Average posterior class probabilities 0.372 0.315 0.151 0.070 0.092 
observations 5,940 
Individuals 297 
Log-likelihood -1,201 
AIC 
BIC 
2,500 
2,777 
 
 
Notes: Estimated using Nlogit. Standard errors are in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Attribute non-attendance is 
expressed as coefficients being constrained to equal zero. Familiar with EPC means the concept was known to the respondent 
before the survey. ASC stands for alternative-specific constant. 
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7.7 Equality-constrained latent class model with inferred attribute 
non-attendance 
Table 2.17: Equality-constrained latent class model 
Dependent variable: choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
 
 
 
Equality-constrained latent class model 
Inferred attribute non-attendance 
(7classes) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
       Upfront Cost  -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0 -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
-0.019*** 
(0.003) 
0 
Expected savings 
 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0 
 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0 0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0.039*** 
(0.007) 
0 
Risk: sav. variation  
 
2.387*** 
(0.845) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Upfront ESCO  
 
0.100 
(0.131) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Savings guarantee  
 
3.280*** 
(0.578) 
0 0 0 3.280*** 
(0.578) 
0 0 
Payment to ESCO  
 
-1.278** 
(0.588) 
0 0 0 0 -1.278** 
(0.588) 
0 
Contract duration  
 
-4.158*** 
(1.138) 
0 0 0 0 0 0 
Meas. Envelope  
 
5.922*** 
(0.493) 
5.922*** 
(0.493) 
5.922*** 
(0.493) 
0 5.922*** 
(0.493) 
5.922*** 
(0.493) 
0 
Meas technic  
 
1.501*** 
(0.277) 
1.501*** 
(0.277) 
1.501*** 
(0.277) 
0 1.501*** 
(0.277) 
1.501*** 
(0.277) 
0 
Meas. Mix  
 
2.422*** 
(0.350) 
2.422*** 
(0.350) 
2.422*** 
(0.350) 
0 2.422*** 
(0.350) 
2.422*** 
(0.350) 
0 
Meas. Heating 
 
1.562*** 
(0.299) 
1.562*** 
(0.299) 
1.562*** 
(0.299) 
0 1.562*** 
(0.299) 
1.562*** 
(0.299) 
0 
        
ASC ee alt. 
 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
-1.025*** 
(0.231) 
0 
ASC epc alt. 
 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
-1.523*** 
(0.261) 
0 
        Average posterior class 
probabilities 
0.206 0.082 0.179 0.130 0.129 0.104 0.170 
Observations 5,940 
Individuals 297 
Log-likelihood -1,279 
AIC 
BIC 
2,595 
2,705 
Notes: estimated using Nlogit. Standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. 
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7.8 Conditional logit with individual and building characteristics 
Table 2.18: Conditional logit with individual and building characteristics 
dependent variable: choice (=1 if choose alternative j) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ASC ee alt.  0.102 (0.428) 1.046* (0.535) 0.793 (0.528) 0.344 (0.439) 0.486 (0.438) -0.541 (0.622) 
ASC ee x familiar with EPC 0.589** (0.233)      
ASC ee x rented building  -0.453 (0.324)     
ASC ee x privately owned building  -0.206 (0.398)     
ASC ee x energy consumption (CHF/year)  -0.000 (0.000)     
ASC ee x respondent=owner   -0.440 (0.339)    
ASC ee x respondent=financial Manager   -0.741 (0.488)    
ASC ee x respondent=facility manager   -0.509* (0.277)    
ASC ee x respondent=energy manager   0.827** (0.358)    
ASC ee x respondent=director of municipal/cantonal buildings   -0.440* (0.266)    
ASC ee x respondent=municipal counsellor   -0.191 (0.376)    
ASC ee x respondent=other type   -0.105 (0.811)    
ASC ee x experience of respondent in that function   -0.005 (0.015)    
 
  
 
   ASC ee x random information on non-energy benefits of ee inv.     -0.083 (0.723)  
ASC ee x random information on cost guar. of epc     -0.181 (0.234)  
ASC ee x EPC seen as not economically viable      0.407 (0.344) 
ASC epc alt.  -0.543 (0.545) 0.277 (0.710) 0.584 (0.639) -0.242 (0.536) -0.014 (0.550) -19.554*** (0.709) 
ASC epc x familiar with EPC 0.580** (0.284)      
ASC epc x rented building  -0.448 (0.405)     
ASC epc x privately owned building  -0.648 (0.482)     
ASC epc x energy consumption (CHF/year)  -0.000 (0.000)     
ASC epc x respondent=owner   -0.411 (0.402)    
ASC epc x respondent=financial Manager   -0.508 (0.569)    
ASC epc x respondent=facility manager   -0.559 (0.341)    
ASC epc x respondent=energy manager   0.969** (0.412)    
ASC epc x respondent=director of municipal/cantonal buildings   -0.666** (0.322)    
ASC epc x respondent=municipal counsellor   -0.079 (0.417)    
ASC epc x respondent=other type   -1.055 (1.154)    
ASC epc x experience of respondent in that function   -0.056*** (0.021)    
ASC epc x random information on non-energy benefits of ee inv.     -0.187 (0.288)  
ASC epc x random information on cost guar. of epc     -0.461 (0.288)  
ASC epc x EPC seen as not economically viable      0.239 (0.309) 
upfront cost  -0.004*** (0.001) -0.005*** (0.002) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004*** (0.001) -0.004 (0.003) 
expected savings 0.011*** (0.003) 0.007 (0.004) 0.010*** (0.004) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.011*** (0.003) 0.009 (0.007) 
savings variation 0.007 (0.008) 0.018* (0.010) 0.013 (0.009) 0.008 (0.009) 0.007 (0.008) -0.006 (0.015) 
upfront cost financed by ESCO -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.002) -0.000 (0.002) 
upfront cost financed by ESCO x privately owned building    0.001 (0.002)   
savings guarantee  0.403** (0.162) 0.473** (0.197) 0.390** (0.163) 0.365 (0.002) 0.403** (0.161) 0.038 (0.104) 
savings guarantee x privately owned building    0.122 (0.308)   
payment to ESCO  -0.001 (0.011) -0.009 (0.016) 0.003 (0.011) -0.004 (0.011) 0.000 (0.011) -0.005 (0.008) 
contract duration  -0.017 (0.015) -0.013 (0.019) -0.012 (0.016) -0.022 (0.016) -0.016** (0.015) -0.001 (0.011) 
contract duration x privately owned building    0.000 (0.021)   
measure envelope  0.861* (0.442) 0.634 (0.545) 0.823* (0.454) 0.918** (0.464) 0.922 (0.437) 1.510** (0.720) 
measures group technic  0.417** (0.186) 0.371 (0.251) 0.385** (0.190) 0.404** (0.189) 0.407** (0.186) 0.685* (0.400) 
measures group biogas/green elec mix  0.013 (0.393) -0.398 (0.480) 0.035 (0.418) 0.089 (0.417) 0.086 (0.388) 0.493 (0.570) 
measures group heating -0.069 (0.393) -0.273 (0.466) -0.059 (0.412) -0.006 (0.414) -0.007 (0.387) 0.403 (0.561) 
observations 5,940 3,500 5,780 5,860 5,940 2,960 
individuals 297 175 289 293 297 148 
Log-likelihood -1,822 -1,078 -1,744 -1,816 -1,835 -718 
AIC 
BIC 
3,675 
3,775 
2,194 
2,311 
3,545 
3,739 
3,664 
3,771 
3,703 
3,817 
1,467 
1,557 
Notes: conditional logits (clogit) are estimated with Stata. ASC=alternative specific constants with alt. overhaul as baseline. Individual-cluster robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. 
In column (2), individual and building characteristics interacted with ASC taken individually in separate regressions are not significant either. In column (3), the status of respondent is given in non-mutually 
exclusive groups. 
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7.9 Robustness checks: dropping incoherent observations 
Table 2.19: Estimation conditional logit 
dependent variable: choice (=1 if choose 
alternative j) 
 
Basis 
(1) 
Without incoherent 
choices (IIA 
incompatible) 
Without choices made 
in less than 5 seconds 
Without uncertain 
choices 
Without building energy 
efficient, planned to be 
destroyed or protected 
 clogit 
full attend. 
clogit 
stated 
weights 
clogit 
full attend. 
clogit 
stated 
weights 
clogit 
full 
attend. 
clogit 
stated 
weights 
clogit 
full 
attend. 
clogit 
stated 
weights 
clogit 
full 
attend. 
clogit 
stated 
weights 
upfront cost  
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.003 
(0.001) 
-0.000 
(0.002) 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
expected savings 
 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.012*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.005) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.021*** 
(0.004) 
savings variation  
 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.009 
(0.009) 
0.000 
(0.012) 
0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.006 
(0.010) 
0.000 
(0.014) 
0.010 
(0.009) 
0.007 
(0.012) 
upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
0.000 
(0.002) 
0.001 
(0.002) 
-0.002 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
savings guarantee  
 
0.401** 
(0.160) 
0.918*** 
(0.214) 
0.413** 
(0.161) 
0.950*** 
(0.216) 
0.437** 
(0.159) 
0.951*** 
(0.213) 
0.626*** 
(0.204) 
1.241*** 
(0.260) 
0.416** 
(0.161) 
0.900*** 
(0.215) 
payment to ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
-0.018 
(0.011) 
-0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
-0.006 
(0.014) 
-0.013 
(0.012) 
0.002 
(0.011) 
-0.019* 
(0.011) 
contract duration  
 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.038** 
(0.015) 
-0.018 
(0.015) 
-0.039** 
(0.015) 
-0.019 
(0.015) 
-0.038** 
(0.015) 
-0.026 
(0.020) 
-0.038** 
(0.018) 
-0.014 
(0.015) 
-0.035** 
(0.015) 
measure envelope  
 
0.860* 
(0.441) 
0.680*** 
(0.274) 
0.828 
(0.518) 
0.689*** 
(0.294) 
0.852* 
(0.441) 
0.680*** 
(0.275) 
0.563 
(0.492) 
0.633** 
(0.274) 
0.960** 
(0.457) 
0.759*** 
(0.283) 
measures technique 
 
0.409** 
(0.186) 
0.087 
(0.199) 
 
0.427** 
(0.192) 
0.119 
(0.210) 
 
0.397** 
(0.189) 
0.074 
(0.200) 
 
0.330 
(0.244) 
0.000 
(0.248) 
 
0.375** 
(0.191) 
0.067 
(0.200) 
 measures biogas/green electric. mix  
 
0.025 
(0.394) 
0.167 
(0.311) 
-0.040 
(0.468) 
0.130 
(0.340) 
0.019 
(0.394) 
0.166 
(0.311) 
-0.177 
(0.415) 
0.268 
(0.376) 
0.060 
(0.413) 
0.246 
(0.310) 
measures heating 
 
-0.071 
(0.392) 
-0.073 
(0.310) 
-0.146 
(0.467) 
-0.157 
(0.333) 
-0.070 
(0.392) 
-0.062 
(0.310) 
-0.135 
(0.418) 
0.063 
(0.370) 
-0.104 
(0.410) 
-0.005 
(0.317) 
ASC ee 
 
0.409 
(0.415) 
0.638*** 
(0.221) 
0.490 
(0.493) 
0.705*** 
(0.243) 
0.422 
(0.416) 
0.640*** 
(0.221) 
0.508 
(0.443) 
0.480 
(0.258) 
0.698 
(0.435) 
0.929*** 
(0.231) 
ASC epc 
 
-0.243 
(0.520) 
-0.045 
(0.251) 
-0.103 
(0.584) 
-0.067 
(0.268) 
-0.243 
(0.521) 
-0.055 
(0.252) 
-0.357 
(0.611) 
-0.488 
(0.298) 
0.021 
(0.542) 
0.274 
(0.257) 
           
observations 5,940 5,580 5,730 5,380 5,915 5,565  4,065 3,890 5,600 5,260 
individuals 297 279 297 279 297 279    250 238   280   263 
Log-likelihood -1,839 -1,641 -1,753 -1,555 -1,830 -1,636  -1,240 -1,123 -1,614 1,434 
AIC 
BIC 
3,709 
3,792 
3,307 
3,393 
3,532 
3,619 
3,137 
3,223 
3,687 
3,774 
3,298 
3,384 
 2,505 
2,587 
2,273 
2,354 
3,255 
3,342 
2,893 
2,979 
Notes: Conditional logit (clogit) are estimated using stata. Conditional logit stated weights uses an interaction of attributes with dummies of individual-stated attributes importance. These 
dummies equate one when the individual states that she considers this specific attribute as important and zero otherwise.  ASC=alternative specific constants with alt. overhaul as 
baseline. Ee=energy efficiency alternative, epc=EPC alternative. Individual-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. 
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7.10 Robustness checks: controlling for the choice task 
Table 2.20: Estimation conditional logit 
dependent variable: choice  
(=1 if choose alternative j) 
Basis Controlling for choice tasksa 
 Conditional logit 
full attendance 
Conditional logit 
stated weights 
Conditional logit 
full attendance 
Conditional logit 
stated weights 
upfront cost  
 
-0.004*** 
(0.001) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
-0.004*** 
(0.002) 
-0.003** 
(0.001) 
expected savings 
 
0.011*** 
(0.003) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.004) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
savings variation  
 
0.007 
(0.008) 
-0.001 
(0.012) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
-0.002 
(0.012) 
upfront cost financed by ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
-0.001 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
savings guarantee  
 
0.401** 
(0.160) 
0.918*** 
(0.214) 
0.403** 
(0.159) 
0.917*** 
(0.214) 
payment to ESCO  
 
-0.001 
(0.011) 
-0.018* 
(0.011) 
0.003 
(0.012) 
-0.017* 
(0.011) 
contract duration  
 
-0.017 
(0.015) 
-0.038** 
(0.015) 
-0.012 
(0.015) 
-0.037** 
(0.015) 
measure envelope  
 
0.860* 
(0.441) 
0.680*** 
(0.274) 
0.904* 
(0.449) 
0.692*** 
(0.276) 
measures group technique 
 
0.409** 
(0.186) 
0.087 
(0.199) 
 
0.423** 
(0.194) 
0.074 
(0.202) 
 measures group biogas/green 
electricity mix  
 
0.025 
(0.394) 
0.167 
(0.311) 
0.028 
(0.399) 
0.182 
(0.314) 
measures group heating 
 
-0.071 
(0.392) 
-0.073 
(0.310) 
-0.059 
(0.395) 
-0.062 
(0.310) 
ASC ee 
 
0.409 
(0.415) 
0.638*** 
(0.221) 
0.490 
(0.430) 
0.631** 
(0.276) 
ASC epc 
 
-0.243 
(0.520) 
-0.045 
(0.251) 
-0.438 
(0.552) 
-0.209 
(0.286) 
     observations 5,940 5,580 5,940 5,580 
individuals 297 279 297 279 
Log-likelihood -1,839 -1,641 -1,838 -1,640 
AIC 
BIC 
3,709 
3,792 
3,307 
3,393 
3,813 
3,840 
3,317 
3,443 
Notes: aControlling for choice tasks: all choice tasks dummies are added to the models and interacted with the alternative 
specific constants. Choice task dummies and interactions coefficients are not displayed here but available upon request to the 
author. Conditional logits are estimated using stata. Conditional logit stated weights uses an interaction of attributes with 
dummies of individual-stated attributes importance. These dummies equate one when the individual states that she considers 
this specific attribute as important and zero otherwise. Individual-clustered robust standard errors in parentheses.  
ASC=alternative specific constants with alt. overhaul as baseline. Ee=energy efficiency alternative, epc=EPC alternative 
***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. 
  
   
146 
 
 
  
   
147 
 
3 The provision of energy service 
contracting113 
 
Abstract 
The market of energy service contracting is growing slowly in Switzerland and some 
types of contracts are only emerging. This study focuses on the supply of energy 
service contracting. It aims to assess the extent to which changes in the energy 
market and energy policies can affect the firms’ willingness to provide energy service 
contracting. Based on a choice experiment among 208 actual and potential suppliers 
in Switzerland, the willingness to supply certain types of energy service contracts is 
empirically investigated in different hypothetical market and regulatory contexts. The 
results show that an obligation for utilities to increase their clients’ energy efficiency, 
as in a White Certificates scheme, has a positive impact on the provision of energy 
service contracts from competitors and non-utilities. An exogenous and positive 
demand shock positively impacts the willingness to supply only if the shock affects 
both public and private clients. Hypothetical changes in the regulatory context, such 
as a total liberalization of the electricity market or new taxes on fuels and electricity, 
do not show significant impacts on the willingness to enter the market. This chapter 
finally shows that focusing on the supply side brings new insights in the possibility to 
develop the market of energy service contracting. Yet, further research is needed in 
order to fully understand the decision to enter the market of energy service 
contracting. 
Keywords: Energy Service Company, supply, market entry 
                                            
113 Based on Klinke et al. (2017) (chapter IV). This research has benefited from financial support from the Swiss Federal Office 
of Energy and from the Swiss Competence Center for Energy Research SCCER CREST funded by the Commission for 
Technology and Innovation (Grant KTI. 1155000154). 
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1 Introduction 
As we have seen in the introduction, energy service contracting consists in 
outsourcing the design, the structure and sometimes the financing of energy services 
or energy-conservation projects to a contractor called Energy Service Company 
(ESCO). Two main types of energy contracting exist: Energy Supply Contracting 
(ESC) and Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) (Sorrell, 2005). ESC usually 
covers the financing, operation and maintenance of the energy equipment, but the 
contractor exert no or little control over the demand for energy services. EPC differs 
from ESC in that, in the former, the contractor has a financial incentive to reduce 
energy costs. In both type of contracts, the client shares the technological risks with 
the contractor and benefits from economies of scale and incentive from the ESCO to 
maintain performance over contractual time (Sorrell, 2007). In addition to possible 
social benefits resulting from the energy savings and renewable energy systems 
implemented through these contracts (Soroye and Nilsson, 2010; Goldman et al., 
2012; Bleyl, 2011), energy service contracting represents business opportunities 
(Gilligan, 2011; Eikmeier et al., 2009). 
The ESC market is growing slowly in Switzerland and the EPC market is only 
emerging and lagging behind in comparison to the situation in neighboring countries, 
such as Germany, France and Italy (Bertoldi and Boza-Kiss, 2017). In order to explain 
this lag, existing market studies are mostly based on interviews of experts and focus 
on obstacles concerning the demand-side, such as a lack of awareness and trust 
(Marino et al., 2010; Bertoldi et al., 2014). In the existing literature, little emphasis has 
been put on the supply-side. Nevertheless, the number of competitors and their 
experience are also likely to play a major role in the development of the market. 
Indeed, competition between ESCOs has been shown to reduce not only EPC prices, 
but also the payment periods and enhanced the guaranteed energy savings (Iimi, 
2016).  
This study aims to analyze how the supply of energy service contracting can be 
developed in Switzerland by using an analysis among active and potential suppliers. I 
study how hypothetical regulatory contexts affecting the energy market can motivate 
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energy market players to offer certain types of energy service contracts. This chapter 
attempts to provide empirical evidence on the extent to which policy instruments 
affecting the energy market interact with market-based instruments such as EPC and 
ESC. The analysis is based on a survey of 208 energy utilities, gas providers, 
engineering firms, appliances and heating systems suppliers. The willingness to 
provide energy service contracts is estimated based on a choice experiment. In the 
latter, certain types of energy performance contracts (EPC) as well as energy supply 
contracts (ESC) are proposed in different hypothetical regulatory contexts. The choice 
experiment makes it possible to analyze how energy policies interact and may 
expand the supply of energy service contracting. I also examine how the firm’s 
characteristics can affect the decision to enter the market. 
The contribution of this paper lies in the fact that it brings a new perspective on the 
potential of energy service contracting by focusing on the mechanisms that can foster 
the supply-side. An extensive survey on the supply side of the ESCO market, 
covering also the potential entrants, is rare in the literature.114 The analysis of the 
interaction of energy policies with the willingness to provide energy service contracts 
is also a contribution of this study. The discrete choice experiment allows me to 
analyze the impact of hypothetical regulatory changes that may affect the Swiss 
energy market in the coming years. While such experiments have been used in other 
contexts (e.g. Banfi et al., 2008; Rose et al., 2012; Blasch and Farsi, 2014; Caputo et 
al., 2014; Hole et al., 2016) they have, to my knowledge, never been employed in the 
field of energy service contracting. 
A brief literature review focusing on the supply side of the energy service contracting 
market is provided in the next section together with the research question. The 
methodology is presented in section 3, which covers the survey design and the 
econometric method. The data are presented in section 4. Section 5 includes the 
econometric results, together with a series of robustness checks. Finally, section 6 
discusses the results and concludes. 
                                            
114 One exception is Kindström et al. (2017) 
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2 Background 
2.1 The supply of energy service contracting 
An extensive survey on the supply side of energy service contracting, covering also 
the potential entrants, is absent from the literature. The closest attempt to fill this gap 
is made by Kindström et al. (2017), who analyze the driving forces and barriers 
related to the provision of energy service contracting among 78 local energy 
companies in Sweden. While they find evidence of an interest by potential suppliers, 
they also observe several obstacles on the supply side such as the lack of a clearly 
defined strategy for the firm, a lack of interest and trust on the demand side and 
insufficient resource commitment to energy services. The perceived drivers are the 
desire to strengthen the company’s position in the market and a clear strategy from 
the top management, as well as a sound customer demand. More generally, they 
argue that local and regional energy providers can be key actors in the development 
of the market of energy service contracting. While these results provide insights into 
the point of view of potential entrants, the authors do not study how the regulatory 
context and energy policies can affect the decision to enter the market. 
The motivations for Swiss ESCOs to provide energy service contracting may depend 
on their core business. Energy service contracting allows the facility management 
companies to increase their market volume for equipment and maintenance portfolio. 
Energy equipment providers may also sell their products via energy service 
contracting. Other elements may be important for all types of firms. For instance, 
energy service contracting can be a mean to gain captive clients over long term 
contracts. It also permits the firms to stabilize and plan their cash flows on an annual 
basis. Finally it has also been mentioned that offering these services allow the firms 
to keep a competitive advantage. While this may appear contradictory, the previous 
arguments explain why energy providers, such as electricity or gas utilities, may be 
interested in providing EPC, even if it means reducing the energy consumption of 
their clients. Additional explanations may stem from the ownership composition of the 
firm. If a public entity is the major stakeholder, the firms may also be constrained by 
energy efficiency, renewable energy and energy independence objectives. Energy 
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service contracting is also an opportunity for utilities to increase their supervision over 
the energy demand and reduce peak loads. Finally, the willingness to enter the 
market of energy service contracting may also be driven by an increased competition 
resulting from changes in the regulatory context of the energy market.  
2.2 Research questions 
The present chapter assesses whether the regulatory context and energy policies 
affect the willingness of firms to provide energy service contracting. Several policy-
driven exogenous shocks on the energy market can enhance competition and 
therefore are expected to have an impact on the supply of energy service contracting.  
First, the liberalization of the electricity market is expected to increase competition as 
electric suppliers try to maintain their market share. Energy market liberalization has 
been cited as an important driver of growth in the market of energy service 
contracting (Marino et al., 2011, Vine, 2005, Adnot et al., 2002). Second, electricity or 
gas suppliers may also choose to diversify with energy services when reacting to the 
implementation of taxes on fuels and electricity. Then, legal energy savings targets 
for energy suppliers, that arise with a White Certificates scheme for instance 
(Langniss and Praetorius, 2006), are also expected to induce competition from 
utilities and may thus increase the supply of energy service contracting (Oikonomou 
et al., 2008). New entrants may also be attracted by a positive shift in the demand for 
energy efficiency, energy conservation or renewable energy. These demand shocks 
can typically arise after the implementation of energy policies, such as new legal 
requirements of energy efficiency (Popp et al., 2010; Nesta et al., 2014), which 
stimulate the market of EPC and ESC services (Capelo, 2011; Marino et al., 2011). 
Taxes on fuel and electricity may also affect the demand for energy services, if the 
tax burden is supported by the demand side. 
To summarize, this study examines the responses of firms as a reaction to the 
following exogenous policy-driven shocks: 
1. Complete liberalization of the electricity market 
2. Introduction of new taxes on fuels and electricity 
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3. White Certificates: energy utilities have the obligation to increase the energy 
efficiency of their clients 
4. Introduction of a new law allowing energy service contracting to satisfy the 
legal requirement for large private energy consumers 
5. Introduction of a new law requiring energy service contracting to be considered 
when retrofitting public buildings 
All these policy-driven shocks may affect the supply side through competition 
(liberalization and White Certificates), an increase in the demand side (large private 
consumers, and public buildings) or both (taxes on fuels and electricity). 
The fact that these policies are hypothetical constitutes the main shortcoming of the 
methodology in this study. However, these are public policies that have all been 
discussed by the Swiss parliament. Some of them, such as the White Certificates, 
have already been implemented in neighboring countries, such as France, Italy and 
the UK. The electricity market is already partially liberalized for large115 electricity 
consumers since 2009. Thus, the suppliers’ perception of the impact of a second 
planned liberalization phase, targeted at smaller consumers, will likely be grounded 
upon their experience after the first phase. As a result, one can plausibly expect the 
firms which are already active in the energy market to have devoted an in-depth 
pondering on the way they could adapt their business model to these new policies. 
Moreover in the survey, all policy shocks are framed in a way that can be perceived 
as plausible with future Swiss energy policies (cf. 3.1.2.c). Still, in order to account for 
this potential shortcoming, the respondents’ perceived plausibility of the hypothetical 
policies has been assessed and is used as a robustness check in the empirical 
analysis. 
3 Methodology 
3.1 Survey design 
3.1.1 Target group 
The survey is targeted at active and potential suppliers of energy service contracting 
in Switzerland. These include electricity and gas providers at municipal and cantonal 
                                            
115 With a yearly electricity consumption superior to 100,000 kWh. 
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levels, engineering and consulting firms, contractors, facility managers, heating 
systems and energy appliances providers. In total 835 addresses were collected 
through associations (e.g. electricity industry and gas industry) and web-sites. Some 
of the contacts were provided by the swissesco association, of which most active 
Swiss EPC providers are members. The addresses collected include participants 
from three main linguistic regions and the survey has been prepared in both German 
and French.116 
Within each firm, the person contacted depended on the size of the company and 
available public information.117 For public utilities of gas and/or electricity, the person 
of contact was the head of energy services, the department head, the CEO or the 
president of municipalities or energy commissions. The CEO or the department heads 
were primarily targeted for all the other companies. 
3.1.2 Survey structure 
The survey is composed of five main parts, which are described in the appendix. The 
choice experiment is described in the next subsection. 
a) Choice experiment 
All respondents are directed to a choice experiment, in which they have to state 
whether their firm would consider offering a certain type of contract, provided that the 
market situation were to hypothetically change in several possible ways.  
All respondents face four choice tasks with one of the following contracts proposed: 
1. Shared-savings EPC: In this type of contract, the ESCO provides its client with a 
reduction in energy consumption. The ESCO finances the equipment and 
installation. The ESCO is remunerated through an agreed percentage of the 
energy savings achieved during the contractual period. 
2. Guaranteed-savings EPC: In this type of contract, the ESCO provides its client 
with a reduction in energy consumption. The client finances the equipment and 
installation. During the contractual period, the ESCO guarantees that the energy 
                                            
116 Italian speakers are invited to complete the survey in the language of their choice. 
117 For each utility, the web-page was consulted in order to find an organization chart. 
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savings will reach a certain amount, otherwise it reimburses the client. The ESCO 
is remunerated through a fixed fee. 
3. Energy Supply Contracting (ESC): In this type of contracts, the ESCO provides its 
client with energy service supply (heating, cooling, hot water, etc.). The ESCO 
finances the equipment and the installation. The ESCO is remunerated through an 
agreed fixed fee and a variable fee for energy consumption. 
For respondents from firms already offering these contracts, they are asked whether 
their firm would consider offering the contract “more often than currently”. A typical 
choice task is presented in Figure 3.1.  
The two EPC contract’s types are randomly assigned to the first three choice tasks 
while the ESC contract is assigned to the fourth choice task. A constraint on the 
randomness insures to have each EPC type proposed at least once. The five policy 
shocks described above are presented to the respondents in the box of figure 3.1 and 
correspond to the levels in Table 3.1. One can note that the choice experiment 
presented to the respondents (figure 3.1) combines several attributes per row (cf. 
Table 3.1), in order to simplify the visualization for respondents. For instance, the row 
corresponding to the “demand” combines the attributes private market demand and 
public market demand. It could show an increase in private demand, an increase in 
public demand, both or none of them. A similar framing has been applied to the 
“political context”, including liberalization and/or taxes or no changes. Nevertheless, 
all attributes are considered independently as in Table 3.1 for the choice experiment 
design. The latter has been defined using the Ngene software and determined by a 
full factorial design of 32 rows, and by using an orthogonal design to combine the 
rows in 8 blocks of 4 choice tasks.118 Full factorial is preferred in this context to a D-
efficient design, because the number of attributes and levels is limited and no priors 
exist on the impact of these on the willingness to offer energy service contracting. 
 
 
 
                                            
118 The design was modified to avoid the case with no changes, i.e. all attributes are associated with the first level. 
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Energy performance contract (EPC) with guaranteed savings: 
In the EPC with guaranteed savings, you provide the client with a reduction in her energy consumption. 
The client finances the equipment. During the contractual period, the client pays a fixed fee. You 
guarantee to the client that the energy savings will reach a certain amount, otherwise you will pay the 
difference. 
 
In the following hypothetical context, will you firm consider supplying this type of contract 
[script]? 
 
You can place your mouse on the elements with a dashed underline to get additional information.  
The demand from large private energy consumers increases: EPC now 
satisfies to the universal convention of objectives (AeNec/ACT) 
The Supply Increases after the legal obligation for energy utilities to increase 
the energy efficiency of their clients 
Political context The liberalization of the electricity market for small customers will 
be implemented in the next months 
 □ 
yes 
□ 
rather yes 
□ 
rather no 
□ 
no 
Choice task 1/4 
Notes: additional information is provided with pop-up for elements with a dashed-underline. “script” is replaced by a blank for 
respondents who state not to offering this contract, and by “more often than currently” for the one already offering it. The market 
demand can include changes on private or public demands, on both or stay as current. The supply can increase after a legal 
obligation as presented in the figure or stay as current. The regulatory context can include a complete liberalization or energy tax 
levies, both of them or a status quo with respect to the current situation. 
Figure 3.1 Example of choice task 
 
Table 3.1: Attributes and levels in the choice experiment design 
Attributes Levels 
Market demand (private) 
1. same as current 
2. demand from large energy consumers of the private sector 
increases: EPC (or ESC)a is now sufficient to meet the 
universal convention of objectives 
Market demand (public) 
1. same as current 
2. demand from all public building increases: public entities are 
obliged to systematically consider EPC (or ESC) as a 
possible solution to energy efficiency projects 
Market supply from utilities 
(White Certificates) 
1. same as current 
2. EPC (or ESC)a supply increases because the government 
obliges the utilities to implement energy efficiency measures 
in their clients’ buildings 
Regulatory context (liberalization) 
1. same as current 
2. liberalization of electricity market for small energy 
consumers will be implemented  
Regulatory context (taxes on 
fuels and electricity) 
1. same as current 
2. new constitutional article (131.a) has been accepted and will 
be implemented in the next months: subsidy schemes will 
be stopped and replaced with electricity and fuel taxes. 
aThe mention of EPC (or ESC) corresponds to the contract proposed. 
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All policy shocks are framed in a way that they can be perceived as plausible with 
future Swiss energy policies. For instance, the electricity market liberalization is 
presented as the second phase of a complete liberalization, which is expected to 
occur in the coming years. Taxes on fuels and electricity are presented as the project 
of a new constitutional article (131a, Swiss Federal Council, 2015; Arrêté federal, 
2015). This article constitutes the second step of the 2050 energy strategy and aims 
at regulating the transformation of a subsidies scheme to a system of tax levies on 
fuels and electricity.119 The consequent modification of incentives provided by such a 
tax levy scheme is likely to have an important impact on both the demand and the 
supply sides of the energy market. This will force the suppliers to find innovative 
products and services to respond to the clients’ needs. Assessing the perceived 
impact from the suppliers’ point of view is relevant for policy-makers, even though the 
implementation of this project of constitutional article is still uncertain.120 
The White Certificates scheme is simplified and presented as an obligation for utilities 
to increase the energy efficiency of their clients. Private demand for EPC (resp. ESC) 
is presented as increasing because of EPC (resp. ESC) being sufficient to meet the 
universal convention of objectives, which is one of the possibilities for large energy 
consumers to meet legal requirements on energy efficiency.121 Finally, the public 
demand for EPC (resp. ESC) is shifted because of an obligation of public entities to 
consider EPC (resp. ESC) as a solution to energy efficiency projects. The 
hypothetical changes on market demand and supply are presented in order to be 
perceived by the respondents as exogenous shocks on which their firm have no 
influence. 
 
 
                                            
119 This constitutional article project also aims at incorporating the current CO2 tax and the supplement to electricity network into 
these fuels and electricity tax levies. 
120 It is important to note that both the finance commission (CdF-N, 2017) and the environmental commission (CEATE-N, 2017) 
of the national council have recently decided not to proceed on this project. The arguments evoked were the insufficiency of the 
instruments proposed, their lack of diversity and little predicted impact, given the current energy market. The negative impact of 
such a taxation scheme on the competitiveness of the Swiss firms has also been invoked. The commission however did not deny 
the need of an incentive scheme and will work on another project. The parliament will also take a decision on the CO2 taxation 
reform by the end of the year. The final constitutional article project will be submitted to the Swiss population and cantons . Most 
of the respondents answered the survey before the deliberations at the finance and environmental commissions.  
121 Yearly electricity consumption above 0.5 GWh and/or yearly heat demand above 5 GWh. 
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Follow-up questions 
Follow-up questions after the choice tasks were aimed at complementing the 
qualitative analysis on the EPC business model.122 Depending on the answer to the 
choice task, firms affirmatively considering offering this type of contract are asked 
about the activities they would implement in order to do so. Respondents not 
considering offering this type of contract are asked to state whether they would 
change their mind if one or several of the market's components (demand, supply, 
regulatory context) would change. 
The survey then assesses the perceived credibility of each hypothetical changes 
proposed in the choice experiment by using a 4 point Likert scale (very plausible to 
not plausible at all). 
3.2 Econometric framework 
In the choice experiment tasks, the respondents are asked to state whether their firm 
would consider offering a certain type of contract. The answer is a 4 points Likert 
scale: 
0. No 
1. Rather no 
2. Rather yes 
3. Yes 
In order to account for the ordinal characteristics of the outcome, as well as to capture 
all the information provided by the Likert scale, the appropriate model is the ordered 
logit or probit model, also known as the proportional odds model (Long and Freese, 
2014). Because each respondent i faces 4 choice tasks j, I treat the data as a panel 
and estimate a random-effects ordered logit model. In this model, a latent continuous 
response yij
∗  is expected to have the following impact on the observed outcome yij: 
yij =
{
 
 
 
 
0   if             yij
∗ ≤ κ1
1   if   κ1 < yij
∗ ≤ κ2
2   if   κ2 < yij
∗ ≤ κ3
3   if             κ3 < yij
∗
                                                                                                                                (1) 
                                            
122 See Klinke et al. (2017) for further details. 
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in which κi are the cut-off points and the latent variable is defined by: 
𝑦𝑖𝑗
∗ = 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗𝜆 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗𝛿 + 𝑧𝑖𝛾 + 𝑣𝑖 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗                                                                                      (2) 
𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑥𝑡𝑖𝑗 is a vector of dummies describing the hypothetical context in choice task j. 
The vector 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑗  includes two dummies for the following types of contracts: EPC 
shared-savings, EPC guaranteed-savings. The contract dummy ESC is omitted and 
therefore considered as the benchmark. The vector 𝑧𝑖 includes the firm's 
characteristics, such as the type of services already offered by the firm and the 
familiarity with the EPC concept. The impact of other firm characteristics, detailed in 
the next section, on the willingness to consider offering EPC or ESC is also tested. 
The random effects 𝑣𝑖 are assumed to be normally, independently and identically 
distributed with mean zero and variance σv2, and the errors 𝜖𝑖𝑗  are assumed to follow 
a logistic distribution and are independent from 𝑣𝑖. 
The probability of observing outcome 𝑘 for response 𝑦𝑖𝑗  is given by: 
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑗 = 𝑘|𝜅, 𝑥𝑖𝑗 , 𝑣𝑖) =
1
1 + exp (−𝜅𝑘 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
−
1
1 + exp (−𝜅𝑘−1 + 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 + 𝑣𝑖)
                       (3) 
in which 𝑥𝑖𝑗𝛽 represents the product of the coefficients’ vector to be estimated with 
the explanatory variables described in equation (2). This probability is used to 
compute the conditional distribution and the likelihood function, which relies on an 
integral that must be approximated. I opted for the mean-variance adaptive Gauss-
Hermite quadrature to approximate the integrated function. 
4 Data 
4.1 Collection process and response rate 
A total of 827 firms were contacted. 41 firms were randomly chosen to participate in a 
pilot survey, while the main survey was targeted at 786 respondents. The data 
collection lasted two months, from December 1st, 2016 to January 31st, 2017. 
280 respondents, (34%) out of the 827 participants invited, accessed the online 
survey. The analysis is based on the 208 respondents who completed the choice 
experiment, representing 25% of the invited participants. The average response rate 
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is similar across the different types of firms surveyed, i.e. electric utilities (26%), gas 
providers (23%) and others (22%). 
4.2 Characteristics of the firms in the sample 
Goods and services offered by the firms, as stated by the respondents, are described 
in table 3.2 and mainly include electricity and gas. Other services offered by the firms 
are street lighting, regional energy planning, consulting on energy services, water 
supply, digital network or telecommunication services. 45% of the firms in the sample 
also stated to provide services related to energy efficiency other than EPC, e.g. 
energy consulting, programs of incentives to increase energy efficiency of the clients, 
energy optimization and planning, consulting for large energy consumers, smart 
metering, building automation, audits or cantonal energy certificate for buildings 
(CECB+). The sample includes representatives of all significant sectors in the energy 
market. 
Table 3.2: Stated goods and services provided by the firm 
Goods and services provided 
Not 
providing 
Providing 
Share 
providing 
N 
Electricity 
46 162 0.78 208 
Gas 
168 40 0.19 208 
Heating systems 
188 20 0.10 208 
Electric appliances 
198 10 0.05 208 
Energy control and optimization 184 24 0.12 208 
Facility management 199 9 0.04 208 
Technical maintenance 172 36 0.17 208 
Energy supply contracting (ESC) 177 31 0.15 208 
Energy performance contracting (EPC) 199 9 0.04 208 
Engineering consulting 152 56 0.27 208 
Other energy efficiency services 114 94 0.45 208 
Other services 
185 23 0.11 208 
Other activities 
167 41 0.20 208 
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While 31 firms are active on the ESC market, 9 (4%) out of the 208 firms in the 
sample are already active in the EPC market, confirming that the market is only at its 
infancy in Switzerland. EPC is never stated as the main activity within the active firms. 
These are instead primarily electricity providers (for 4 EPC providers), ESC providers 
(2 EPC providers), while some are gas provider, supplier of energy control and 
optimization and technical maintenance supplier. Out of the nine EPC providers, five 
firms are privately held with a major public shareholder, one is a public firm and three 
are private. Three ESCOs controlled by a public entity stated that the latter is exerting 
pressure to decrease their clients’ energy consumption. These numbers can be 
compared with those for the non-EPC providers in Table 3.3. Note that only a minority 
of publicly controlled firms (28 %) are receiving pressure from the public owner to 
reduce energy consumption or increase energy efficiency of their clients. 
 
Table 3.3: Private vs. public firms 
EPC provider public Private with public 
major stakeholder 
private total 
No 107 (54%) 36 (18%) 56 (28%) 199 (100%) 
Yes 1 (11%) 5 (56%) 3 (33%) 9 (100%) 
Total 108 (52%) 41 (20%) 59 (28%) 208 (100%) 
 
149 (72%)   
 
Pressure from the controlling public 
institution to increase energy efficiency of 
the clients  
(missing answers: 11) 
  
 
No Yes   
No 96 (73%) 36 (27%)  132 (100%) 
Yes 3 (50%) 3 (50%)  6 (100%) 
Total 99 (72%) 39 (28%)  138 (100%) 
 
A majority of firms (68 %) in the sample supply clients in only one canton. This 
probably stems from the companies not having yet taken advantage of the market 
liberalization which allows to target new clients beyond the cantonal border. 23 firms 
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(11 %) have clients in many cantons and 24 firms (12 %) cover the whole Swiss 
territory. A remaining 5 % are also active abroad. 
Figure 3.2 compares the firms’ size, in terms of employees, of EPC and ESC 
providers and in the whole sample. As compared to the whole sample, firms active in 
the EPC and ESC market are instead mostly medium to large size enterprises. This 
suggests that being present in these markets necessitates a sufficient size in terms of 
personnel capacity. The econometric analysis in the next section will test empirically 
whether larger firms are more likely to provide ESC and EPC.  
While the sample appears to be representative in terms of sectors, there is currently 
no exhaustive statistics on the suppliers’ composition of the energy market. Hence, it 
cannot be assessed whether the study sample is also representative in terms of size. 
The sample, with 92 % of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) with less than 250 
employees, is however close to the population of firms in the Swiss market, where 
99% of the firms are SMEs (OFS, 2017) 
 
Figure 3.2  Number of employees 
4.3 Descriptive statistics of the choice experiment variables 
The choice experiment aims at analyzing how firms react to diverse shocks on the 
energy market. The willingness to consider offering EPC or ESC in each of the four 
choice tasks is presented in Table 3.4.  
The share of respondents rejecting the contracts proposed (stating “no” or rather “no”) 
represent a large majority (varying from 68-75% across choice tasks). ESC is 
57%
9%
11%
8%
7%
4% 4%
Sample (n=208)
1-9 employees
10-19 employees
20-49 employees
50-99 employees
100-249 employees
250-999 employees
>1000 employees
10%
3%
13%
16%
26%
19%
13%
ESC providers 
(n=31)
22% 0%
0%
11%
34%
33%
0%
EPC providers 
(n=9)
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however less often rejected than EPC. The results are consistent with the 140 (67 %) 
respondents stating to be (rather) not interested in providing EPC in the future as 
described in section 4.4. The choices do not vary much across choice tasks. Finally, 
the respondents do not consistently prefer EPC shared-savings over guaranteed-
savings. This suggests that the choice between both schemes is more likely to be 
driven by the client’s choice, or the context, than by the firm’s preference.  
 
Table 3.4: Consideration to offer contracts 
 EPC shared-
savings 
EPC 
guaranteed-
savings 
ESC All types of 
contracts 
Choice task 1     
No 33 (29%) 45 (49%) N/A 78 (38%) 
Rather no 49 (44%) 27 (29%) N/A 76 (37%) 
Rather yes 24 (21%) 14 (15%) N/A 38 (19%) 
yes 6 (5%) 6 (7%) N/A 12 (6%) 
Total 112 (100%) 92 (100%) N/A 204 (100%) 
Choice task 2     
No 36 (35%) 40 (41%) N/A 76 (38%) 
Rather no 31 (30%) 36 (37%) N/A 67 (34%) 
Rather yes 29 (28%) 15 (15%) N/A 44 (22%) 
yes 6 (6%) 7 (7%) N/A 13 (7%) 
Total 102 (100%) 98 (100%) N/A 200 (100%) 
Choice task 3     
No 37 (38%) 32 (31%) 1 (50%) 70 (35%) 
Rather no 34 (35%) 35 (34%) 0 69 (34%) 
Rather yes 21 (22%) 27 (26%) 1 (50%) 49 (24%) 
yes 5 (5%) 9 (9%) 0 14 (7%) 
Total 97 (100%) 103 (100%) 2 (100%) 202 (100%) 
Choice task 4     
No 0 N/A 82 (40%) 82 (40%) 
Rather no 1 (50%) N/A 57 (28%) 58 (28%) 
Rather yes 1 (50%) N/A 39 (19%) 40 (20%) 
yes 0 N/A 25 (12%) 25 (12%) 
Total 2 (100%) N/A 203 (100%) 205 (100%) 
Notes: In the main survey, the first 3 choice tasks are randomly assigned to EPC contracts (shared- or guaranteed savings) and 
the 4th choice task is assigned to ESC. The few ESC in choice task 3 (resp. EPC in choice task 4) are gathered in the pilot 
survey. The total number of respondents is smaller than 208 due to missing values in the contract variable. This is due to the fact 
that some respondents began to respond to the survey in the pilot and finished in the main survey. When this occurred, a 
technical problem resulted in missing values for the randomized contracts seen in the choice experiment, therefore excluding 
these choice tasks from the estimation. Also, in the pilot survey, some respondents are also proposed Integrated Energy 
Contracts (IEC), which is no longer the case in the main survey. These choice tasks were dropped from the main estimations. 
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The descriptive statistics of the hypothetical contexts and types of contracts proposed 
in the choice experiment data are presented in Table 3.5. The share represents the 
frequency at which each hypothetical context or contract’s type was proposed to the 
respondents. In the regression, I include a two-way interaction term between private 
and public demand increase, so that the explanatory variables include three 
dummies: 
1. Only public demand increases (private demand remains unchanged) 
2. Only private demand increases (public demand remains unchanged) 
3. Both public and private demand increase (public x private demand increase) 
The empirical analysis based on the choice experiment will also control if the contract 
proposed in the choice experiment is already offered by the firm. This is the case in 
7.2% of the choice tasks. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics of attributes in the choice tasks  
Attributes (dummies) share N 
Hypothetical context 
 public demand increases 0.507 811 
 private demand increase 0.485 811 
 public increases (private unchanged) 0.238 811 
 private increases (public unchanged) 0.260 811 
 public x private demand increase 0.247 811 
 supply increase 0.502 811 
 liberalization 0.544 811 
 new taxation system (constitutional article)  0.520 811 
Contracts proposed 
 EPC shared-savings 0.386 811 
 EPC guaranteed-savings 0.361 811 
 ESC 0.253 811 
 Contract already being offered 0.072 811 
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4.4 EPC supply in Switzerland 
The market size of EPC is quite limited in Switzerland (see Klinke et al., 2017 for 
estimated number of actors and contracts signed). A majority of ESCOs have started 
providing EPC since 2012. This is in line with the recent emergence of the EPC 
market in Switzerland. 
Out of the 199 firms which are inactive on the EPC market, 59 firms may be 
interested to provide EPC in the future. The main reason invoked by the 140 firms 
unwilling to enter the market is a lack of internal competencies and personnel 
capacity (58% of the firms). This result relates to the fact that many respondents 
represent small firms.123 If these firms were convinced of the market potential for 
EPC, one solution for them to provide EPC would be to group their competencies or 
to opt for partial outsourcing.  
Other respondents mention a lack of interest from clients (26%), a poor economic 
viability (25%) or a lack of energy savings (21%). This must however be contrasted by 
the fact that only five (4%) of the 140 firms not interested in EPC stated to have 
conducted a market analysis to confirm these conjectures. Lack of financing is also 
cited as a barrier for 23% of firms unwilling to enter the market, and risk is stated as 
too high for 9% of them. Finally, a minority of respondents cited inadequacy with the 
core business (10%), an objection from the company's management (6%) or no 
interest from the firm (2%). The latter barriers are structural and are therefore more 
difficult to overcome. The fact that they represent only a small minority of firms is 
however encouraging for the development of the EPC supply. 
124 (62%) were not familiar with the EPC concept before answering the survey. This 
indicates that information campaigns on EPC could also be beneficial on the supply 
side. Table 3.6 shows a positive correlation between familiarity with the EPC concept 
and the stated consideration to provide such contracts in the future. While 44% of the 
firms familiar with EPC state to be potentially interested in providing EPC (Maybe and 
Yes), only 20.9% of the firms not familiar with the concept are interested in providing 
EPC. The relationship between the familiarity with the EPC concept and the 
                                            
123 Indeed, 72 of the 81 respondents claiming a lack of internal competencies are part of firms with less 
than 50 employees. 
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willingness to offer EPC in the future will be further explored empirically in the next 
sections.124 The stated consideration to provide EPC in the future is also used to 
check the robustness of the results based on the choice experiment, and especially to 
examine how the firms’ characteristics affects the interest in providing EPC.125 
 
Table 3.6: Familiarity and consideration to provide EPC in the future 
 Familiar with the EPC concept  
Considering to provide EPC in the future no yes Total 
No 64 (51.6%) 17 (22.7%) 81 (40.7%) 
Rather no 34 (27.4%) 25 (33.3%) 59 (29.6%) 
Maybe 23 (18.5%) 24 (32.0%) 47 (23.6%) 
Yes 3 (2.4%) 9 (12.0%) 12 (6.0%) 
Total 124 (100%) 75 (100%) 199 (100%) 
 
  
                                            
124 In order to include both active ESCOs and potential entrants, the variable familiar with EPC will take the value 1 for active 
ESCOs. 
125 In order to include both active ESCOs and potential entrants, the variable consideration to provide EPC will take the value 3 
(=yes) for active ESCOs. 
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4.5 Plausibility of the hypothetical situations presented in the choice 
experiment 
The respondents state their perceived credibility of the regulatory contexts presented 
in the choice experiment (Table 3.7). 
 
Table 3.7: Plausibility of the hypothetical situations 
 Not 
plausible 
Hardly 
plausible 
plausible Very 
plausible 
Don’t 
know 
Total 
Increased public demand: publicly-owned buildings have to consider EPC/ESC 
 20 
(10%) 
49 
(24%) 
100 
(49%) 
16 
(8%) 
20 
(10%) 
205 
(100%) 
Increased private demand: EPC/ESC satisfies the universal convention of objectives 
 9 
(4%) 
48 
(23%) 
110 
(54%) 
18 
(9%) 
20 
(10%) 
205 
(100%) 
Increased supply: utilities forced to increase their clients’ energy efficiency 
 33 
(16%) 
65 
(32%) 
68 
(33%) 
14 
(7%) 
25 
(12%) 
205 
(100%) 
Liberalization of the electricity market extended to small consumers 
 36 
(18%) 
70 
(34%) 
53 
(26%) 
16 
(8%) 
30 
(15%) 
205 
(100%) 
Subsidies will be replaced by fuel and electricity tax levies 
 28 
(14%) 
57 
(28%) 
75 
(37%) 
13 
(6%) 
32 
(16%) 
205 
(100%) 
 
The hypothetical situation perceived as the most plausible is an increase in the 
private demand for EPC and ESC due to a certification of EPC and ESC as satisfying 
the universal convention of objectives. The second most plausible situation is an 
increased of the public demand due to a federal obligation for collectivities to always 
consider EPC and ESC when retrofitting or investing in energy efficiency. The project 
of a constitutional article replacing subsidies with fuel and electricity tax levies is then 
considered plausible or very plausible by 43 % of the respondents. This legislation is 
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also the one implying the highest share of uncertainty (16 % of “don’t know”). The 
obligation for utilities to increase their clients’ energy efficiency, as in the White 
Certifications scheme, is considered plausible or very plausible by 40 % of the 
respondents. White Certificates scheme had already been rejected by the Swiss 
parliament at the time of the survey. The complete liberalization of the electricity 
market is considered as being the least plausible situation, with 52% of the 
respondents perceiving it as hardly plausible or not plausible. Regulatory contexts 
(liberalization and constitutional article) are the one associated with the least certainty 
according to the respondents (15 and 16% of “don’t know”). Using this information, I 
test whether these hypothetical situations have different impacts when considered as 
plausible by the respondents. 
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5 Estimation results 
The results of the random effects ordered logit, based on the choice experiment data, 
are presented in Table 3.8.126 Column (1) first shows the results when the dependent 
variable is the willingness to offer ESC or EPC. Column (2) focuses only on the 
choice to provide EPC, i.e. ignoring choice tasks with ESC. The last column adds 
another covariate, namely the fact that the public entity in charge of the firm exerts 
pressure for it to increase its clients' energy efficiency. 127 
A complete liberalization of the electricity market has no significant impact on the 
consideration to offer ESC or EPC. This may be explained by the fact that energy 
service contracting is targeted at larger consumers that are already part of the 
liberalized segment of the market. Therefore, energy service contracting may not be a 
response to the potentially increased competition for the market segment of small 
electricity consumers. Replacing subsidies by tax levies on fuels and electricity has 
no significant effect either. It may result from the difficulty for suppliers to foresee its 
concrete impacts on the market. Since this policy is only likely to be implemented in 
the second phase of the energy strategy 2050, if at all, respondents may not have 
evaluated its potential consequences when filling the survey. 
An exogenous supply increase from utilities due to a White Certificates scheme 
affects positively the probability of offering EPC or ESC. Implementing such a policy 
on the supply side does not only affect utilities, but all the actors in the energy market. 
Indeed, an interaction term between a dummy variable equating one if the firm is a 
utility and the White Certificates dummy variable is not significant. Ceteris paribus, the 
odds of willing to offer energy service contracting128 are around 1.5 greater if energy 
utilities increase their supply after an obligation to increase the energy efficiency of 
their clients. 
                                            
126 Column (1) does not necessarily include 4 choice tasks by respondent and column (2) does not necessarily include 3 choice 
tasks per respondent. This is due to the fact that some respondents began to respond to the survey in the first pilot and fin ished 
in the main survey. When this occurred, a technical problem resulted in missing values for the randomized contracts s een in the 
choice experiment, therefore excluding these choice tasks from the estimation. Also, in the pilot survey, some respondents are 
proposed Integrated Energy Contracts (IEC), while this is no longer the case in the main survey. We therefore dropped these 
choice tasks from the main estimations. 
127 Controlling for public pressure also results in a decrease of the number of observations. This is why it is presented in a 
separated column 
128Odds of answering yes vs. combined rather yes, rather no and no categories. 
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Table 3.8: Determinants of ESC and EPC supply 
Dependent variable: consider offering contract j 
(4pts Likert scale) Random effects ordered logit 
 ESC and EPC proposed 
 
 
Only EPC proposed 
 
Only EPC proposed 
 
Attributes (1) (2) (3) 
 coefficients odds ratio coefficients odds ratio coefficients odds ratio 
Public demand increases (private 
unchanged) 
-0.000 
(0.258) 
1.000 
(0.258) 
0.039 
(0.335) 
1.04 
(0.349) 
0.177 
(0.330) 
1.193  
(0.394) 
Private demand increases (public 
unchanged) 
-0.059 
(0.268) 
0.943 
(0.252) 
-0.132 
(0.371) 
0.877 
(0.325) 
-0.186 
(0.384) 
0.830 
(0.319) 
Public x private demands increase 
0.391* 
(0.210) 
1.479* 
(0.310) 
0.453* 
(0.257) 
1.573* 
(0.404) 
0.491* 
(0.270) 
1.634* 
(0.441) 
Supply increase from utilities 
(White certificates) 
0.394** 
(0.161) 
1.482** 
(0.238) 
0.530** 
(0.220) 
1.699** 
(0.374) 
0.462** 
(0.229) 
1.587** 
(0.363) 
Liberalization 
-0.228 
(0.200) 
0.796 
(0.159) 
-0.258 
(0.260) 
0.773 
(0.202) 
-0.253 
(0.278) 
0.776 
(0.216) 
 
Taxation system 
-0.077 
(0.177) 
0.926 
(0.164) 
-0.071 
(0.217) 
0.931 
(0.202) 
-0.076 
(0.231) 
0.927 
(0.214) 
Contract proposed 
=shared-savings 
-0.110 
(0.238) 
0.895 
(0.213) 
 
0.056 
(0.211) 
1.057 
(0.223) 
0.087 
(0.224) 
1.091 
(0.245) 
Contract proposed 
=guaranteed-savings 
-0.112 
(0.280) 
0.894 
(0.250) 
 
. 
 
. 
 
. . 
Contract proposed x contract 
already offered 
2.189** 
(1.096) 
8.928** 
(9.782) 
 
. . . . 
Firm’s characteristics about current activities 
Familiar with EPC 
1.270** 
(0.639) 
3.562** 
(2.276) 
 
1.232* 
(0.678) 
3.429* 
(2.326) 
1.353** 
(0.684) 
3.869** 
(2.647) 
EPC provider 
-1.663 
(1.736) 
0.190 
(0.329) 
 
0.831 
(1.480) 
2.296 
(3.398) 
0.662 
(1.525) 
1.939 
(2.958) 
ESC provider 
0.741 
(0.905) 
2.098 
(1.899) 
 
0.640 
(0.957) 
1.897 
(1.815) 
0.561 
(1.027) 
1.753 
(1.800) 
Electricity provider 
0.321 
(0.690) 
1.378 
(0.952) 
 
-0.130 
(0.714) 
0.878 
(0.627) 
-0.527 
(0.748) 
0.590 
(0.442) 
Gas provider 
1.576** 
(0.781) 
4.835** 
(3.774) 
 
1.428* 
(0.797) 
4.169* 
(3.323) 
1.418* 
(0.770) 
4.130* 
(3.181) 
Heating systems provider 
2.088** 
(1.033) 
8.065** 
(8.330) 
 
2.245** 
(1.104) 
9.438** 
(10.421) 
2.524** 
(1.110) 
12.475** 
(13.847) 
Appliances provider 
-1.124 
(1.192) 
0.325 
(0.387) 
 
-0.844 
(1.330) 
0.430 
(0.572) 
-0.450 
(1.323) 
0.638 
(0.844) 
Energy control optimization 
provider  
1.250 
(0.873) 
3.492 
(3.048) 
 
2.141** 
(0.886) 
8.504** 
(7.534) 
2.514*** 
(0.875) 
12.349*** 
(10.809) 
Facility management provider 
1.070 
(1.125) 
2.916 
(3.279) 
 
0.795 
(1.172) 
2.215 
(2.595) 
0.894 
(1.269) 
2.445 
(3.103) 
Technical maintenance provider 
-0.085 
(0.892) 
0.918 
(0.818) 
 
-0.112 
(0.938) 
0.894 
(0.839) 
-0.718 
(0.922) 
0.488 
(0.450) 
Engineering consulting 
-0.368 
(0.765) 
0.692 
(0.530) 
 
-0.629 
(0.816) 
0.533 
(0.435) 
-0.988 
(0.820) 
0.372 
(0.305) 
Other energy efficiency services 
provider 
1.142* 
(0.638) 
3.131* 
(1.998) 
 
1.268* 
(0.668) 
3.554* 
(2.375) 
0.660 
(0.672) 
1.935 
(1.301) 
Public direction pressure to 
improve clients’ energy efficiency 
    
1.753** 
(0.808) 
5.773** 
(4.665) 
Cut-off point 1 0.834 (0.865) 0.395 (0.944) 0.057 (0.986) 
Cut-off point 2 4.592 (0.939) 4.609 (1.054) 4.298 (1.077) 
Cut-off point 3 8.036 (1.047) 8.598 (1.232) 8.366 (1.234) 
Observations 811 591 769 
Individuals 208 200 197 
Log pseudo likelihood -713.295 -541.534 -676.678 
AIC 
 
1,476.591 1,129.067 1,405.356 
BIC 1,594.048 1,230.43 1,526.129 
Notes: 4-points Likert scale of the dependent variable are: 0 “no”, 1 “rather no”, 2 “rather yes”, 3 “yes”. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Baseline contract is ESC in column (1) and EPC guaranteed-savings in column (2). contract x already offered means 
the firm is already proposing this type of contract (equivalent to EPC provider for columns 2 and 3). The question was in this case: “Would you 
consider offering this contract more often than currently given this hypothetical situation?”. All estimations are performed with 36 integration points: 
The quality of the quadrature approximation of the integrated likelihood function was examined by changing the number of integration points. 
Because the default of 12 integration points was not sufficiently accurate (the relative differences in the estimates with 8 or 16 integration points 
were larger than 1% for some estimates), I increased the number to 36 points, which resulted in more robust estimates. 
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A hypothetical exogenous increase in demand covering both the public and private 
sectors has a significant positive impact on the willingness of potential providers to 
consider ESC or EPC. The impact is slightly lower than that associated with White 
certificates, but the odds ratio is still around 1.5. However, an increase of only one of 
these sectors (private or public) is not sufficient to have an impact. This result may 
suggest that entering the energy service contracting market represents an important 
up-front investment. 
Column (1) also shows that there is no preference for EPC schemes (guaranteed or 
shared-savings) over ESC. Similarly, shared-savings is not preferred to guaranteed-
savings, as can be seen in column (2). This suggests that the potentially active 
ESCOs are quite flexible regarding financing and contracting schemes. In general, 
the hypothetical shocks have similar impacts on the supply of both ESC and EPC, 
which may suggest that these two markets are related. 
A dummy variable contract x already offered captures the fact that some firms were 
already offering the type of contract proposed. In this case, the respondent is asked 
whether her firm would consider offering the contract more often than is currently the 
case, given the hypothetical situation. In column (1), where both ESC and EPC 
contracts are proposed, the coefficient on this variable is significant and positive, 
suggesting that active firms would be willing to offer the contracts more often than 
they currently do. However, when considering only EPC contracts, the active ESCOs 
(captured in the variable EPC provider) do not consider offering the contracts more 
often than the suppliers inactive in EPC. This suggests that regardless of the 
hypothetical situation, current ESCOs may not be able to offer EPC more often. 
The results show a positive relationship between the respondent’s familiarity with the 
EPC concept and the consideration to offer these contracts (as well as ESC). The 
odds are around 3.5 greater when the respondent is familiar. Although this variable 
may suffer from endogeneity due to reverse causality, it may suggest that information 
campaigns may be needed on the supply side of the EPC market. 
A series of dummies for the activities already offered by the firm were used as control, 
resulting in the following findings: Gas suppliers, and to a larger extent heating 
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system providers, are more inclined to offer both ESC and EPC. Firms offering 
energy control and optimization appliances are also more likely to consider offering 
EPC (columns 2 and 3). 
Several other firms’ characteristics have been tested but did not show any significant 
impact. This is the case for the location of the firm’s clients (one or several cantons, 
whole of Switzerland and/or abroad). The number of employees (as a proxy for the 
firm’s size) has no significant influence either. This contrasts with the descriptive 
statistics showing that early active ESCOs are rather large firms, which thus confirms 
the necessity to have sufficient personnel capacities in order to be an early entrant in 
a market such as the EPC market. Being a private or a public firm does not impact 
the consideration of providing EPC or ESC either. However, if the respondent stated 
that the public entity in charge of the organization exerts pressure to increase the 
energy efficiency of its clients, then the firm is more likely to consider providing EPC 
or ESC, as shown in column (3). This result suggests that a solution to foster EPC 
supply would be to inform the public entities in charge of these companies. 
5.1 Robustness checks 
One of the limitations of this study relies on the choices and regulatory contexts being 
hypothetical. I control for the plausibility of the hypothetical situations presented as 
perceived by the respondents (cf. appendix 7.3). The situations attributes are 
interacted with dummies equating 1 if the respondent perceived the situation as being 
plausible or rather plausible. While some coefficients gained in magnitudes and/or in 
significance, controlling for the perceived plausibility of the policy-driven shocks does 
not affect the overall results described above.  
Another shortcoming of this study lies in the fact that the mix of incumbent and non-
active suppliers results in a dependent variable which has a different meaning for 
these two groups. Indeed, for respondents who are already offering these types of 
contracts, they were asked whether they would be willing to offer these more 
frequently given the particular context proposed. On the other hand, inactive firms 
were asked whether they would consider offering these contracts in the stated 
situation. In order to account for the difference in the outcome variable, I run two 
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separated regressions depending on the outcome variable. The results are presented 
in appendix 7.5. For firms inactive in the energy service contracting market, the 
results are confirmed, i.e. only the White Certificates and a combined increase in the 
public and private demands have an impact on the supply. However for firms already 
on the ESCO market, the results change: no energy policy has an impact when both 
ESC and EPC are proposed. When focusing on EPC only, the actors seem more 
reactive to the changes in the regulatory contexts. Nevertheless, the results of the 
regressions including only active firms should be interpreted cautiously due to the 
small samples (58 observations with ESC and EPC proposed and 27 observations 
with EPC proposed). 
The random effects ordered logit provides a likelihood-ratio test showing a sufficient 
variability between the respondents to favor a random-effects model129, as opposed 
to a standard ordered logit model, which would ignore that several choice tasks 
correspond to the same individual. The ordered logit is also preferred to a logit 
regression as it would mean losing some preferences information by transforming the 
4-points Likert scale into a binary variable. 
The random effects model however assumes uncorrelated effects. I thus relax this 
assumption by using a conditional logit model (cf. appendix 7.4). In order to do so, the 
4 points Likert-scale was transformed in a binary variable (equal to 1 if yes or rather 
yes and 0 if no or rather no). This comes at the cost of losing the individuals for whom 
the only variations occurred between yes and rather yes (resp. no and rather no). 
Also, in such a conditional logit, all firm’s specific characteristics are omitted. In this 
model, only the energy utilities’ supply increase (White Certificates) keeps its 
significant positive impact. But this is likely to be due to the critical decrease in the 
number of observations (147 individuals corresponding to 567 observations dropped 
and 61 individuals, respectively 244 observations, remaining). Another alternative to 
relax the assumption of uncorrelated effects is the blow-up and cluster (BUC) method 
suggested by Baetschmann et al. (2015) (cf. appendix 7.4). It consists in using 
conditional logit model with 3 observations per individual, each time considering 
                                            
129 The likelihood-ratio test  of xtologit vs. ologit model shows a Chi-bar squared of 297.53 when considering only EPC (resp. 
455.19 when considering both ESC and EPC) and a p-value of 0.000. 
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another cut-off130 to determine the binary dependent variable. The sample is clustered 
by individuals. This avoids the important decrease in the number of observations. 
Using this method validates the results presented in the previous section. 
I then checked the ordered logit parallel lines assumption at the 0.05 level of 
significance in the regression model with ESC and EPC. All the variables meet this 
assumption except for the variables contract proposed is shared savings, EPC 
provider and heating systems provider. The results of the generalized ordered logit 
model, in which the constraints for parallel lines are not imposed for these three 
variables, are presented in appendix 7.6. It is compared to the standard ordered logit 
model without random effects, in which the constraints for parallel lines are imposed 
for all parameters. The main empirical conclusions remain unaltered, i.e a positive 
impact associated with a White Certificates scheme and with an increase in both 
public and private demands. Relaxing the assumption of parallel lines for the three 
variables suggests a reticence to offer shared-savings EPC. Indeed, the coefficient is 
significantly positive at the cut-point no (vs. rather no, rather yes and yes) and 
significantly negative at the cut-point yes (vs. no, rather no, rather yes). The 
generalized ordered logit results also suggest that EPC providers are less likely to 
reject a contract with a “no” and appliances providers are less likely to accept a 
contract with a “yes” answer. 
I also checked the robustness of the firms’ characteristics in affecting the choice to 
enter the EPC market. In order to do so, I used the firm’s stated intention to propose 
EPC in the future. This question is asked in part 2 of the survey and the answer is a 4 
point Likert scale. The choices are analyzed using an ordered logit model. Already 
active ESCOs are considered as confirmed entrants. The results are provided in 
appendix 7.7 and are similar to those found with the choice experiment, except for the 
following elements. First, being familiar with the EPC concept becomes insignificant 
once I add the control for the public direction pressure to increase the energy 
efficiency of the clients.131 Second, unlike the baseline results, providing ESC 
                                            
130 3 observations per individual with 3 different dependent variables per individual, one binary dependent variable with the cut-
off between no and rather no, one between rather no and rather yes and one between rather yes and yes.  
131 This is likely to be due to the correlation between these two variables. When there is a public entity exerting pressure, the firm 
is not only more likely to be willing to provide EPC but also more likely to be aware of the existence of this instrument.  
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significantly and positively affects the decision to enter the EPC market, suggesting 
ESC to work as a complement to EPC. I again tested other firm’s characteristics, 
such as the number of employees, the fact of being a private or a public firm and the 
location of the firm’s clients. These factors had no significant impact on the decision. 
While this research is focusing on how energy policies would affect the provision of 
energy service contracting, further research will be needed in order to understand 
how the contractual schemes, such as the degree of risk taken by the supplier, might 
affect the firms’ decisions. Such an analysis could also consider how the project’s 
duration, the costs and the number of actors involved affects the willingness to offer 
these contracts. 
6 Discussion and conclusions 
This study aims at exploring how the supply-side of the ESCO market may evolve, 
and how the regulatory context affects the firm’s business decisions regarding the 
supply of EPC and ESC. The analysis is based on a survey and a choice experiment 
addressed to 208 active and potential suppliers of energy service contracting, 
including energy utilities, gas providers, engineering offices as well as appliances and 
heating systems suppliers.  
The empirical analyses show that a complete liberalization of the electricity market 
does not affect the willingness to provide energy service contracting. A first 
explanation could be a lack of attention from the respondents or heterogeneity across 
respondents. This may also be due to the fact that these contracting schemes are not 
targeted at small energy consumers, who are concerned by such a hypothetical 
liberalization. The replacement of subsidies with taxes on fuels and electricity does 
not affect the willingness to offer energy service contracting either. Again, this may 
come from inattention or heterogeneity. Another explanation could be that the 
respondents may fail to foresee the impact of such a policy. This may also reflect 
inertia from suppliers who fail to adapt their business model to the new regulatory 
context.  
Increased competition on the ESCO market may still be induced by an exogenous 
increase in the supply originating from utilities. In the choice experiment, this 
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hypothetical context is presented as being the consequence of a new regulation 
forcing the energy utilities to increase the energy efficiency of their clients. Such a 
policy can be considered similar to a White Certificates scheme, as implemented in 
several European countries. This affects the willingness to enter the market from both 
utilities and non-utilities, suggesting that the resulting competition would concern the 
major part of the energy market players.  
A demand shock can also affect the supply of energy services. It is nevertheless the 
case only if both private and public demands rise together. This result may suggest 
that an important upfront investment is necessary to enter the market. The latter 
conjecture is confirmed by firms answering in the survey that they are unwilling to 
enter the EPC market primarily because of a lack of both internal competencies and 
personnel capacity. Vocational training on the design, risk assessment, elaboration 
and operation of energy service contracts may be useful. Furthermore, in the current 
Swiss context in which EPC remains a market niche, strategic collaboration between 
the market stakeholders appears to be primordial. 
Certain firms are more reactive to market developments, namely gas suppliers, 
heating systems or energy control and optimization systems providers. On the other 
hand, the project’s size, its location or being a public firm does not significantly affect 
the willingness to provide energy service contracting. However, I show that firms 
controlled by a public entity exerting pressure to increase energy efficiency of the 
clients, increases the likelihood to offer energy service contracting. This provides 
another lead to foster the ESCO market, i.e. increasing awareness among public 
entities in charge of utilities. The motivations of firms are likely to differ substantially 
based on their core business. This point should be examined in further research. 
While a large majority of the existing research focuses on the demand side, the 
supply side of the energy market is rarely considered. The exceptions are studies 
exploring how policies and competition affect prices or technical innovation. Further 
research is therefore needed in order to better understand the provision of energy 
services and business model innovation. The literature on energy service contracting 
could also gain further understanding by focusing on the supply side, and especially 
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on firms that are not yet active in the market. I show for instance that the concept of 
EPC was unknown to 62% of the respondents in this sample of firms. This share is 
higher than that on the demand side (cf. Chapter 2). Changing the focus may not only 
facilitate the implementation of projects involving energy efficiency or renewable 
energy projects. It may also unlock important business opportunities and market 
innovations that will support environmental policies in a new way.  
   
177 
 
7 Appendix 
7.1 Letter of invitation to the survey 
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7.2 Survey structure 
The survey is composed of five main parts: 
 Part 1: General questions on the firm 
 Part 2: Questions regarding the current relation with EPC 
 Part 3: Choice experiment 
 Part 4: Credibility of hypothetical situations 
 Part 5: Contact details and end of the survey 
The survey creation software Sawtooth is used to prepare and host the survey online. 
a) General questions on the firm 
The first part of the survey includes introductory questions aimed at gathering a 
general picture about the firm, its products and services provided. The first part also 
questions the presence of a public institution in the direction or in the stockholders, 
and if so its impact on strategies to improve energy efficiency of its clients. 
Information on the regions of activities as well as the number of employees is also 
collected in this first part. 
b) Firms’ experience of EPC 
In the second part of the survey, the respondents are directed towards different sets 
of questions depending on their background and experience with respect to EPC (see 
illustration in the next Figure). The respondents are split into two categories. 
On the one hand, the respondents who state that their firm is already offering EPC in 
Switzerland are directed towards questions on their experience and activities related 
to EPC. On the other hand, respondents stating no current EPC activities are directed 
towards the definition of the concept and asked whether their firm could envisage 
offering those services in the future. 
Both ESCOs active on the EPC market (i.e. already trying to offer EPC in 
Switzerland) and those who state a potential willingness to enter that market in the 
future are then directed to seven questions intended to capture the business model 
implemented or envisaged. 
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All the firms inactive on the EPC market are asked about services related to energy 
efficiency (other than EPC and ESC) they are already providing to their clients. 
c) Choice experiment 
All respondents are then directed to a choice experiment, which is described in 
section 3.1.2. 
d) Credibility of hypothetical situations 
The survey then assesses the perceived credibility of each hypothetical changes 
proposed in the choice experiment by using a 4 point Likert scale (very plausible to 
not plausible at all). 
e) Contact and end 
Finally, the respondents are asked if they desire to obtain the results of the study, and 
if so are requested to provide contact information. They can provide remarks on the 
survey and are thanked for completed the survey.  
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Notes: green arrows describe active ESCOs with signed contracts, blue are active ESCOs without any contracts signed, red are 
firms unwilling to provide EPC and orange are potential future entrants. 
does not currently propose EPC 
Welcome 
Part 1: General questions on firm: 
Public/private services currently proposed – clients location – number of employees 
 
Part 2.A. Part 2.B. 
Where the idea of offering EPC came 
from? 
Nb employees EPC? 
 
Business model (BM) in 7 questions 
Concrete barriers in the market? 
Role of the government (top 3 priorities)? 
Will modify/modified BM to solve barriers? 
Facilitators needed? 
Part 3: choice experiment 
With follow up questions: 
If yes/rather yes: with which financial, human resources, actions and for which cust. segment? 
If no/rather no: what should be changed (regul. or market context) so that you change your mind? 
Part 4: credibility of hypothetical situations of choice experiment 
Part 5: Contact & End 
Familiar with EPC ? 
Definition of EPC 
Intention to enter EPC 
market ? 
Activities implemented to offer EPC ? 
Year began to offer? 
Nb offers and tenders? 
Offers to which type of clients 
Nb contract signed 
 
Already offers other services 
related to energy efficiency? 
propose EPC 
nb EPC signed >0 nb EPC signed=0 
Signed with which type of 
clients ? 
intention to 
enter EPC 
market 
(yes, 
maybe) 
(Rather) no intention to 
enter EPC market 
Reasons for not entering 
based on market analysis? 
(if yes results of the analysis?) 
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7.3 Controlling for perceived plausibility 
Table 3.9: Controlling for perceived plausibility-potential suppliers choices 
Dependent variable: consider offering contract j 
(4pts Likert scale) 
random effects ordered logit 
 both ESC and EPC proposed only EPC proposed 
Attributes (1) (2) 
Public demand increases (private unchanged) x (rather) 
plausible 
0.167 
(0.297) 
 
( 
0.552 
(0.403) 
Private demand increases (public unchanged) x (rather) 
plausible 
0.006 
(0.318) 
0.101 
(0.391) 
Public x private demands increase x (rather) plausible 0.527* 
(0.279) 
0.649* 
(0.333) 
Supply increase x (rather) plausible 0.678*** 
(0.244) 
1.050*** 
(0.306) 
 
( 
Liberalization x (rather) plausible -0.212 
(0.293) 
0.081 
(0.292) 
Taxation system x (rather) plausible 0.075 
(0.257) 
0.042 
(0.280) 
Contract=shared-savings -0.087 
(0.225) 
0.057 
(0.203) 
Contract=guaranteed-savings -0.080 
(0.252) 
. 
Contract x already offered 2.071* 
(1.100) 
 
. 
Firm’s characteristics  
Familiar with EPC 1.236** 
(0.628) 
1.136* 
(0.642) 
EPC provider -1.793 
(1.737) 
0.541 
(1.390) 
ESC provider 0.854 
(0.897) 
0.778 
(0.935) 
Energy efficiency services provider  
(other than EPC) 
1.086* 
(0.626) 
1.140* 
(0.637) 
Electricity provider 0.395 
(0.677) 
-0.029 
(0.674) 
Gas provider 1.539** 
(0.764) 
1.453* 
(0.757) 
Heating systems provider 1.984* 
(1.016) 
2.009* 
(1.048) 
Appliances provider -1.020 
(1.173) 
-0.684 
(1.276) 
Energy control optimization provider  1.256 
(0.860) 
2.184** 
(0.854) 
Facility management provider 1.096 
(1.129) 
0.911 
(1.135) 
Technical maintenance provider 0.022 
(0.878) 
-0.040 
(0.889) 
Engineering consulting -0.362 
(0.753) 
 
-0.635 
(0.782) 
Cut-off point 1 0.978 0.629 
Cut.off point 2 4.710 4.759 
Cut-off point 3 8.137 8.701 
Observations 811 606 
Individuals 208 205 
Log pseudolikelihood -712.714 -539.290 
AIC 
 
1,475.429 1,124.581 
BIC 1,592.886 1,225.939 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Baseline contract is ESC in column (1) and EPC guaranteed-savings 
in column (2). Both estimations are performed with 36 integration points. All contextual attributes are interacted with a dummy equating one if the 
attribute is considered as plausible or rather plausible by the respondent.  
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7.4 Conditional logit (chap. IV) 
Table 3.10: Conditional logit-Blow-Up and Cluster estimator 
Dependent variable: consider 
offering contract j 
(binary variable) 
Conditional logit 
(binary variable 0=no or rather 
no, 1=yes or rather yes) 
Conditional logit  
Blow-Up and Cluster (BUC) estimator 
(binary variable with changing cut-off) 
 both ESC and 
EPC proposed 
only EPC 
proposed 
both ESC and EPC 
proposed 
only EPC proposed 
Attributes (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Public demand increases (private 
unchanged) 
-0.508 
(0.464) 
-0.616 
(0.644) 
-0.166 
(0.363) 
0.108 
(0.519) 
Private demand increases (public 
unchanged) 
0.119 
(0.499) 
0.510 
(0.584) 
0.259 
(0.388) 
0.205 
(0.482) 
Public x private demands increase 0.292 
(0.394) 
0.392 
(0.432) 
0.634** 
(0.293) 
0.722** 
(0.347) 
Supply increase 0.658** 
(0.270) 
0.785** 
(0.391) 
0.583** 
(0.227) 
0.690** 
(0.301) 
Liberalization -0.376 
(0.352) 
-0.316 
(0.432) 
-0.124 
(0.287) 
-0.300 
(0.350) 
Taxation system 0.100 
(0.270) 
0.022 
(0.335) 
-0.143 
(0.229) 
-0.139 
(0.282) 
Contract=shared-savings -0.423 
(0.419) 
0.399 
(0.397) 
-0.336 
(0.335) 
0.008 
(0.282) 
Contract=guaranteed-savings -0.713 
(0.525) 
. -0.296 
(0.391) 
. 
Contract x already offered 0.556 
(0.767) 
 
. 1.531** 
(0.730) 
. 
     
Observations 244 138 513 282 
Individuals 61 46 89 73 
log pseudo-likelihood -90.240 -50.536 -174.629 -93.628 
AIC 
 
184.226 104.493 367.257 201.257 
BIC 215.700 124.984 405.420 226.750 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Baseline contract is ESC in column (1) and EPC 
guar-savings in column (2). Blow-Up and Cluster estimator as suggested by Baetschmann et al. (2015). 
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7.5 Separated regressions for active and non-active 
Table 3.11: separated regressions for active and non-active suppliers 
Dependent variable 
(4pts Likert scale) Random effects ordered logit 
 ESC and EPC proposed 
 
 
Only EPC proposed 
 
Attributes (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: offer contract j For the first time 
more often 
than currently  
For the first time 
more often than 
currently  
Public demand increases (private unchanged) 
-0.134 
(0.286) 
0.431 
(1.096) 
-0.138 
(0.360) 
6.894*** 
(1.773) 
Private demand increases (public unchanged) 
-0.168 
(0.280) 
0.679 
(1.076) 
-0.175 
(0.389) 
-0.318 
(3.088) 
Public x private demands increase 
0.407* 
(0.236) 
-0.135 
(1.052) 
0.480* 
(0.265) 
1.164 
(1.788) 
Supply increase from utilities (White 
certificates) 
0.506*** 
(0.173) 
0.340 
(0.569) 
0.601** 
(0.234) 
-1.560** 
(0.662) 
Liberalization 
-0.244 
(0.216) 
-0.244 
(0.747) 
-0.101 
(0.281) 
-5.249*** 
(1.443) 
Taxation system 
-0.109 
(0.197) 
-0.266 
(0.595) 
-0.016 
(0.230) 
2.187* 
(1.117) 
Contract proposed 
=shared-savings 
-0.220 
(0.267) 
-0.439 
(0.789) 
 
0.128 
(0.222) 
-2.139 
(1.751) 
Contract proposed 
=guaranteed-savings 
-0.262 
(0.308) 
0.287 
(0.805) 
 
  
Firm’s characteristics about current activities 
Familiar with EPC 
1.212* 
(0.686) 
1.660 
(1.701) 
 
1.254* 
(0.700) 
 
EPC provider 
-35.925*** 
(2.625) 
-1.280 
(1.832) 
 
  
ESC provider 
0.251 
(1.072) 
0.707 
(3.012) 
 
0.380 
(1.100) 
11.359*** 
(4.255) 
Electricity provider 
0.888 
(0.801) 
0.487 
(1.326) 
 
0.426 
(0.797) 
-7.749*** 
(2.948) 
Gas provider 
2.231** 
(0.890) 
-2.081 
(1.603) 
 
1.897** 
(0.884) 
 
Heating systems provider 
2.818** 
(1.280) 
1.365 
(1.702) 
2.634** 
(1.321) 
 
Appliances provider 
-0.441 
(1.429) 
-2.883** 
(1.159) 
-0.184 
(1.460) 
-6.627** 
(3.061) 
Energy control optimization provider  
1.111 
(0.941) 
-0.497 
(2.103) 
1.813** 
(0.910) 
4.626** 
(2.126) 
Facility management provider 
1.121 
(1.360) 
-1.110 
(2.494) 
1.054 
(1.366) 
-9.368** 
(3.788) 
Technical maintenance provider 
0.052 
(0.985) 
1.504 
(1.393) 
0.112 
(1.000) 
 
Engineering consulting 
-0.309 
(0.890) 
-0.952 
(1.702) 
-0.601 
(0.921) 
1.500 
(2.862) 
Other energy efficiency services provider 
1.428* 
(0.738) 
-0.082 
(1.775) 
1.488** 
(0.744) 
7.196** 
(3.062) 
Cut-off point 1 1.303 -2.994 1.148 4.494** 
Cut-off point 2 5.430*** -1.249 5.601*** 6.827** 
Cut-off point 3 9.368*** 1.215 9.868*** 11.199*** 
Observations 753 58 579 27 
Individuals 199 32 196 9 
Log pseudo likelihood -625.883 -63.743 -501.834 -18.245 
Notes: 4-points Likert scale of the dependent variable are: 0 “no”, 1 “rather no”, 2 “rather yes”, 3 “yes”. Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Baseline contract is ESC in column (1) and EPC guaranteed-savings in column (2). All estimations are performed with 
36 integration points. Variables omitted because of colinearity in the last column.  
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7.6 Generalized ordered logit model 
Table 3.12: Ordered logit vs. generalized ordered logit model 
Dependent variable: consider offering contract j  
(4pts Likert scale)   
ESC and EPC proposed 
Standard ordered logit  
(parallel lines imposed) 
 
 
Generalized ordered logit 
(parallel lines not imposed for the variables not 
satisfying the assumption) 
 
 (1) (2) 
  No Rather no Rather yes 
Public demand increases (private 
unchanged) 
0.019 
(0.158) 
0.035 
(0.157) 
0.035 
(0.157) 
0.035 
(0.157) 
Private demand increases (public 
unchanged) 
-0.010 
(0.162) 
0.006 
(0.168) 
0.006 
(0.168) 
0.006 
(0.168) 
Public x private demands increase 
0.217** 
(0.104) 
0.238** 
(0.107) 
0.238** 
(0.107) 
0.238** 
(0.107) 
Supply increase from utilities (White 
certificates) 
0.217*** 
(0.076) 
0.227*** 
(0.078) 
0.227*** 
(0.078) 
0.227*** 
(0.078) 
Liberalization 
-0.096 
(0.135) 
-0.076 
(0.138) 
-0.076 
(0.138) 
-0.076 
(0.138) 
Taxation system 
-0.045 
(0.093) 
-0.052 
(0.094) 
-0.052 
(0.094) 
-0.052 
(0.094) 
Contract proposed 
=shared-savings 
0.113 
(0.123) 
0.310** 
(0.140) 
-0.010 
(0.141) 
-0.609** 
(0.269) 
Contract proposed 
=guaranteed-savings 
-0.082 
(0.146) 
-0.073 
(0.143) 
-0.073 
(0.143) 
-0.073 
(0.143) 
Contract proposed x contract already 
offered 
1.558*** 
(0.597) 
1.343** 
(0.600) 
1.343** 
(0.600) 
1.343** 
(0.600) 
Firm’s characteristics about current activities  
Familiar with EPC 
0.482* 
(0.252) 
0.484* 
(0.254) 
0.484* 
(0.254) 
0.484* 
(0.254) 
EPC provider 
-1.103 
(0.923) 
-1.774* 
(1.021) 
-0.597 
(0.978) 
-1.007 
(0.776) 
ESC provider 
0.187 
(0.414) 
0.206 
(0.432) 
0.206 
(0.432) 
0.206 
(0.432) 
Electricity provider 
0.123 
(0.289) 
0.131 
(0.290) 
0.131 
(0.290) 
0.131 
(0.290) 
Gas provider 
0.675* 
(0.347) 
0.670* 
(0.347) 
0.670* 
(0.347) 
0.670* 
(0.347) 
Heating systems provider 
0.957* 
(0.508) 
0.972* 
(0.521) 
0.972* 
(0.521) 
0.972* 
(0.521) 
Appliances provider 
-0.535 
(0.557) 
0.251 
(0.943) 
-0.743 
(0.681) 
-13.867*** 
(0.524) 
Energy control optimization provider  
0.695 
(0.425) 
0.752* 
(0.447) 
0.752* 
(0.447) 
0.752* 
(0.447) 
Facility management provider 
0.551 
(0.500) 
0.538 
(0.944) 
0.538 
(0.944) 
0.538 
(0.944) 
Technical maintenance provider 
-0.047 
(0.423) 
-0.113 
(0.439) 
-0.113 
(0.439) 
-0.113 
(0.439) 
Engineering consulting 
-0.128 
(0.326) 
-0.109 
(0.322) 
-0.109 
(0.322) 
-0.109 
(0.322) 
Other energy efficiency services 
provider 
0.454* 
(0.266) 
0.473* 
(0.265) 
0.473* 
(0.265) 
0.473* 
(0.265) 
Observations 811 811 
Individuals 208 208 
Log pseudo likelihood -940.892 -927.723 
   
Notes: 4-points Likert scale of the dependent variable are: 0 “no”, 1 “rather no”, 2 “rather yes”, 3 “yes”. Individual clustered standard errors in 
parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Parallel lines assumption using the 0.05 level of significance is satisfied for all variables except those in 
bold. Baseline contract is ESC. contract x already offered means the firm is already proposing this type of contract. The question was in this case: 
“Would you consider offering this contract more often than currently given this hypothetical situation?”  
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7.7 Ordered logit with willingness to enter the EPC market  
Table 3.13: Potential supplier’s choice to enter the EPC market 
Dependent variable: entering the EPC market 
(4pts Likert scale) 
ordered logit 
Firm’s characteristics (1) (2) 
Familiar with EPC 0.506* 
(0.270) 
0.468 
(0.297) 
 ESC provider 0.799 
(0.500) 
0.836 
(0.538) 
Energy efficiency services provider 
(other than EPC) 
0.409 
(0.317) 
0.283 
(0.326) 
Electricity provider -0.151 
(0.369) 
-0.200 
(0.389) 
Gas provider 0.750** 
(0.366) 
0.688* 
(0.363) 
Heating systems provider 1.386*** 
(0.590) 
1.613*** 
(0.618) 
Appliances provider -0.070 
(0.483) 
-0.080 
(0.542) 
Energy control optimization provider  1.327*** 
(0.481) 
1.378*** 
(0.502) 
Facility management provider 0.101 
(0.804) 
-0.030 
(0.930) 
Technical maintenance provider 0.042 
(0.391) 
-0.040 
(0.418) 
Engineering consulting -0.079 
(0.378) 
-0.179 
(0.402) 
Public direction pressure to increase clients’ energy 
efficiency 
 0.892** 
(0.359) 
Cut-off point 1 0.148 (0.419) 0.185 (0.437) 
Cut-off point 2 1.600 (0.438) 1.635 (0.458) 
Cut-off point 3 3.604 (0.517) 3.666 (0.561) 
Observations (=individuals) 234 220 
Log pseudo-likelihood -261.319 -242.140 
AIC 
 
552.638 516.281 
BIC 604.468 570.579 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. ***P<0.01, **P>0.05, *P<0.1. Dependent variable: Does your firm intend, in the 
future, to propose energy performance contracting to its clients? 0 (no) 1 (rather no) 2 (maybe) 3 (yes). Replaced by 3 if already 
active in the EPC market. 
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Conclusion and further research 
The literature on energy contracting is wide and has benefitted from the contribution 
of experts coming from many fields. Existing research provides insights into the 
evolution of the ESCO markets around the world and the potential driving forces and 
barriers to the deployment of a sustainable contracting market. 
By exploring the determinants of adoption of energy service contracting, the 
academic contribution of my PhD thesis consists in analyzing how the economics of 
outsourcing decision applies in the context of energy. The results show that the risk-
sharing mechanism dominates, while the financing advantage of energy service 
contracting is positively valued only by a minority of potential clients. The results on 
the importance of the risk sharing mechanism not only show the potentials of energy 
service contracting, it also suggests that risk may be an important determinant in the 
customer’s choice to invest in renewable energy or energy efficiency. This study also 
provides insights into the complexity and heterogeneity underlying the decision to 
invest in energy efficiency. Finally, by focusing on the supply side, it also contributes 
to the analyses of the market and business model innovation in the energy sector. 
Yet, my research also shows that further research is needed in this domain. My thesis 
focuses on the economic perspective in a narrow sense by considering transaction 
costs economics, risk sharing and economies of scale. Further research in the 
domain should enlarge the scope to account for the organizational behavior involved 
in the decision to adopt energy service contracting, especially in the case of 
institutions or firms (see for instance Cooremans, 2012). This would also permit to 
explore the role of behaviors that differ from the neoclassical economic theory or from 
financial considerations and how they could be exploited. Future studies should better 
account for the investments categories, such as the level of risk, the number of actors 
involved, the incentives or the scope of the investment with respect to the core 
business. These should be analyzed by considering specific types of firms and 
institutions. The decision mechanisms should not only be explored from a profitability 
point of view but also in terms of the firm’s strategy, i.e. related to the potential of 
increasing the competitiveness of the core business. 
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A second important area of research related to energy service contracting follows 
from the results of my study. If risk sharing is indeed an important determinant of 
adoption of energy service contracting, one should further study the implications in 
terms of moral hazard and adverse selection. The ESCO market may indeed be 
considered as an insurance market subject to similar problems of market inefficiency. 
If this problem is indeed prevalent, then policy intervention could be warranted in 
order to foster renewable and energy efficiency investments, for instance by 
increasing the standards or opting for stringent regulations. 
The impact of the technologies may also be further explored since they are likely to 
involve different technological and financial risks, different levels of profitability and 
different kind of non-financial benefits. 
Other questions are left unanswered and could be explored in further research. For 
instance, can energy service contracting induce investment in energy efficiency or 
renewable energy, and if so, through which mechanisms? Are there other business 
models that could reduce the risk of energy efficiency investments and reach other 
market segments, such as small energy customers or SMEs? How will these 
business models adapt to technology innovation in order to foster energy efficiency? 
What will be the impact of the energy market transition on energy service contracting 
and market innovation? 
While these questions are left for further research, my PhD thesis will hopefully 
convince the reader of the great interest of new business models such as contracting 
in energy markets. These markets are impacted by an enormous transition, with 
drastic changes in the regulatory frameworks at the cantonal, federal and 
international levels (DETEC, 2017; OFEV, 2017). Boosted by relevant business 
innovations, new technologies could revolutionize the supply chain at every level. In 
such a context, it is of primary interest for researchers to study how the incumbents, 
the new market players and the customers will respond to these developments.  
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